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Chapter 1
Introduction
Real options theory has revolutionized the neoclassical way of viewing and evaluating
investment projects. Pioneers of this approach—such as Bernanke (1983), Brennan and
Schwartz (1985) and McDonald and Siegel (1986)—recognized the analogy between …-
nancial call options and investment projects and discovered the option value of waiting
or value of ‡exibility that had been ignored by the orthodox theory of investment. Also,
the impact of game theory and the theory of industrial organizations on the economists’
understanding of investment decisions has probably not been less. The …rst explicit anal-
yses of the strategic dimension of investment decisions and their e¤ects on market power
are due to Spence (1977) and Dixit (1980). However, the implicit knowledge about it per-
haps dates back to von Stackelberg (1934). The main contribution of the latter theories
is what we would like to call the strategic value of investment1.
In the thesis at hand it is one of our main concerns to work out the e¤ects of both
values on the …rms’ timing of investment and closure in duopoly. For each model of
capacity adjustment we …rst present the adjustment policy proposed by the standard real
options theory. These solutions do not capture the strategic interaction between …rms but
they do account for the option value of waiting. Its impact on the …rms’ investment and
closure decisions can easily be characterized by contrasting the corresponding adjustment
1While the intuition that is associated with the option value of waiting does not depend on whether
positive investment or negative investment, i.e. disinvestment, is investigated, this does not apply to
the strategic value of investment. Spencer and Brander (1992, p.1601) introduce the notion of the
strategic value of pre-commitment which only refers to positive investment. Of course, closure and exit
opportunities also have an inherent strategic value, but this value does not emerge from pre-commitment.
For this reason we use the more general but ambiguous notion of strategic value of investment where
investment should be understood in a wider sense.
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policy with the timing rules of the neoclassical investment theory. Finally, by combining
game-theoretic and real options methods we derive the strategically optimal capacity
adjustment rules. It should be clear that a comparison of outcomes allows to determine
the autonomous e¤ect of the strategic value of investment on the behavior of …rms.
1.1 The Real Options Approach
Over the last two decades the real options approach has evolved into a powerful tool
for evaluating various kinds of business projects by highlighting three basic features of
investment decisions. First, most investment projects are at least partially irreversible.
Once a …rm has invested in new capital equipment, the installation cost are completely
sunk. Also the purchase cost cannot be fully retrieved even if the equipment is not
…rm-speci…c but industry-speci…c. The reason is that the equipment’s value is almost
equally low for all …rms in a market that is exposed to an economic downturn. Second,
the future ‡ow of revenues that arises after investment is highly uncertain. Especially in
multi-stage projects this might also apply to the sunk investment expenditure. Third,
…rms are assumed to have some leeway to choose the timing of investment. These three
properties give rise to the analogy between a call option and an investment decision and
generate the option value of waiting. Let us develop the basic intuition by resorting to a
simple example of closure timing.
Example 1 Suppose a utility has the opportunity or the right to shut down a 150 MW
peak load plant that currently makes losses. The retirement cost equals DM 10 million.
The utility cannot reinvest or recover its expenditure. Thus, its closure decision is com-
pletely irreversible. Uncertainty about future revenues is captured in the simplest possible
manner. The ‡ow of net revenues is exposed to a single shock in the next period that
either permanently rises the periodwise net revenue ¼t by DM one million or decreases it
by the same amount. Each state occurs with probability 1=2. The stream of net revenues
7
is graphically depicted by
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 :::
%1=2 ¼1 = 0:0 ¡! ¼2 = 0:0 ¡! :::
¼0 = ¡1:0
&1=2 ¼1 = ¡2:0 ¡! ¼2 = ¡2:0 ¡! :::
Assuming that plant closure is instantaneous and that the utility discounts future revenues
at a rate of 10 per cent, the net present value (NPV) generated by the strategy ’shut down
immediately (at t = 0)’ is DM ¡10 million which is greater than the expected NPV from
maintaining production eternally,
¡1 +
1X
t=1
1
2
¢ 0 + 1
2
¢ (¡2)
1:1t
= ¡
1X
t=0
1
1:1t
= ¡11.
Thus, the orthodox investment theory suggests ’immediate closure’ to be the optimal in-
vestment policy. This rule ignores the value of owning the right to postpone capacity
reduction and, thereby, keeping open the possibility of not closing the plant should rev-
enues rise. Under uncertainty of revenues and with irreversibility of the disinvestment
decision, this value of having some leeway to time the plant closure is exactly what has
been called the option value of waiting. The question arises how the option value of wait-
ing a¤ects the optimal closure strategy. Suppose the utility plays the strategy ’wait and
shut down if price goes down; continue production otherwise’ instead of adhering to the
orthodox rule. Then its NPV is given by
¡1 + 1
2
¢ ¡10
1:1
+
1
2
¢
1X
t=0
0
1:1t
' ¡5:05 > ¡10:
Thus, waiting, resolving the ongoing uncertainty and conditioning the disinvestment de-
cision on new information strictly dominates the orthodox NPV rule.
Though the example is rather rudimentary, it is su¢ciently detailed to convey the
crucial ideas underlying the theory of real options. It also reveals the analogy of the
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closure option to an American put option in …nance. Note that the holder of the disin-
vestment option owns the right to ”sell” the underlying asset—the plant—at an arbitrary
exercise date. The option’s strike price equals the retirement cost. In our example the
option is ”deep in the money”.
In recent years the number of theoretical and empirical contributions to the real op-
tions literature has grown rapidly. Meanwhile, the approach exhibits a su¢cient amount
of ‡exibility to cover a wide variety of business problems. However, most researchers in
this …eld restricted their attention to either single-…rm settings with an exogenous price
process or perfect competition2 or monopolistic scenarios3 (called standard real options
theory models henceforth). Also, recent research e¤orts are mainly dedicated to the re-
…nement of fully stochastic and, therefore, exogenous pricing models.4 Papers dealing
with the evaluation of real options in oligopoly are still relatively rare.
1.2 Introducing Strategic Interaction
A unique de…nition of the strategic value of investment can hardly be given, since it takes
di¤erent forms with each speci…c economic context. For example, consider the well-known
”Stackelberg leadership game”. One exogenously determined …rm has the opportunity to
pre-commit to a certain capacity and, thereby, output level. Or it might wait and enter
a simultaneous capacity game with its rival. Suppose we observe that the Stackelberg
leader chooses the pre-commitment strategy in equilibrium. In this case the timing of
investment is strategically relevant and the strategic value of investment must be strictly
positive. Another example is a game of entry deterrence (see Spence, 1977, and Dixit,
1980) with an incumbent that has the opportunity to invest excessively in idle capacity
to prevent potential rivals from entering the market. If the threat of using the excess
2As is shown by Leahy (1993), the investment timing in models of single price-taking …rms is identical
to that in fully competitive scenarios. The intuition behind this result is that perfect competition reduces
not only the option value of waiting to zero, but at the same time the value of installed capital. This
two e¤ects exactly o¤set each other.
3For example, see McDonald and Siegel (1986) and Pindyck (1988) for investment options available to
a single …rm. Dixit (1989, 1991) analyzes chains of product market entry and exit options in, respectively,
monopolistic and perfectly competitive settings.
4For a collection of recent contributions to the …eld of real options theory, see Brennan and Trigeorgis
(1999).
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capacity once the rival has entered is credible5, then the strategic aspect of investment
timing matters again. Finally, consider a game of investment timing with symmetric
…rms, i.e. both …rms have the opportunity to choose their timing of capacity expansion.
They may have the incentive to preempt their rival to attract additional market shares.
In this preemption game, if …rms do not invest jointly, then the (Stackelberg) leader
arises endogenously and, once more, the strategic value of investment is strictly positive.
General versions of this game have been proposed, for example, by Fudenberg and Tirole
(1985) and, more recently, by Huisman and Kort (1999). The latter contribution is
discussed in chapter 3.
As the examples reveal, there often exists a trade-o¤ between the strategically ”opti-
mal” timing of investment and the timing that is proposed by the standard real options
theory. The latter approach always suggests to delay investment for better information,
while the strategic view of investment seems to involve an increased speed of investment.
Among others, Spencer and Brander (1992), Sadanand and Sadanand (1996) and Dewit
and Leahy (2001) investigate what determines the size of the trade-o¤ in various game
settings with endogenous investment timing. Vives (1989), however, makes the impor-
tant general point that the trade-o¤ does not always emerge in investment timing games.
This also applies to the model by Huisman and Kort (1999). Depending on the size of the
underlying parameters a delayed joint-investment scenario rather than a preemption-type
equilibrium might prevail. In the (Pareto-optimal) joint-investment equilibrium strategic
interaction does not increase but slow down the speed of investment. As is shown in
chapter 3, this e¤ect can be detected by comparing the equilibrium investment pattern
of the competitors with the hypothetic behavior of a …rm that fully takes the option-like
nature of its investment decision into account. But it completely ignores strategic inter-
action with its rivals and its own impact on (inverse) demand. Thus, this …rm is a price
taker.
In games of closure timing that generally belong to the class of wars of attrition6 one
might expect that the option value of waiting and the strategic value of (dis)investment
do not o¤set each other but accumulate. In analogy to the above example of investment
5Bulow et al. (1985) show that the credibility of the threat to use excess capacity hinges on the shape
of the demand curve and on whether Bertrand or Cournot competition is anticipated.
6Maynard Smith (1974) proposed this type of game to investigate certain patterns of behavior in
animal con‡icts.
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timing, consider two symmetric …rms, each of which holds a single option to reduce
capacity. Then …rms may have the incentive to postpone disinvestment to prevent the
rival from attracting additional market shares. Thus, intuition suggests that strategic
interaction and the option-like nature of the disinvestment project both tend to delay the
timing of closure. In chapter 2 we propose a closure timing game that is an elaborate
version of this example. Equivalently to the model by Huisman and Kort (1999), it
depends on the initial assumptions whether the basic intuition applies or not.
1.3 Strategic Real Options in Electricity Markets
The real options approach has extensively been used in the electric utility industry. Ap-
plications range from plant investment and retirement scenarios (e.g., EPRI, 1996) and
the problem of determining optimal plant operating policies (e.g., Gardner and Zhuang,
2000) to environmental investment projects such as the installment of ”srubbers”7 (Her-
belot, 1992) and models of transmission network investments (Martzoukos and Teplitz-
Sembitzky, 1992).
Experts (e.g., Pilipovi´c, 1998, p.2) agree that spot markets for electric power are
highly illiquid as compared, for example, to …nancial markets, and that agents—especially
on the supply side—have signi…cant market power.8 Nevertheless, research e¤orts in the
…eld of real asset valuation are mainly dedicated to fully stochastic and, therefore, exoge-
nous price models.9 The more sophisticated the assumptions about the stochastic nature
of the underlying price process, the more likely it is that one has to resort to numerical
solutions of the option pricing model. This naturally results in a loss of intuition for the
market-speci…c mechanisms. The research trend prevails, though the limited experience
with market pricing in generation markets has con…rmed the importance of horizontal
7Srubbers are devices that remove the SO2 emissions of power generation units.
8Schuppe and Nolden (1999) provide a detailed but partially out-dated analysis of market power in
the European electric power and gas markets. They …nd that in January 1997 the Her…ndahl index
shows high concentration in the electric utility industry in Austria, Denmark, England and Wales,
France, Finland, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden. Only in Germany and Norway the results point
to moderate concentration. The remaining countries are not investigated. However, due to a number of
mergers the market structure in Germany has dramatically changed since 1997. Certainly, the market
power of utilities has signi…cantly increased.
9For a collection of recent papers on valuation methods for power generating assets, see Risk Books
(publisher, 1999).
11
market power. For example, by applying the theory of supply function equilibria devel-
oped by Klemperer and Meyer (1989) to the U.K. Pool10, Green (1994) and Green and
Newbery (1992) …nd a substantial markup on marginal cost at peak times.11 With the
Californian electricity spot markets in view, Hogan (1997) makes the point that capac-
ity constraints in electricity transmission networks give rise to strategic interaction and
opens up the possibility to exercise horizontal market power.12 All these contributions,
however, are essentially static—they focus on modelling oligopoly pricing in the short
run. Capacity is assumed to be …xed and investment is not an issue.
Papers dealing with the strategic dimension of investment in the electric utility in-
dustry are extremely rare. The only analyses that are known to us are Wei and Smeers
(1996a, 1996b) and Smeers and Wei (1997). The authors use two-stage models à la Kreps
and Scheinkmann (1983). On the …rst stage …rms play a game of capacity expansion,
while on the second stage they enter in capacity constrained competition in the output
market. Though Bertrand competition is assumed to take place on the second stage,
Kreps and Scheinkmann obtain an overall Cournot outcome. David and Denecker (1986)
…nd that this result is not universally valid. For di¤erent demand rationing rules the
overall Cournot scenario does not occur. Smeers and Wei point out that the physical
nature of electricity (it cannot be stored), the time structure of demand (peak and base
times) and the institutional arrangements in electricity markets (pool mechanism) give
rise to a type of demand rationing that does not support Kreps and Scheinkmann’s result.
Their simulation studies suggest that …rms can exert market power only if the Cournot
competition paradigm on the second stage is assumed.
There are several drawbacks associated with the two-stage models applied by Smeers
and Wei. First, in the capacity game on the …rst stage the Stackelberg leader is ex-
ogenously determined. In a general context Bergman (1998) shows that endogenizing
the timing of capacity expansion leads to a variety of possible outcomes, however, not
including the extreme overall Cournot scenario. Second, Smeers and Wei establish their
10In the U.K. Pool generation is dominated by the duopoly of National Power and PowerGen.
11More precisly, they detect a symmetric equilibrium with supply functions that are less steep than
in the Cournot model but steeper than in the Bertrand model. In Bunn (eds., 1999) the assumptions
required to derive a supply function equilibrium are criticized to be too restrictive. Instead a market
simulation study of the U.K. Pool is presented that, however, leads to similar results.
12There exists a very recent paper by Mason and Weeds (2001) that models strategic network e¤ects
in a real options model. However, it is not related to electricity transmission grids.
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results for a radial network and, thereby, ignore the market power that is induced by
realistic models of transmission networks (Hogan, 1997). Finally, stochastic ‡uctuations
in demand and the related option value of waiting are not taken into account.
We think that this overview points to a lack of theoretical and empirical evidence
concerning the strategic value of investment in the electric utility industry and its impact
on the evolution of market prices and quantities. Moreover, several discussions with
energy managers and traders13 lead us to the conclusion that there is not only a lack
of explicit knowledge. In practice agents have not even become aware on an intuitive
level that the right to choose the timing and the volume of investment opens up the
possibility to exercise market power and to in‡uence market pricing. In chapter 4 an
empirical model of investment in the German power generation industry is developed. It
is based on the assumption that during the sample period from 1977 to 1993 utilities took
prices as being exogenously determined when evaluating investment and closure projects.
The fact that practical knowledge about the strategic scope of investment and closure
decisions is still missing justi…es this assumption.
Our main motive for investigating ”strategic real options” in the thesis at hand has
been to shed light on some aspects of the interaction between the strategic dimension
of timing capacity expansion and reduction and the option-like nature of these projects.
With respect to the electric utility industry, we have particularly been inspired by the
following ”real world” closure scenario: In the German electricity sector the regional
monopolies were disbanded in the course of its deregulation and liberalization in 1998.14
Responding to the increased competition, each of the two major utilities, RWE and
Eon, which are approximately of equal size and together account for about 61.77 per
cent of the industry’s total capacity, announced the closure of about 5000 MW of excess
capacity in October 2000.15 Moreover, the largest competitors, Veag, EnBW and Bewag,
publicly denied similar closure intentions. Table 1.1 summarizes the major utilities’
market shares measured in terms of power generation capacity. Note that the category
13I am grateful to Michael Römmich, Hoss Hauksson and Christophe Chassard from RWE Trading
for spending a lot of their scarce time on answering my questions.
14Since the adoption of a European Parliament and European Council directive on the liberalization
of the EU electricity markets in 1996, the process of deregulation of the electricity sector was completed
in UK, Sweden, Finland and Germany. Many other EU countries will reach this aim soon.
15The underlying data stems from the ”Handelsblatt”, 2000/10/11, and from ”Stromzahlen 2001”
published by the Association of the Electricity Industry (VDEW).
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Table 1.1: Capacity and Market Share of German Utilities
RWE Eon Veag EnBW Steag HEW Bewag Other Utilities
I.C. 24412 24553 9838 8420 3795 3758 2702 23702
A.C. 32500 30000 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
M.S., I.C. 24.13 24.27 9.72 8.32 3.75 3.71 2.67 23.43
M.S., A.C. 32.12 29.65 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Sources: Utilities, "Handelsblatt" (2000/10/11), VDEW (2001).
I.C. = installed capacity (in MW), A.C. = available capacity (in MW),
M.S. = market share (in per cent), n.a. = not available.
”installed capacity” does not include those power generation units that utilities have
under control either by holding shares or by holding long-term power delivery contracts.
Three facts strongly support the view that the above closure timing problem should
be dealt with in a duopoly model. First, RWE and Eon account for more than 3=5
of the industry’s total capacity. Second, the largest competitors do not plan capacity
reductions. Finally, the structure of the ”residual supply side” is nearly atomistic. As
we already mentioned, in chapter 2 we propose a general theoretical model of closure
timing in duopoly of which the closure scenario ”RWE versus Eon” would represent an
almost ideal application. In chapter16 4 we come back to this example and investigate
whether the strategic value of investment is empirically signi…cant and should be taken
into account by the rivals.
1.4 Related Literature
Among the small group of researchers who succeeded in building real options pricing
models for duopolistic settings, the pioneering work of Smets (1991) should be mentioned.
The paper examines the timing of irreversible entry in a product market that is subject
to aggregate demand uncertainty. Smets derives the optimal entry triggers by …xing
exogenously which …rm invests …rst and becomes the Stackelberg leader. Huisman and
Kort (1999) consider investment decisions of previously active …rms. In contrast to
Smets, they allow the leader’s role to be assigned endogenously. Weeds (2000) analyzes
investment in R&D activity. Though this requires a slightly di¤erent model set-up,
the classes of equilibria induced by her model are directly comparable to those derived
16The content of this chapter is also included in a recent working paper by Sparla (2001c).
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from models of market entry and capacity choice. Finally, Grenadier (1996) applies an
investment options model to the real-estate market. He provides an explanation for the
empirical puzzle of building booms in the face of declining property values. Moreover,
Grenadier points out that the problem of …nding optimal exercise policies of certain
…nancial assets such as warrants and convertible securities involve equivalent strategic
aspects as the corresponding problem in the case of real assets.
In the industrial-organizations literature there exist numerous papers on the optimal
timing of entry or investment in duopoly. Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) might be the
most prominent example. The timing games with a link to real options theory that has
been listed above are basically closely related versions of Fudenberg and Tirole’s model.
The two-stage game by Kreps and Scheinkmann (1983) that we already discussed in the
previous section establishes another approach to assess the strategic value of investment.
Bergman (1998) combines the models by Fudenberg and Tirole on the one hand and
Kreps and Scheinkmann on the other hand. All these contributions, however, completely
neglect the option value of waiting.
While strategic entry and investment decisions have been studied in a real options
framework, strategic closure and exit options has not. The closure timing game intro-
duced in chapter17 2 should partially …ll this gap. Analogously to the contributions on
investment options, our model allows the market price (or, equivalently, inverse demand)
to be driven by Cournot competition of …rms on the one hand and by aggregate uncer-
tainty of a form that is widely used in option pricing theory on the other hand. However,
there is a distinguishing feature that limits the analogy. We already mentioned that
closure timing games generally belong to the class of wars of attrition, while investment
timing games are preemption games. Hendricks et al. (1988, p.663) characterize the war
of attrition as a game in which ”each of the two players must choose a time at which he
plans to concede in the event that the other player has not already conceded. The return
to conceding decreases with time, but, at any time, a player earns a higher return if the
other concedes …rst.”18
The existing papers on investment options in duopoly have two features in common.
17This chapter summarizes the results of two working papers on closure options. See Sparla (2001a,
2001b).
18We will see in chapter 2 that this de…nition is slightly too restrictive in our case. In particular the
return to conceding of the …rst mover does not uniformly decrease with time.
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First, as mentioned above, the underlying timing games have to be characterized as pre-
emption games. The de…ning property of this class of timing games is that there exist
times where moving …rst yields a higher expected payo¤ than moving second (Fudenberg
and Tirole, 1991, section 4.5.3). Second, the speci…c pattern of strategic interaction aris-
ing in these models is driven by the widely used key assumption of …rst-mover advantages,
that is, investing …rst yields a higher increase in the ‡ow of net revenues at the time of
investment than investing second. The notions might suggest that preemption games
require …rst-mover advantages, but this conjecture turns out to be wrong. Becoming the
leader can still result in a higher payo¤ than waiting until the opponent has invested if
…rms are involved in an investment timing game with second-mover advantages19. How-
ever, this complementary assumption (second-mover advantages) that induces a di¤erent
kind of strategic interaction has not been analyzed so far.20
In the special case of an isoelastic inverse demand function, …rst-mover advantages
can be shown to correspond to a high quantity (low price) elasticity of inverse demand (of
demand), while a low quantity (high price) elasticity implies second-mover advantages.21
One can easily think of a number of cases where demand becomes more elastic in the
long run. Consider, for example, the manufacturing sector’s demand for electricity. In
the short run externally purchased electric power is a complementary input factor and
…rms’ demand is inelastic.22 But in the long run …rms may decide to build up there own
power generation capacities. Thus, capital and fuel are long-term substitutes for external
electricity. This probably points to second-mover advantages in games that model long
term decisions such as investment in or closure of plants. For this reason we analyze both
cases, …rst-mover as well as second-mover advantages, in chapter 2.
In contrast to the literature on real options, the process of …rm exit out of a duopolistic
19Second-mover advantages require models with …rms that are active ex ante to investment. In models
of market entry with previously idle …rms the revenue functions always exhibit the property of …rst-mover
advantages.
20In a recently published paper by Hoppe (2000) with the title ”Second-mover advantages in the
strategic adoption of new technology under uncertainty” the notion of second-mover advantages is used
to describe a special type of equilibrium, not an exogenous assumption. A closer look at p.319 reveals that
Hoppe assumes an ordering of revenue ‡ows that implies …rst-mover advantages in a very similar sense
as in Weeds (2000), Huisman and Kort (1999) and the present paper. However, Hoppe’s contribution is
not related to real options theory.
21This property of isoelastic inverse demand functions is shown in chapter 4.
22Borenstein et al. (1996) indeed …nd low demand elasticity levels in short-term electricity markets in
California.
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market has been studied explicitly in the industrial-organizations literature. Ghemawat
and Nalebu¤ (1985) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1986), for example, analyze continuous-
time models of asymmetric duopoly. Both articles, however, deal with an evolution of
prices that is driven by exogenous deterministic ”shocks”. They exclude aggregate price
or demand uncertainty. The model by Fine and Li (1989) is closer to our approach.
It considers a fairly general type of demand uncertainty, i.e. demand follows a Markov
process. Nevertheless, there are some distinctive features. First, Fine and Li use a
discrete-time model that makes it di¢cult to relate their results to most of the option-
pricing literature. Second, in contrast to the real options approach, they need to impose
exogenously that demand declines over time in the sense of …rst-order stochastic dom-
inance to derive their existence results. Finally, they analyze the extreme case of …rm
exit, while we are concerned with disinvestment decisions.23
Last but not least, the remarkable paper by Baldursson (1998) should be mentioned,
though it is not directly related to our approach. He is concerned with incremental
investment, where output and pro…t ‡ow are available all the time as a function of the
installed capital stock. And the capital stock can be altered gradually rather than in large
discrete units. The aim is to characterize the …rms’ optimal investment policies that are
rates of capacity expansion in this context. Regarding his solution concept Baldursson
draws from Slade (1994) who has shown that the problem of …nding oligopoly Nash
equilibria is equivalent to a ”…ctitious social-planner problem”. For the special case of
a linear demand function, Baldursson succeeds in deriving analytical expressions for the
optimal investment and disinvestment triggers of …rms in a n-…rm oligopoly.
23As in entry models with previously idle …rms second-mover advantages never occur in models of
complete …rm exit.
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Chapter 2
Closure Options and Wars of
Attrition
Strategic closure options in oligopoly has not been analyzed so far, though potential
applications are not rare in practice. We already mentioned the ”RWE versus Eon”
closure scenario in the German electric utility industry. The envisaged termination of
long-term supply contracts by automobile manufacturers competing in the same market
segment (e.g., ”DaimlerChrysler versus BMW”) might serve as another example. Finally,
one can imagine a wide variety of non-economic applications such as the decision to
initiate divorce proceedings (e.g., ”Kramer versus Kramer”).
2.1 Model Set-Up
We analyze a duopolistic market in continuous time t, t 2 [0;1). Full capital utilization
is assumed, i.e. the two risk neutral1 …rms currently produce at the capacity limit
(maximal output ‡ow), qi = q, i 2 f1; 2g. The competitors contemplate partial closure
of production facilities which irreversibly reduces qi to the lower capacity (and output
‡ow) level2 q. In view of the very long-term horizon of the disinvestment decision, the
full-capital-utilization condition does not seem to be too restrictive. Instead of full capital
1This seemingly restrictive assumption can easily be relaxed by adjusting the drift term of the un-
derlying stochastic process (see below) to capture a risk premium.
2The reduction in capacity q¡q should be considered as being equivalent to shutting down a single
discrete production unit of a large system.
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utilization one could equivalently assume a constant output-to-capital ratio that might
be interpreted as the long-term average utilization rate or as the utilization rate that is
most e¢cient from the side of the production technology.3
A …rm’s only decision (action) in this game is to choose the threshold of current
revenue ‡ows, at which the single closure option should optimally be exercised. Giving up
capacity is not costless. In order to shut down a factory, …rm i incurs the lump-sum cost
E. This can be interpreted as severance payments to workers or as cost of demolishing
the factory and restoring the site. In some instances E might be negative, e.g., when the
scrap value exceeds the cost of closure. Setting the variable cost of production for …rm
i constant at Ci, we concentrate on output price uncertainty. Suppose that the inverse
industry demand function exhibits the speci…c form
P = Y ¢D (Q) ; (2.1)
where Q represents the aggregate output, q1 + q2. The functional speci…cation of the
deterministic part D(Q) implies that the …rms’ products are perfect substitutes.4 The
industry-wide demand shock Y is supposed to follow a geometric Brownian motion5,
dY = ®Y dt+ ¾Y dB: (2.2)
Additionally, some assumptions about …rm i’s gross revenue function are required.
For ease of notation we de…ne the deterministic part of i’s revenues as
R (qi; qj) = D (qi + qj) qi;
for i; j 2 f1; 2g, i 6= j. Then, let us assume that the market is characterized by strategic
3For example, power generation units usually have a maximum degree of e¢ciency between 50 and
65 per cent in terms of fuel input units per generated MWh.
4As long as the conditions on revenues (see below) are satis…ed, the assumption of perfect substi-
tutibility is not needed.
5More precisely, let (­;F; P ) be a …ltered probability space, i.e. a family F = fFt; t ¸ 0g of ¾-algebras
on ­ such that Ft µ F for all t ¸ 0 and Fs µ Ft if s · t. Further let B denote a standard Brownian motion
that is adapted to the space (­;F; P ). Then Y = fY (t; !) = Y0 ¢ exp[(®¡ (¾2=2))t + ¾B(t; !)]; t ¸ 0
and ! 2 ­g with Y0 > 0 is a geometric Brownian motion.
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substitutability of the …rms’ capacity decisions, i.e.
R
¡
q; q
¢
> R (q; q) and R
¡
q; q
¢
> R
¡
q; q
¢
:
Further, …rms cannot raise gross revenues by reducing their capacity ceteris paribus,
R
¡
q; q
¢
> R
¡
q; q
¢
and R (q; q) > R
¡
q; q
¢
:
If the inequalities were reversed, …rms would prefer to shut down production facilities
immediately, independent of what the rival does. This scenario may occur, but its solution
is trivial and uninteresting, since it does not exhibit any scope for strategic interaction.
Another rather technically motivated assumption is added,
R (q; q) > R
¡
q; q
¢
:
In terms of the inverse demand function, it says that the percentage increase in prices
due to simultaneous plant closure is required to be smaller than the percentage change
in capacity from q to q, D(2q)=D(2q) < q=q. Intuitively, the price reaction to a jump in
quantity should be rather sluggish. Note that this condition is not needed to derive most
of the results in this chapter.6 In particular, it is not required to derive the equilibrium
behavior of …rms. Moreover, the analysis and, especially, the proofs would simplify if
the inequality sign were reversed and the complementary case were considered. Nev-
ertheless, we impose the assumption to ensure the comparability of our approach with
the investment option models by Huisman and Kort (1999) (see chapter 3) and Weeds
(2000). There the condition has a crucial impact on the set of equilibria.7 Together with
the former assumptions one obtains the following ordering of revenues
R
¡
q; q
¢
> R (q; q) > R
¡
q; q
¢
> R
¡
q; q
¢
: (2.3)
6The only exception is the optimal investment timing of a monopolist in the case of second-mover
advantages (see section 2.2). Note that the condition just guarantees that the payo¤ arising from
simultaneous closure has a maximum in the time of simultaneous closure. If the inequality sign were
reversed, then this payo¤ function would be uniformly decreasing for all times of joint closure.
7In Huisman and Kort’s game of investment timing the set of equilibria becomes unbounded and a
(well-de…ned) Pareto-optimal joint-investment equilibrium does no longer exist.
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Finally, we have to distinguish the case of ”…rst-mover advantages”, i.e.
R
¡
q; q
¢¡R ¡q; q¢ > R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢ ; (2.4)
from the complementary case of ”second-mover advantages”, i.e.
R
¡
q; q
¢¡R ¡q; q¢ < R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢ : (2.5)
Both assumptions and their implications for the strategic interaction of …rms will be
discussed later in this chapter. Nevertheless, let us consider the economic content of these
inequalities brie‡y. If inequality (2.4) is satis…ed, then the …rst mover which is the …rm
that reduces capacity before its rival is exposed to a drop in gross revenues when exercising
his closure option that is less severe than the decrease in revenues of the second mover.8
In the context of a model of complete …rm exit we would have R(q; q) = R(q; q) = 0.
In this case condition (2.5) implies that R(q; q) < R(q; q) contradicting the assumption
about strategic substitutability. Thus, second-mover advantages cannot occur in an exit
model.
The only source of uncertainty in our model stems from (future) aggregate demand,
so that each …rm has common knowledge about the current state of the world and the
payo¤ function of its rival. This setting constitutes a timing game in continuous time
under imperfect, but complete information. Pitchik (1981), for example, introduces an
adequate formalization of strategy spaces and payo¤s for timing games in continuous
time under perfect information. He describes a player’s mixed strategy as a function
Gti(s). It denotes the cumulative probability that player i has moved by time s ¸ t
conditionally on no player moving before t: Additionally, an intertemporal consistency
condition is required to be satis…ed for each family of functions Gti. We will impose such
a condition in section 2.3. Notice that this formalization of strategies allows to test for
subgame perfection of any prevailing Nash equilibrium if one interprets t as the root of
a subgame.
8In the special case of a hyperbolic inverse demand function, D(qi + qj) = a=(qi + qj)b, inequality
(2.4) (inequality (2.5)) is valid, if D is elastic (inelastic) with respect to aggregate production, i.e.
b > 1 (b 2 (0; 1)). A linear inverse demand function, D(qi+qj) = a¡b(qi+qj), guarantees that strategic
interaction among …rms is driven by …rst-mover advantages 8a; b > 0.
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In section 2.3 we also show that the closure timing game proposed in this chapter
can be characterized as a war of attrition. This implies that we do not run into the
di¢culties that are bound up with the representation of continuous-time analogues of
the equilibria of discrete-time preemption games. In particular, we do not need to resort
to the extended strategy spaces as suggested by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985). In chapter
3 it will be motivated that the corresponding investment timing game is a preemption
game and, therefore, requires two-dimensional strategy spaces.
In our model players act in an imperfect information world due to the uncertainty
about future revenues. This requires some modi…cations of the strategy concept. In
contrast to Pitchik, the simple strategy GTi (t; !) should not be interpreted as an ordinary
function, but as a stochastic process, e.g., if the event ! 2 ­ has realized and YT > 0
denotes a …xed threshold, then GTi (t; !) gives the probability of …rm i having moved
(having adopted the leader’s role) by time t in the (sub)game that starts at T(!) =
inf(t ¸ 0 jY (t; !) · YT ). Notice thatGTi (t; !) ´ 0 for t < T(!). In Figure 2-1 an example
of the step function GTi (t; !) is given. It can be seen that G
T
i (t; !) jumps discretely, when
Y (t) …rst hits YT1 and YT2, respectively. For the moment, we have reached a su¢cient
level of description of strategy spaces. We will come back to this point in section 2.3 that
includes more formal de…nitions. The modi…cations required with respect to the …rms’
payo¤ functions are also discussed in section 2.3.
Remark 1 Throughout the paper we use Y (t), t 2 [0;1), to denote the element of the
stochastic process Y at t; but YT, YT ; or YT to be a …xed threshold. In the former case
t simply represents a time index, while in the latter case the capital letters T, T , and
T (occasionally used with subindices) should be interpreted as …rst passage or stopping
times, e.g. the stochastic time that is required for the process Y to reach YT …rst given
that Y (0) = Y0 > YT . Formally, we have T = inf (t ¸ 0 jY (t) · YT ).
Remark 2 Throughout the rest of the paper we use either the …xed threshold YT or the
stochastic stopping time T to denote the root of the subgame that starts when the process
Y …rst reaches the threshold YT.
Since each …rm possesses only a single option, there are in principle four outcomes of
strategic interaction that can arise. In the …rst case …rm 1 reduces capacity before …rm
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Figure 2-1: Strategies as Stochastic Processes
2 and, thereby, becomes the leader. Then …rm 2 follows. The second case is equivalent
to the …rst one, but with interchanged roles—…rm 2 becomes the leader and …rm 1 the
follower. In the third case both …rms reduce capacity simultaneously. Finally, in the
fourth case neither …rm 1 nor …rm 2 disinvest. We immediately exclude the last case
from our analysis, since both …rms will close production facilities, if market conditions
become su¢ciently bad.9
In order to determine which of the remaining outcomes constitutes a (subgame per-
fect) equilibrium, we analyze the players’ potential roles, i.e. leader, follower, and si-
multaneous mover. Focusing on roles rather than players allows us to calculate the
corresponding payo¤s and optimal closure thresholds. This is done in section 2.2. In sec-
tion 2.3 we give a proper de…nition of players’ strategies and combine strategies with the
9If market conditions become too unfavorable, it is always a dominant strategy to reduce capacity.
Thus a …rm will never …nd it optimal to keep the high capacity level for all Y 2 R+.
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roles’ payo¤ functions. The expected payo¤s of …rms are obtained as functions of their
strategy pro…les. Then, in section 2.4, the equilibrium assignments of roles to players are
derived, i.e. we describe which player prefers to play which role in any subgame perfect
equilibrium of the timing game.
2.2 Potential Roles
We start o¤ with the analysis of the follower’s role. This is done in a rather extensive
way to introduce the basic methodology of real options theory.
2.2.1 Follower
Let us suppose that one …rm (the leader) has already reduced its capacity from q to
q. In this situation, the follower does not face competition for market shares, since the
leader is not allowed to move more than once and to react to the follower’s action. Thus,
…rms do not interact strategically anymore, and the follower can time his disinvestment
as if he was the only …rm in the market. He remains active as long as Y stays above
the optimal closure threshold YF which we still have to determine. At YF the return
on ’reducing capacity immediately’ equals the (expected) return on ’sticking to initial
production capacity forever’.
If the follower, who discounts future revenues at the constant rate ½; produced q
eternally, then the expected net present value of his …rm would equal10
©(YT) = ET
24 1Z
T
e¡½(t¡T)
£
Y (t)D
¡
q + q
¢¡ CF ¤ qdt
35
= R
¡
q; q
¢ ¢ g (YT)¡ CF q
½
;
where YT denotes the root of the subgame, i.e. the level of the stochastic process at T:
ET represents the conditional expectations operator contingent on Y having …rst reached
10Note that D(Q) need not be introduced as a functional argument of ©; since it depends on the actual
position of Y whether D(Q) = D(2q) or D(Q) = D(q + q) or D(Q) = D(2q).
24
YT: The conditional expectation
g (YT) = ET
24 1Z
T
e¡½(t¡T)Y (t) dt
35 (2.6)
is written as a function of the root of the subgame. We show in Lemma 6 in Appendix
A.1 how to calculate g(YT). The term CF q=½ gives the present value of current and
future variable cost. The upper bar on © indicates that the value of the follower’s …rm
is computed, when he produces at the high capacity limit q. One yields
©(YT) =
YTR
¡
q; q
¢
±
¡ CFq
½
:
We refer to © as the follower’s ”fundamental value” that arises from eternal production
at q. It is linear in the starting threshold YT. Note that without any prospect of a
positive revenue ‡ow, the value of keeping up production at level q becomes negative, but
nevertheless remains bounded. Similarly, let us de…ne © to be the follower’s ”fundamental
value” after capacity reduction, when the follower produces eternally at q: Obviously it
holds that
©(YT) =
YTR
¡
q; q
¢
±
¡ CFq
½
:
We mentioned above that neither …rm is forced to produce forever at q. If market
conditions become too unfavorable, the follower may choose to partially abandon capacity
and to shut down production facilities, thereby incurring the lump-sum cost E. Since
CF (q ¡ q)=½ is the maximum loss which the follower can avoid by exercising the closure
option, we need E < CF (q ¡ q)=½. Otherwise the follower will never choose to reduce
capacity. Holding this closure option implies that the value of the follower’s …rm (with
low or high capacity) exhibits a lower bound at ¡E. The question arises, at which point
in time the closure option is optimally exercised. The net-present-value rule (NPV)
suggests to do so at Y NPVF , where
©
¡
Y NPVF
¢
= ©
¡
Y NPVF
¢¡E:
Among others, Dixit and Pindyck (1994) have shown that the exercise rule Y NPVF is not
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an adequate threshold if the follower’s decision is made under uncertainty about future
market conditions. It ignores the option value of waiting. For YT not too large, where the
closure option is far out of the money, the strategy to wait and refrain from exercising
the option has a positive value, since future uncertainty partly resolves as time goes by.
Especially, even if demand is unfavorably low, the follower might refrain from partial
capacity closure at Y NPVF if he assigns a high probability to the event that demand will
recover again. If the follower shut down at the NPV threshold and, thereby, disregarded
the inherent (option) value of the chance to experience future market conditions, he
would give up this chance too early.
Taking the additional value from holding the option into account, let us de…ne the
value of the follower’s …rm, equipped with a closure option, as
F (YT) = max
n
©(YT)¡ E; e©(YT)o ;
where e© is the follower’s fundamental value or the expected net revenues from keeping
up production at q plus the value that arises from still holding the option, i.e. e© ¸ © for
all YT. Notice that e© and F are not yet known. Let us assume for the moment that the
optimal exercise threshold YF has already been determined. Then an explicit expression
for e© and F can be obtained. If YT > YF ; then the follower still holds his option and
produces at q. Thus the expected value of his …rm equals
F (YT) = e©(YT) = ET
24 TFZ
T
e¡½(t¡T)
£
Y (t)R
¡
q; q
¢¡ CFq¤ dt
35
+ET
24 1Z
TF
e¡½(t¡T)
£
Y (t)R
¡
q; q
¢¡ CF q¤ dt
35¡ ET £e¡½(TF¡T)E¤ :
After rearranging we get
F (YT) = e©(YT) = ¡R ¡q; q¢¡R ¡q; q¢¢ ¢ h (YT)jT=TF
+R
¡
q; q
¢ ¢ g (YT)¡ CFq
½
+
Ã
CF
¡
q ¡ q¢
½
¡ E
!
¢ f (YT)jT=TF ; (2.7)
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where g(YT) has already been de…ned by equation (2.6) and
f (YT) = ET
£
e¡½(T¡T)
¤
; (2.8)
h (YT) = ET
24 TZ
T
e¡½(t¡T)Y (t) dt
35 . (2.9)
The expectations f (YT) and h (YT) are also calculated in Lemma 6 in Appendix A.1.
The resulting expression for the value of the follower’s …rm is given in Lemma 1 below.
If YT · YF ; then it is known that the follower already exercised its closure option and
eternally produces at the lower capacity limit q: Hence, we obtain
F (YT) = © (YT)¡E (2.10)
in this case. Again, see Lemma 1 for the resulting expression. It can easily be veri…ed that
F satis…es the so-called ”value-matching condition” (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p.130¤.),
e©(YF ) = © (YF )¡ E;
i.e. F is a continuous function at YF . Intuitively, the condition says that the follower
equipped with a closure option can principally choose among two alternatives. On the
one hand, he can decide to keep on waiting and producing at the original capacity level q.
On the other hand, the follower can exercise his option, thereby, incurring the lump-sum
cost E and producing at the low capacity level q. At the optimal exercise threshold the
follower is just indi¤erent between these alternatives and, therefore, the payo¤s arising
from the corresponding choices should be equal at YF :
It remains to determine the optimal exercise threshold YF . This can be accomplished
by maximizing the follower’s payo¤ from still holding the option, e©; with respect to YF .
The …rst-order condition, @e©=@YF = 0; is given by
µ
YF
YT
¶¡¯Ã
¡¯ (CF=½)
¡
q ¡ q¢¡ E
YF
¡ (1¡ ¯) R
¡
q; q
¢¡R ¡q; q¢
±
!
= 0
(2.11)
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If YF > 0, then the equation can explicitly be solved for YF : The solution is stated in
Lemma 1. By using this solution, it can be shown that F satis…es the so-called ”smooth-
pasting condition” (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p.130¤.),
e©0 (YF ) = ©0 (YF ) ;
i.e. F is not only continuous at YF , but also smooth. Let us summarize:
Lemma 1 The expected value of the follower’s …rm conditionally on Y having …rst
reached YT is
F (YT) =
8>>><>>>>:
YTR(q;q)
±
¡ CF q
½
¡ E for 0 · YT · YF ;
YTR(q;q)
±
¡ CF q
½
+
³
YF
YT
´¡¯ µCF (q¡q)
½
¡ E ¡ YF (R(q;q)¡R(q;q))
±
¶
for YT > YF ;
(2.12)
where the optimal exercise rule of the follower’s closure option is given by the unique
…xed threshold
YF = ¡ ±¯
1¡ ¯ ¢
(CF=½)
¡
q ¡ q¢¡E
R
¡
q; q
¢¡R ¡q; q¢ ; (2.13)
and
¯ =
8<: ¯2 = 12 ¡ ®¾2 ¡
q£
®
¾2
¡ 1
2
¤2
+ 2½
¾2
< 0 for ® < ¾
2
2
;e¯
2 = ¯2 + 1¡ (2®=¾2) < 0 for ® ¸ ¾22 :
(2.14)
Proof. Equation (2.12) is derived by plugging the formulas for f(YT), g(YT), and h(YT)
computed in Lemma 6 in Appendix A.1 into equations (2.7) and (2.10). YF as given by
equation (2.13) is determined by rearranging equation (2.11). For ¯ < ¡1, there exists
another solution at the boundary YF = 0. However, the second-order condition reveals
that only equation (2.13) maximizes e©, while the function exhibits a saddle point at
YF = 0, ¯ < ¡1.
Since the ”markdown factor” ¡¯=(1¡ ¯) in equation (2.13) is smaller than one, but
positive, the closure threshold that is suggested by the net-present-value rule, Y NPVF [R(q; q)¡
R(q; q)] = ±[(CF (q¡ q)=½)¡E] is set too high (Y NPVF > YF ), i.e. following the NPV rule
the follower would reduce capacity too early. This result con…rms our earlier intuitive
considerations. Moreover, it is interesting to see that, if YF is smaller than the leader’s
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closure threshold, then the follower’s timing decision is not a¤ected by the leader’s be-
havior in the sense that the value of the follower’s …rm does not depend on the leader’s
exercising rule.
Another important result is hidden in equation (2.14). It reveals that the expected
value of a …rm—here: the follower—equipped with a disinvestment option may be over-
estimated11 if one directly translates the standard results that have been obtained for
investment option models (see chapter 3) into our context. There, it is the positive root
¯1 =
1
2
¡ ®
¾2
+
s·
®
¾2
¡ 1
2
¸2
+
2½
¾2
rather than the negative root ¯2 of the so-called ”fundamental quadratic equation”
12
that a¤ects the roles’ payo¤s and the corresponding optimal thresholds. One might
guess that the formula for the disinvestment case can easily be obtained by substituting
¯2 for ¯1 in the investment-option formula. However, this assumption is not true in
general. The intuition is that the market price and, therefore, the …rms’ revenues might
become in…nitely large if the drift ® exceeds ¾2=2. In this case the value of holding a
closure option goes to zero, while the value of holding an investment option increases
without bound. In the reverse case, where market conditions deteriorate and the price
approaches zero, the value of holding an investment option goes to zero. The value of
the closure option, however, does not become in…nite, but converges to a bounded value.
It is this asymmetry that drives our result.
For later purposes we simplify F (YT) for YT > YF by substituting ¡[(1 ¡ ¯)=±¯] ¢
YF [R(q; q)¡R(q; q)] for [(CF (q ¡ q)=½)¡ E]. One yields
F (YT) =
YTR
¡
q; q
¢
±
¡ CF q
½
+
µ
YF
YT
¶¡¯ YF ¡R ¡q; q¢¡R ¡q; q¢¢
¡±¯ for YT > YF : (2.15)
11Note that (YF =YT)¡¯2 > (YF=YT)¡
e¯
2 , if YT > YF .
12The ”fundamental quadratic equation” is introduced brie‡y in Appendix A.1. See also Dixit and
Pindyck (1994, section 5.2).
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2.2.2 Leader
By de…nition of the leader’s role, it is implicitly assumed that this ”role” has already ex-
ercised its closure option at some unknown threshold eYL. So, in contrast to the follower’s
threshold YF ; eYL cannot be derived from the payo¤ function of the corresponding role.
Actually, it is the equilibrium strategy pro…le that determines if and when a particular
…rm chooses to become the leader. Out of equilibrium eYL remains unknown.13 Neverthe-
less there is something that should be said about eYL: If YT is the root of the (sub)game
and eYF denotes the actual closure threshold of the follower—to be distinguished from
the preferred closure threshold YF in equation (2.13)—, then it holds that
eTL = inf ³t ¸ T ¯¯¯Y (t) · eYL´ · eTF = inf ³t ¸ T ¯¯¯Y (t) · eYF ´ ;
and eYF · eYL again by de…nition of the leader’s role. Since the follower does not reduce
capacity before the leader, eYF equals the follower’s optimal closure rule YF , if and only
if YF · eYL. Otherwise eYF < YF . Thus, the leader’s payo¤ function depends on the
(actual) timing of the follower’s capacity decision. For YF ¸ eYL = eYF both, leader and
follower, partially close production facilities at eYL and we have an instance of ’simultane-
ous capacity reduction’ which is discussed in the next subsection. So let us concentrate
on the scenario YF = eYF < eYL. As is proved below, the graph of the leader’s value
function exhibits a kink at YF due to the change in the follower’s behavior. Therefore, it
is useful to distinguish between the two subcases YT · YF < eYL and YF · YT < eYL. We
start o¤ with the assumption YT · YF < eYL. In this case the follower reduces capacity
immediately after the subgame has started—and so does the leader. Hence, the expected
value of the leader’s …rm in this region must equal the ”fundamental value” arising from
eternal aggregate production at 2q net of the option’s strike price E;
L (YT) = ET
24 1Z
T
e¡½(t¡T)
£
Y (t)R
¡
q; q
¢¡ CLq¤ dt
35¡ E
= R
¡
q; q
¢ ¢ g (YT)¡ CLq
½
¡E; (2.16)
13Of course, if none of the equilibrium strategy pro…les implies an assignment of the leader’s role to a
…rm, then eYL cannot be determined even in any of the corresponding equilibria.
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where g(YT) is de…ned by equation (2.6). The expression resulting for L(YT) is given in
Lemma 2. Next, let us examine the second case, YF · YT < eYL, where the follower still
refrains from exercising his option, but the leader immediately reduces capacity. The
leader’s value becomes
L (YT) = ET
24 TFZ
T
e¡½(t¡T)
£
Y (t)R
¡
q; q
¢¡ CLq¤ dt
35
+ET
24 1Z
TF
e¡½(t¡T)
£
Y (t)R
¡
q; q
¢¡ CLq¤ dt
35¡ E
= ¡ ¡R ¡q; q¢¡R ¡q; q¢¢ ¢ h (YT)jT=TF
+R
¡
q; q
¢ ¢ g (YT)¡ CLq
½
¡ E; (2.17)
where h(YT) is de…ned by equation (2.9). In the following lemma we summarize the
piecewise functions that give the expected value of the leader’s …rm for the di¤erent
regions.
Lemma 2 The expected value of the leader’s …rm conditionally on Y having …rst reached
YT is
L (YT) =
8>>><>>>:
YTR(q;q)
±
¡ CLq
½
¡E for 0 · YT · YF ;
YTR(q;q)
±
¡ CLq
½
¡E
+
³
YF
YT
´¡¯ YF (R(q;q)¡R(q;q))
±
for YF < YT < eYL;
(2.18)
where YF and ¯ are given by equations (2.13) and (2.14), respectively. Further, L is not
smooth at YF .
Proof. Equation (2.18) is derived by plugging the formulas for g(YT) and h(YT) in
Lemma 6 in Appendix A.1 into equations (2.16) and (2.17). In Appendix A.2 we verify
that L
0
(YT) exhibits a point of discontinuity at YF .
As mentioned above, the actual closure threshold of the leader, eYL, results as an out-
come of strategic interaction and can only be determined in equilibrium. The equilibria
of the closure timing game will be discussed in section 2.4. Nevertheless, by preassigning
roles to players, we can compute an exercise rule YL that turns out to be payo¤ maximiz-
ing for the …rm that gets preassigned to the leader’s role. This threshold represents an
important benchmark in the case of …rst-mover advantages (see condition (2.4)) ,when
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comparing our equilibrium exercising rules with the optimal policies as suggested by the
standard real options theory. To be more precise, consider a myopic …rm currently pro-
ducing at its capacity limit q and contemplating capacity reduction by q¡q to q. The …rm
is myopic in the sense that it ignores strategic interaction, i.e. it has static expectations
with respect to its rival’s actions. However, in contrast to a price-taking …rm it takes the
impact of its own disinvestment decision on the price process into account. As the follow-
ing proposition says, if the leader’s variable cost is not too di¤erent from the follower’s
variable cost, then not only the myopic …rm …nds it optimal to exercise its closure option,
when Y (t) …rst hits the threshold YM but also the leader in the duopolistic timing game.
Thus, the leader’s optimal timing is identical to that of a myopic …rm if the strategic
interaction is driven by …rst-mover advantages. However, the following proposition also
suggests that, under the assumption of second-mover advantages, a strikingly di¤erent
outcome arises, if the di¤erence in variable cost is not too extreme.
Proposition 1 (i) Let us preassign roles to players such that one …rm is the leader and
the other …rm becomes the follower. Further, let
C = (CL=½)
¡
q ¡ q¢¡ E
(CF=½)
¡
q ¡ q¢¡E ;R1 = R (q; q)¡R
¡
q; q
¢
R
¡
q; q
¢¡R ¡q; q¢ ;R2 = R (q; q)¡R
¡
q; q
¢
R
¡
q; q
¢¡R ¡q; q¢ :
Under the assumption of …rst-mover (second-mover) advantages, R1 and R2 satisfy R1 <
R2 < 1 (R1 < 1 < R2). If the (sub)game starts at YT > YL, then the leading …rm
maximizes its payo¤ by reducing capacity from q to q, when Y (t) …rst reaches the …xed
threshold
YL =
8>><>>:
YSijCi=CL if C < R1
YF if R1 · C · R2
YM jCM=CL if C > R2
; (2.19)
where YF , YM and YSi are de…ned by equations (2.13), (2.20) and (2.27), respectively,
i 2 f1; 2g. If YT · YL holds, then the leader maximizes its payo¤ by reducing capacity
immediately at YT.
(ii) Suppose that a myopic …rm with constant marginal cost of production CM 2 fCL; CFg
is equipped with the option to reduce capacity from q to q. Then the myopic …rm maxi-
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mizes its payo¤ by exercising the option at
YM = ¡ ±¯
1¡ ¯ ¢
(CM=½)
¡
q ¡ q¢¡ E
R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢ (2.20)
if YT > YM , and at YT if YT · YM .
(iii) Suppose that a price-taking …rm with constant marginal cost of production CP 2
fCL; CFg facing an exogenous price process P = Y D(2q) is equipped with the option to
reduce capacity from q to q. Then this …rm maximizes its payo¤ by exercising the option
at
YP = ¡ ±¯
1¡ ¯ ¢
(CP=½)
¡
q ¡ q¢¡ E
D (2q)
¡
q ¡ q¢ (2.21)
if YT > YP , and at YT if YT · YP . The same disinvestment threshold is optimal for a
single price-taking …rm that owns the option to reduce capacity from 2q to q + q.
(iv) Suppose that CM = CP = CL = CF , C = 1. Then the disinvestment thresholds can
be ordered as
minfYP ; YFg < maxfYP ; YFg < YM = YL (2.22)
if condition (2.4) holds. The corresponding ordering is given by
YP < YM < YF = YL (2.23)
if condition (2.5) holds.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Note that YSi denotes the optimal exercise threshold of …rm i conditionally on both
…rms moving simultaneously. The corresponding formula is derived in the next subsec-
tion. The importance of Proposition 1 will become obvious in section 2.4, where the
equilibria of the timing game are derived. However, let us anticipate later derivations
and point out that e.g. with identical …rms, C1 = C2 , CF = CL, and with second-mover
advantages the unique equilibrium prediction will be that both …rms should exercise their
closure options at YL = YF . If the second-mover advantage (2.5) is of signi…cant size,
then the ordering (2.23) suggests that this policy might be very di¤erent from the my-
opic …rm’s exercising rule YM . Moreover, YF lies even farther away from the price taker’s
threshold YP than from the myopic …rm’s disinvestment trigger. Thus, Proposition 1 im-
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plies that fully rational competitors in a duopoly with second-mover advantages disinvest
earlier than price-taking …rms would do.
In the case of …rst-mover advantages (2.4) the equilibrium prediction will be that one
…rm exercises its closure option at YL = YM , while the other …rm follows at YF . As
the ordering (2.22) reveals, the leader certainly shuts down production facilities before
the price taker would do. However, the picture is not that clear regarding the follower’s
disinvestment timing. To realize the full pro…ts from having attracted additional market
shares, the follower might even reduce capacity much later than a price-taking …rm.
Under fairly general conditions—including in…nitely divisible investment projects—
Leahy (1993) shows that the optimal investment threshold of a single …rm facing an
exogenous price process is identical to the optimal exercise threshold of a …rm in perfect
competition. Unfortunately, there does not exist a general analogous result that applies to
the price taker’s optimal closure threshold YP in our model due the limited divisibility of
the underlying disinvestment project. However, in the special case of a linear adjustment
cost function, i.e. E = k ¢ (q ¡ q) with k denoting the closure cost per retired unit, YP
equals the perfect competition benchmark as derived by Leahy. The next section contains
a result on the optimal disinvestment timing of a monopolist.
2.2.3 Joint Capacity Closure
The third role that …rms can play is that of simultaneous movers. In this case …rms
reduce capacity simultaneously at TS = inf(t ¸ T jY (t) · YS ); where YS denotes the
threshold of simultaneous capacity closure. The expected value of …rm i; i 2 f1; 2g;
conditionally on Y having …rst reached the threshold YT > YS equals
Si (YT; YS) = ET
24 TSZ
T
e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)R (q; q)¡ Ciq] dt
+
1Z
TS
e¡½(t¡T)
£
Y (t)R
¡
q; q
¢¡ Ciq¤ dt¡ e¡½(Tt¡T)E
35 :
After rearranging one yields
Si (YT; YS) =
¡
R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¢ ¢ h (YT)jT=TS +R ¡q; q¢ ¢ g (YT)
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¡Ciq
½
+
Ã
Ci
¡
q ¡ q¢
½
+ E
!
¢ f (YT)jT=TS ; (2.24)
where f(YT), g(YT), and h(YT) are de…ned by equations (2.8), (2.6), and (2.9), respec-
tively, and are calculated in Lemma 6 in Appendix A.1. If YT · YS both …rms reduce
capacity immediately and the expected value of …rm i becomes
Si (YT; YS) = ET
24 1Z
T
e¡½(t¡T)
£
Y (t)R
¡
q; q
¢¡ Ciq¤ dt¡E
35
= R
¡
q; q
¢ ¢ g (YT)¡ Ciq
½
¡E: (2.25)
The resulting expressions for …rm i’s payo¤ are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 The expected value of …rm i that arises from simultaneous closure condition-
ally on Y having …rst reached YT is
Si (YT; YS) =
8>>>><>>>:
YTR(q;q)
±
¡ Ciq
½
¡E for 0 · YT · YS;
YTR(q;q)
±
¡ Ciq
½
¡
³
YS
YT
´¡¯ µYS(R(q;q)¡R(q;q))
±
¡ Ci(q¡q)
½
+ E
¶
for YT > YS;
(2.26)
where ¯ is given by equation (2.14).
Proof. Equation (2.26) is derived by plugging the formulas for f(YT), g(YT), and h(YT)
in Lemma 6 in Appendix A.1 into equations (2.24) and (2.25).
So far, it is left undetermined what should be the optimal exercise rule if both …rms
coordinate on reducing capacity simultaneously. We expect that, as long as C1 6= C2,
there does not exist any joint closure time TS¤ = inf(t jY (t) · YS¤ ), where both players
…nd it optimal to reduce capacity. Let us con…rm this assertion. From the point of
view of player i the optimal joint reduction time is TSi = inf(t jY (t) · YSi ) with YSi =
argmaxYT>Ys>0 Si (YT; YS). We compute the …rst-order condition @Si=@YS = 0 and obtain
YSi =
¡±¯
1¡ ¯ ¢
(Ci=½)
¡
q ¡ q¢¡ E
R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢ ; (2.27)
35
which turns out to be an interior local maximum, since the second partial derivative
evaluated at YSi is negative, i.e.
@2Si
(@YS)
2
¯¯¯¯
YS=YSi
= ¡ (1¡ ¯)
µ
YSi
YT
¶¡¯ R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢
±YSi
< 0:
The optimal joint closure thresholds for …rm one and two indeed di¤er for C1 6= C2.
We have YSi > YSj for Ci > Cj; i 6= j, i; j 2 f1; 2g. Moreover, a comparison with the
follower’s optimal exercise threshold in equation (2.13) reveals that YFi < YSi.
Further, note that the payo¤ from immediate and simultaneous capacity reduction
(at YT) is given by
Ii (YT) = Si (YT; YT) =
YTR
¡
q; q
¢
±
¡ Ciq
½
¡ E: (2.28)
The threshold YSi is not only the optimal joint reduction trigger of …rm i but also
of a monopolist in the model with second-mover advantages as the following proposition
suggests.
Proposition 2 Suppose that a monopolist with constant marginal cost of production Ci,
i 2 f1; 2g; is equipped with a chain of options—an option to reduce capacity from 2q to
q + q and a subsequent option to reduce capacity from q + q to 2q.
(i) Suppose that condition (2.4) is satis…ed. Then the monopolist maximizes his payo¤
by exercising his options sequentially at
Y 0O =
¡±¯
1¡ ¯ ¢
(Ci=½)
¡
q ¡ q¢¡E
2R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¡R ¡q; q¢ (2.29)
and
Y 00O =
¡±¯
1¡ ¯ ¢
(Ci=½)
¡
q ¡ q¢¡ E
R
¡
q; q
¢
+R
¡
q; q
¢¡ 2R ¡q; q¢ < Y 0O (2.30)
if YT > Y 0O, at YT and Y
00
O if Y
00
O < YT · Y 0O, and simultaneously at YT if YT · Y 00O .
(ii) Suppose that condition (2.5) is satis…ed. Then the monopolist maximizes his payo¤
by exercising both options simultaneously at YSi as given by equation (2.27) if YT > YSi,
and at YT if YT · YSi.
(iii) Suppose that C = C1 = C2: If condition (2.4) is satis…ed, then the disinvestment
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thresholds can be ordered as
YF < min fYM ; Y 00Og < max fYM ; Y 00Og < YS¤ < Y 0O; (2.31)
where YS¤ = YSijCi=C ; and YF , YM , YP and YSi are de…ned by equations (2.13), (2.20),
(2.21) and (2.27), respectively. If condition (2.5) is satis…ed, then
YM < YF < YS¤. (2.32)
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Since the monopolist internalizes the strategic externalities that arise in duopoly,
his disinvestment timing represents the cooperative optimum. Suppose that …rms are
identical, C = C1 = C2: If strategic interaction among …rms is driven by second-mover
advantages (2.3), then the optimal cooperative disinvestment trigger, YS¤ ; equals the
optimal closure threshold of two fully rational competitors contingent on these …rms
moving simultaneously. Our equilibrium prediction in this case will be that both …rms
should exercise their closure options at YL = YF . Since YS¤ > YF , Proposition 2 suggests
that the equilibrium timing of disinvestment in a duopoly with second-mover advantages
is delayed as compared to the optimal cooperative disinvestment pattern.
In the complementary case of …rst-mover advantages (2.4) the equilibrium prediction
will be that one …rm exercises its closure option at YL = YM , while its rival follows at
YF . As the ordering (2.31) reveals, the equilibrium follower certainly exercises his closure
option after the monopolist has …nished his disinvestment sequence. However, the results
are more ambiguous with respect to the equilibrium leader’s disinvestment timing. To
realize the full pro…ts from having attracted the …rst-mover advantage, the leader might
have completed capacity reduction before the monopolist exercises his second option.
Nevertheless, at least on average …rms still reduce capacity earlier than a monopolist.
Let us provide some closer investigation of the relative magnitude of YM as compared
to Y 00O . Assume that D is a downward slopping C
1 function. Suppose further that con-
sumers have a …nite reservation price, i.e. D(0) < +1. To order Y 00O and the myopic
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…rm’s threshold YM by size, we compare the denominators,
YM R Y 00O
, R ¡q; q¢¡ 2R ¡q; q¢+R ¡q; q¢ R R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢
, D ¡q + q¢ q ¡D ¡2q¢ 2q +D ¡q + q¢ q R D (2q) q ¡D ¡q + q¢ q
, D ((1 + c) q) (1 + c)¡D (2cq) 2c R D (2q)¡D ((1 + c) q) c
where c = q=q 2 (0; 1). For c ! 1; both sides of the latter inequality converge to zero,
i.e. limc!1 YM = limc!1 Y 00O = +1. However, for c! 0; D being strictly decreasing and
D(0) < +1, the left-hand side’s expression converges to D(q) which is strictly greater
than the right-hand side’s limit value, D(2q). Moreover, evaluating the derivative of the
left-hand side term with respect to c;
D0 ((1 + c) q) (1 + c) q +D ((1 + c) q)¡D0 (2cq) 4cq ¡ 2D (2cq) ;
at c = 1 yields ¡D0(2q)2q¡D(2q). The corresponding derivative of the right-hand side,
¡D0 ((1 + c) q) cq ¡D ((1 + c) q) ;
attains the value ¡D0(2q)q ¡D(2q) at c = 1 which is strictly smaller than ¡D0(2q)2q ¡
D(2q _): This implies that there exists " > 0 such that YM > Y 00O for c 2 (1¡"; 1). However,
if c becomes su¢ciently small, then the reverse relation, YM < Y 00O , holds. Additional
regularity conditions on the second derivative of the inverse demand function ensure that
there exists a unique c¤ such that YM > Y 00O for c > c
¤ and YM < Y 00O for c < c
¤.
We conclude that the myopic …rm in the model with …rst-mover advantages reduces
capacity after the monopolist has …nished his disinvestment sequence if its closure option
resembles an exit option (regarding the ratio of ex-post to ex-ante capacity).
2.3 Strategies and Payo¤s
It has already been mentioned in section 2.1 that the choice of adequate strategy spaces
depends on whether the underlying timing game is a war of attrition or a preemption
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game.14 So, it seems reasonable to proceed with showing that the closure timing game
proposed in this chapter is a war of attrition. It should be stressed that there does not
exist a uniform de…nition of this type of game. For example, Hendricks et al. (1988)
present a fairly general characterization of the war of attrition in continuous time with
complete information. However, it is straightforward to show that the payo¤ functions of
our closure timing game are too complex to satisfy their rather restrictive assumptions.
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) provide more general classifying criteria, but focus on timing
games with perfect information. Thus, as a prerequisite we have to modify their de…nition
to …t the imperfect-information case. Moreover, notice that the roles’ payo¤s in the
standard timing-game literature are de…ned as functions of the leader’s stopping time,
TL, which generally does not coincide with the root of the subgame, T. In Huisman and
Kort (1999) and this paper the roles’ payo¤s, however, are written as functions of the
root of the subgame, T, conditionally on the leader moving at T. To ensure compatibility,
we adopt the standard notation in the following two paragraphs and switch back to our
original notation afterwards.15
In accordance with the modi…ed de…nition of the roles’ payo¤s, if player i, i 2 f1; 2g,
gets assigned to the leader’s role and the leader stops before the follower’s optimal stop-
ping time, i.e. YL > YFj ; j 2 f1; 2g, i 6= j, then player i’s payo¤ function is given
by,
Li (YT; YL) = ET
24 TLZ
T
e¡½(t¡T) (Y (t)R (q; q)¡ Ciq) dt¡ e¡½(TL¡T)E
+
TFjZ
TL
e¡½(t¡T)
¡
Y (t)R
¡
q; q
¢¡ Ciq¢ dt
+
1Z
TFj
e¡½(t¡T)
¡
Y (t)R
¡
q; q
¢¡ Ciq¢ dt
375 ;
where TL = inf(t ¸ T jY (t) · YL ), YFj = YF jCF=Cj , and YF is de…ned in equation (2.13).
14See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for a general classi…cation of timing games.
15Alternatively, one could use the roles’ payo¤ functions as de…ned in the previous section and adapt
the classifying criteria. However, in this case the analogy to the criteria as suggested by Fudenberg and
Tirole (1991) would become less clear.
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Equivalently, if player i becomes the follower at YL > YFi, then i’s payo¤ can be written
as
Fi (YT; YL) = ET
24 TLZ
T
e¡½(t¡T) (Y (t)R (q; q)¡ Ciq) dt
+
TFiZ
TL
e¡½(t¡T)
¡
Y (t)R
¡
q; q
¢¡ Ciq¢ dt¡ e¡½(TFi¡T)E
+
1Z
TFi
e¡½(t¡T)
¡
Y (t)R
¡
q; q
¢¡ Ciq¢ dt
375 :
Now, with this modi…ed de…nitions of the roles’ payo¤s at hand, let us adapt the
classifying criteria for war-of-attrition games suggested by Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)
to cover the imperfect information case. That is, continuous-time timing games with
aggregate price uncertainty as de…ned by equation (2.1) can be viewed as wars of attrition
if they satisfy the following conditions: For all players i, i 2 f1; 2g, and all thresholds
YL; Y
0
L 2 (0; YT], (i) Fi(YT; YL) ¸ Fi(YT; Y 0L) for YL > Y 0L, (ii) Fi(YT; YL) ¸ Li(YT; Y 0L) for
YL > Y
0
L, (iii) Li(YT; YT) > lim YL!0Li(YT; YL), and (iv) lim YL!0 Li(YT; YL) = lim YL!0
Fi(YT; YL).
To show the validity of conditions (i) to (iv), let us assume without loss of generality
that C2 > C1 ) YF2 ¸ YF1 . Then one obtains for YL > YF2
F1 (YT; YL)¡ L1 (YT; YL)
= ET
264 TF2Z
TL
e¡½(t¡T)
£
Y (t)
¡
R
¡
q; q
¢¡R ¡q; q¢¢¡ C1 ¡q ¡ q¢¤ dt
+
TF1Z
TF2
e¡½(t¡T)
£
Y (t)
¡
R
¡
q; q
¢¡R ¡q; q¢¢¡ C1 ¡q ¡ q¢¤ dt
+
³
e¡½(TL¡T) ¡ e¡½(TF1¡T)
´
E
i
> ET
264 TF1Z
TL
e¡½(t¡T)
£
Y (t)
¡
R
¡
q; q
¢¡R ¡q; q¢¢¡ C1 ¡q ¡ q¢¤ dt
375
+ET
h
e¡½(TL¡T) ¡ e¡½(TF1¡T)
i
¢ E
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=
R
¡
q; q
¢¡R ¡q; q¢
±
£
£
"µ
YL
YT
¶¡¯ µ
YL ¡ 1¡ ¯¡¯ YF1
¶
+
µ
YF1
YT
¶¡¯
YF1
¡¯
#
> 0 ;
and
F2 (YT; YL)¡ L2 (YT; YL)
= ET
264 TF2Z
TL
e¡½(t¡T)
£
Y (t)
¡
R
¡
q; q
¢¡R ¡q; q¢¢¡ C2 ¡q ¡ q¢¤ dt
+
TF1Z
TF2
e¡½(t¡T)Y (t)
¡
R
¡
q; q
¢¡R ¡q; q¢¢ dt+ ³e¡½(TL¡T) ¡ e¡½(TF2¡T)´E
375
> ET
264 TF2Z
TL
e¡½(t¡T)
£
Y (t)
¡
R
¡
q; q
¢¡R ¡q; q¢¢¡ C2 ¡q ¡ q¢¤ dt
375
+ET
h
e¡½(TL¡T) ¡ e¡½(TF2¡T)
i
¢ E
=
R
¡
q; q
¢¡R ¡q; q¢
±
£
£
"µ
YL
YT
¶¡¯ µ
YL ¡ 1¡ ¯¡¯ YF2
¶
+
µ
YF2
YT
¶¡¯
YF2
¡¯
#
> 0 :
If YL · YF1; then the follower exercises his option immediately after the leader has done
so. Thus, the roles payo¤s are equal,
F2 (YT; YL) = L2 (YT; YL)
= ET
24 TLZ
T
e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)R (q; q)¡ Ciq] dt¡ e¡½(TL¡T)E
+
1Z
TL
e¡½(t¡T)
£
Y (t)R
¡
q; q
¢¡ Ciq¤ dt
35 :
If YL 2 (YF1 ; YF2 ], then only the high-cost …rm (…rm 2) …nds it optimal to move immedi-
ately after the leader conditionally on the low-cost …rm getting assigned to the leader’s
role. With interchanged roles, however, the low-cost …rm does not follow the high-cost
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…rm at YL, but waits until YF1 is reached. We get
F1 (YT; YL)¡ L1 (YT; YL)
= ET
264 TF1Z
TL
e¡½(t¡T)
£
Y (t)
¡
R
¡
q; q
¢¡R ¡q; q¢¢¡ C1 ¡q ¡ q¢¤ dt
375
+ET
h
e¡½(TL¡T) ¡ e¡½(TF1¡T)
i
¢ E
> ET
264 TF1Z
TL
e¡½(t¡T)
£
Y (t)
¡
R
¡
q; q
¢¡R ¡q; q¢¢¡ C1 ¡q ¡ q¢¤ dt
375
+ET
h
e¡½(TL¡T) ¡ e¡½(TF1¡T)
i
¢ E
=
R
¡
q; q
¢¡R ¡q; q¢
±
£
£
"µ
YL
YT
¶¡¯ µ
YL ¡ 1¡ ¯¡¯ YF1
¶
+
µ
YF1
YT
¶¡¯
YF1
¡¯
#
> 0 ;
and
F2 (YT; YL)¡ L2 (YT; YL) = ET
264 TF1Z
TL
e¡½(t¡T)Y (t)
¡
R
¡
q; q
¢¡R ¡q; q¢¢ dt
375 > 0:
Finally, notice that @Fi (YT; YL) =@YL > 0 8YL 2 (0; YT]. From these derivations it follows
immediately that the closure timing game proposed in this chapter satis…es the classifying
conditions (i) to (iv). Therefore, we do not need to resort to the extended strategy spaces
suggested by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985).
In what follows we give a full description of the …rms’ payo¤ functions. This can be
managed by combining the roles’ payo¤ functions and the …rms’ strategies in an adequate
way. Recall that each mixed strategy pro…le gives the probability of a certain assignment
of roles to players for every subgame and every state of the world at each instant of
time. By modifying the formalism of Pitchik (1982) let us state what we understand by
a strategy of a subgame of the timing game more precisely.
De…nition 1 A simple strategy for …rm i in the subgame starting at T = inf(t ¸
0 jY (t) · YT ), YT > 0, is a stochastic process GTi : [0;1) £ (­;F) ! [0; 1] satisfying
for all ! that GTi (¢; !) is non-decreasing and right-continuous.
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This condition represents the natural extension of the de…nition by Pitchik (1981,
p.208) to the imperfect information world. In section 2.1 we provided some intuition for
the above de…nition. From hereafter we suppress the upper index, T, and the second
functional argument, !; of Gi for the ease of notation, whenever there is no risk of
confusion. LetG¡i (t) = lims"tGi(s) and imposeG
¡
i (T) ´ 0, i 2 f1; 2g, i.e. the probability
that …rm i moves before the (sub)game has started equals zero. Then …rm i’s expected
payo¤ conditionally on Y having …rst reached YT is given by
Vi (YT; Gi; Gj)
= ET
24 1Z
T
e¡½(t¡T) (Y (t)R (q; q)¡ Ciq) (1¡Gi (t)) (1¡Gj (t)) dt
+
1Z
T
e¡½(t¡T)Li (Y (t)) (1¡Gj (t)) dGi (t)
+
1Z
T
e¡½(t¡T)Fi (Y (t)) (1¡Gi (t)) dGj (t) (2.33)
+
X
t¸T
e¡½(t¡T)
¡
Gi (t)¡G¡i (t)
¢ ¡
Gj (t)¡G¡j (t)
¢
Ii (Y (t))
#
;
where Fi (¢) = F (¢)jCF=Ci and Li (¢) = L (¢)jCL=Ci;CF=Cj ; i 6= j, i; j 2 f1; 2g. Further,
F (¢) ; L (¢), and Ii (¢) are de…ned by equations (2.12), (2.18), and (2.28), respectively.
By taking expectations contingent on the information that is available at the root of the
subgame T in equation (2.33) we generalize the corresponding payo¤ functions given in
Pitchik to account for the inherent uncertainty regarding future revenues: Recall that
the stochastic process Y …rst hits YT at T. The second line of equation (2.33) captures
the expected pro…ts ex ante to capacity-reduction. The third and the fourth line of
the formula give …rm i’s expected payo¤ from becoming the leader and the follower,
respectively, when i shuts down production facilities with probability Gi, while …rm j
moves with probability Gj. Finally, the …fth line of equation (2.33) determines …rm i’s
payo¤ if both …rms move simultaneously with positive probability. Some more de…nitions
are required. First, let us de…ne what is understood by a Nash equilibrium in simple
strategies.
De…nition 2 A pair of simple strategies G1(¢; ¢) and G2(¢; ¢) is a Nash equilibrium of the
43
timing game starting at YT (with neither …rm having yet reduced capacity) if each …rm’s
strategy maximizes its expected payo¤ Vi(YT; Gi; Gj); i; j 2 f1; 2g; i 6= j, holding the other
…rm’s strategy …xed.
Second, closed-loop strategies must satisfy the following intertemporal consistency
condition.
De…nition 3 A closed-loop strategy for …rm i is a collection of simple strategies
fGTi (¢; ¢)gYT>0 satisfying for all ! 2 ­ and 0 · u · v that GTi (T+ v) = GTi (T+u)+ (1¡
GTi (T+ u)) ¢GT+ui (T+ v):
Thus, a closed-loop strategy determines a simple strategy for every subgame YT > 0.
The condition ensures that …rms are aware of the intertemporal nature of the game, i.e.
…rms take into account that they have to reconsider tomorrow what is currently supposed
to be the optimal action at some future point in time if they do not move with probability
one today. In our case this requires GTi (T+ v) to be greater or equal than G
T+u
i (T+ v)
for 0 < u · v. Finally, let us de…ne what is meant by a subgame perfect equilibrium of
the timing game.
De…nition 4 A pair of closed-loop strategies fGT1 (¢; ¢)gYT>0 and fGT2 (¢; ¢)gYT>0 is a sub-
game perfect equilibrium if for every YT > 0 the simple strategies GT1 (¢; ¢) and GT2 (¢; ¢)
are a Nash equilibrium.
2.4 Equilibria
We start o¤ by examining the special case where …rms are identical, i.e. C1 = C2: Then
our analysis is extended to the general case, C1; C2 2 R+.
2.4.1 Identical Firms
The problem of determining the equilibria of the closure timing game simpli…es signi…-
cantly, when identical variable costs, i.e. C1 = C2 = C, are assumed. In this special case
each role’s payo¤ function does not di¤er across …rms,
L1 (¢) = L (¢)jCL=C1;CF=C2 = L2 (¢) = L (¢)jCL=C2;CF=C1 ;
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F1 (¢) = F (¢)jCL=C1 = F2 (¢) = F (¢)jCL=C2 ;
S1 (¢; ¢) = S2 (¢; ¢) = S (¢; ¢) and I1 (¢) = I2 (¢) = I (¢) ;
and the reduction thresholds can be ordered as
YF < YM = YL < YS1 = YS2 = YS¤
in the case of …rst-mover advantages (2.4), and
YM < YF = YL < YS1 = YS2 = YS¤
in the case of second-mover advantages (2.5). The following Lemma 4 suggests an order-
ing of the roles’ payo¤ functions that will turn out to be crucial in the derivation of the
equilibria of the timing game.
Lemma 4 Let C = C1 = C2: (i) Then it holds that
L (YT) < I (YT) · S (YT; YS¤) < F (YT) for YT > YF ;
L (YT) = I (YT) = S (YT; YS¤) = F (YT) for 0 · YT · YF :
(ii) L(¢) and F (¢) are strictly convex for YT > YF : S(¢; YS¤) is strictly convex for YT > YS¤.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
The graphs of F , L, S and I are depicted in Figure 2-2. Though L might be more
convex than F and/or S, as YT !1; F and S converge to higher ”fundamental values”
than L. The fundamental values are de…ned by
lim
YT!1
Ã
F (YT)¡
YTR
¡
q; q
¢
±
+
Cq
½
!
= 0;
lim
YT!1
Ã
L(YT)¡
YTR
¡
q; q
¢
±
+
Cq
½
+ E
!
= 0;
and
lim
YT!1
µ
S(YT)¡ YTR (q; q)
±
+
Cq
½
¶
= 0:
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Recall that R(q; q) > R(q; q) > R(q; q). The fundamental values are depicted by dashed
lines in Figure 2-2.
Exp. Profit
YS*YF
 
- VCl- E
- VCh
I(YT)
S(YT,YS*)
L(YT)
YT
F(YT)
Figure 2-2: Graphs of F , L, S, and I for Identical Firms; V Cl = C½ q and V Ch =
C
½
q.
It seems as if the subgame perfect equilibria of this game could be derived just by
having a closer look at Figure 2-2. Suppose that for any subgame starting at T < TF
or, equivalently, for any current position YT > YF of the stochastic process Y , there
exists a …rm choosing the leader’s role with positive probability. The ordering of payo¤
functions depicted in Figure 2-2 suggests that such a strategy will never be played in an
equilibrium of the timing game, since F (YT) > L(YT) implies that the potential leader
has an incentive to deviate, i.e. to postpone capacity reduction and to refrain from
giving up market shares. Because F (YT) > S(YT; YS¤) holds for T < TF , the same line
of arguments seems to apply to any strategy pro…le that induces simultaneous capacity
reduction. Each …rm has an individual incentive to deviate from simultaneous closure,
thereby attracting some of the rival’s market shares. Thus, our graphical approach points
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to the following equilibrium outcome: Both …rms decide to wait, until either the rival
chooses to play the leader’s role or market conditions become unfavorable enough, so that
…rms are forced to partially leave the market irrespective of what the rival does. We guess
that the latter scenario arises, when Y (t) …rst hits YF , since F (YF ) = L (YF ) = I(YF );
i.e. the …rms are indi¤erent between leading, following and moving simultaneously at
YF : So, simultaneous closure at YF seems to be a natural equilibrium candidate.
However, the graphs do not capture the costs of not assigning roles to players that
are captured by the ex-ante-to-closure revenues in the …rms’ payo¤ functions (see line
two of equation (2.33). If Y (t) is close to YF ; market conditions are su¢ciently bad, so
that the revenues ex ante to capacity reduction become negative. Thus, at each instant
of time, at which …rms do not ”agree upon” the equilibrium assignment of roles, they
accumulate losses from currently producing at the high capacity level. The question arises
whether these ”costs of coordination failure” are high enough to make at least one …rm
prefer the leader’s role and to o¤set the opportunity cost of the foregone market shares.
The following proposition indicates that the answer is closely linked to the presence of
…rst-mover versus second-mover advantages.
Proposition 3 (i) The asymmetric strategy pro…les (GT1 (t) ; GT2 (t)) = (G1 (t) ; G2 (t))
such that
Gi (t) =
8<: 0 for t < TM ;1 for t ¸ TM ; and Gj (t) =
8<: 0 for t < TF ;1 for t ¸ TF ;
for i; j 2 f1; 2g, i 6= j; are subgame perfect equilibria of the capacity-reduction game with
identical …rms and …rst-mover advantages.
(ii) The symmetric strategy pro…le (GT1 (t) ; G
T
2 (t)) = (G1 (t) ; G2 (t)) such that
Gi (t) =
8<: 0 for t < TF ;1 for t ¸ TF ;
for i 2 f1; 2g, is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the capacity-reduction game with iden-
tical …rms and second-mover advantages.
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
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Thus, in the case of second-mover advantages the costs of coordination failure do not
destroy the intuition that we gained from interpreting Figure 2-2. The reason is that with
second-mover advantages the threat of losing market shares carries more weight. First-
mover advantages that work into the same direction as the costs of coordination failure,
however, induce a strikingly di¤erent set of equilibria. Firms choose a kind of maximum
di¤erentiation outcome16, i.e. one obtains two asymmetric pure strategy equilibria, where
…rm i chooses the leader’s role at the myopic …rm’s threshold YM ; while …rm j follows
and reduces capacity at YF . Recall that YF and YL = YM were shown to represent the
optimal closure rules of …rms that get preassigned to the corresponding roles in Lemma
1 and Proposition 1, respectively.
The following nonexistence results considerably enforce the predictive power of the
pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria presented in Proposition 3.
Proposition 4 (i) In the capacity-reduction game with identical …rms and …rst-mover
advantages there does not exist any symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
(ii) In the capacity-reduction game with identical …rms and second-mover advantages
there does not exist any other symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium beside the one
given in Proposition 3.
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
In both cases there are additional asymmetric equilibria. Under the assumption of
…rst-mover advantages we get a continuum of pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria
(G1(t); G2(t)); where
Gi (t) =
8<: 0 for t < TM ;1 for t ¸ TM ; and Gj (t) =
8<: 0 for t < T 0;1 for t ¸ T 0; ;
i; j 2 f1; 2g, i 6= j; T 0 > TF . Under the assumption of second-mover advantages the
equivalent set of equilibria is given by (G1(t); G2(t)) such that
Gi (t) =
8<: 0 for t < TF ;1 for t ¸ TF ; and Gj (t) =
8<: 0 for t < T 0;1 for t ¸ T 0; ;
16This notion is borrowed from the literature about Hotelling’s spatial location game.
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i; j 2 f1; 2g, i 6= j; T 0 > TF . However, note that each of these equilibria generates the
same pattern of disinvestment timing than the corresponding equilibrium in Proposition
3. Their existence should be considered as an artefact of the speci…c construction of
the payo¤ functions. Recall that players do not choose closure times but roles. And
roles themselves are assumed to time the reduction of capacity optimally. Particularly,
the follower …nds it optimal to move at YF conditionally on the leader having moved
before or at YF . Since the assignment of the follower’s role is determined by the leading
player’s strategy and since moving …rst yields the same payo¤ than moving second or
moving simultaneously at all closure thresholds YT · YF , one can …nd a continuum of
equilibrium strategies of the follower, though we have a unique equilibrium outcome. We
stress that there does not exist any other asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium than
these ”arti…cial” ones.
The subsequent proposition excludes mixed-strategy equilibria.
Proposition 5 (i) In the capacity-reduction game with identical …rms and …rst-mover
advantages there does not exist any symmetric non-degenerate mixed strategy equilibrium
where strategies are restricted to be discrete lotteries over the space of thresholds.
(ii) In the capacity-reduction game with identical …rms and second-mover advantages
there does not exist any symmetric non-degenerate mixed strategy equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.8.
Another result is closely related to Proposition 3.
Proposition 6 Suppose that strategic interaction of …rms is driven by second-mover
advantages. Suppose further that …rms play the unique symmetric equilibrium strategy
pro…le suggested in part (ii) of Proposition 3. Let V ¤i (YT) denote the equilibrium payo¤
of …rm i, i 2 f1; 2g. Then
L (YT) < V
¤
i (YT) < S (YT; YS¤) for YT > YF ;
L (YT) = V
¤
i (YT) = S (YT; YS¤) for 0 · YT · YF ;
where YS¤ = YSi jCi=C and YSi is de…ned by equation (2.27).
Proof. See Appendix A.9.
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In the case of second-mover advantages Proposition 6 implies that …rms would Pareto-
improve their position if they were able to coordinate on reducing capacity simultaneously
at some threshold YS = minfYT; YS¤g > YF . However, joint disinvestment at YS never
prevails in equilibrium, since the net payo¤s from deviating and delaying disinvestment
are positive. Especially, …rms cannot commit to the cooperative optimum YS¤ . For that
reason one may characterize the capacity-reduction timing game with identical …rms and
second-mover advantages as a prisoners’ dilemma. Interestingly, we were not able to
establish an equivalent result in the case of …rst-mover advantages. Though the sum
of the duopolists’ values would be maximized if they could coordinate on playing the
monopolist’s optimal sequential disinvestment program, this strategy is not necessar-
ily Pareto-optimal. Of course, Pareto-optimality can be achieved by allowing for side
payments.
2.4.2 Heterogeneous Firms
In this subsection we return to the original model by relaxing the assumption of identical
costs, i.e. C1 might be di¤erent from C2.
Lemma 5 Let C1; C2 2 R+; Li (¢) = L (¢)jCL=Ci;YF=YFj , Fi (¢) = F (¢)jCF=Ci;YF=YFi , and
YFi = YF jCF=Ci, i 6= j, i; j 2 f1; 2g. Further, let TminF = inf(t ¸ T
¯¯
Y (t) · Y minF ) and
Y minF = YF jCF=minfC1;C2g.
(i) Then it holds that
Li (YT) = Ii (YT) = Si (YT; YSi) = Fi (YT) for 0 · YT · Y minF ;
Li (YT) · Ii (YT) · Si (YT; YSi) < Fi (YT) for YT > YFi, Ci < Cj;
Li (YT) < Ii (YT) · Si (YT; YSi) < Fi (YT) for YT > YFi, Ci > Cj:
(ii) Li(YT) is strictly convex for YT > YFj and Fi(YT) is strictly convex for YT > YFi.
Si(YT; YSi) is strictly convex for YT > YSi
Proof. See Appendix A.10.
Suppose without loss of generality that …rm 2 exhibits higher variable cost than …rm
1, i.e. C1 < C2 , YF1 < YF2. The corresponding graphs of Fi, Li, and Si, i 2 f1; 2g, are
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depicted in Figure 2-3.
YT
YF2
Exp. Profit
F1 S1
L1
F2
S2
L2
YF1
Assumption:     C1< C2
Figure 2-3: Graphs of Fi, Li, and Si, i 2 f1; 2g; in the General Case.
Let us begin with the closure scenario in the case of second-mover advantages. If
the ”prisoners’ dilemma e¤ect”, i.e. the payo¤ constellation that creates an incentive for
…rms to reduce capacity as late as possible, were still e¤ective in the general model, we
would expect that the competition for market shares ”forces” the high-cost …rm (…rm
2) not to adopt the leader’s role before Y (t) …rst hits YF1 where the low-cost …rm is
known to follow immediately (notice that L2(YT) < F2(YT) = S(YT; YS2) for YT > YF1 ;
but L2(YT) = F2(YT) = S(YT; YS2) for YT · YF1). Proposition 7 shows that this intuition
is indeed applicable if the di¤erence in variable cost is not too extreme. Nevertheless,
the equilibrium qualitatively di¤ers from the model with identical …rms, even if C2 ¡C1
becomes arbitrarily small: The low-cost …rm (…rm 1) adopting the leader’s role at any
YT , YF1 < YT · YF2 ; knows that its rival will follow immediately. Thus, …rm 1 yields
S1(YT; YT ) in this case. In section 2.2 we proved S1(YT; YS) to be increasing in YS for
51
all YS < YS1 . This implies that …rm 1 always prefers to adopt the leader’s role at
YL1 = minfYS1 ; YF2g rather than moving late at YF1 and, thereby, obtaining S1(YT; YF1).
Intuitively, its higher e¢ciency or more advanced production technology allows …rm 1
to avoid the extreme prisoners’ dilemma outcome and to realize a higher joint-reduction
payo¤ than in the identical …rm case.
If the di¤erence in variable cost exceeds a certain upper bound, the prisoners’ dilemma
e¤ect is predominated by a ”cost-pressure e¤ect” that forces the high-cost …rm to avoid
the ruinous run for market shares. In the proof of Proposition 1 we showed that the
high-cost …rm being preassigned to the leader’s role …nds it optimal to move at YL2 =
YM2 > YF1 , if CL ¡ CF = C2 ¡ C1 is su¢ciently large. Proposition 7 indicates that the
cost-pressure e¤ect indeed gives rise to an additional equilibrium, where …rm 2 moves
…rst at YL2 = YM2 and …rm 1 follows later at YF1 . However, the former equilibrium, where
…rm 1 reduces capacity at YL1 = minfYS1 ; YF2g and …rm 2 follows immediately, may still
occur for a wide range of parameter values implying that we obtain a multiplicity of
equilibrium outcomes. Proposition 7 says that the joint-reduction equilibrium vanishes
if the degree of heterogeneity becomes even more extreme.
Proposition 7 Let Fi; Si; Li; and YFi be de…ned by Lemma 5, and let YMi = YM jCM=Ci,
YM and YSi be de…ned by equations (2.20) and (2.27), respectively, i 2 f1; 2g. Let
C1 < C2 w.l.o.g. and suppose that condition (2.5) is satis…ed. Then R1 < 1 < R2,
YL1 = minfYS1; YF2g and YL2 = maxfYM2 ; YF1g according to Proposition 1. There exists
a unique threshold bY1 2 (YF1; YL1); YT ¸ YL1; such that
ET
h
e¡½(TL1¡T)I1(YL1)
i
=
ET
264 bT1Z
TL1
e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)R (q; q)¡ C1q] dt+ e¡½( bT1¡T)F1 ³bY1´
375 (2.34)
with TL1 = inf(t ¸ T jY (t) · YL1 ) and bT1 = inf(t ¸ T ¯¯¯Y (t) · bY1 ). If YL2 = YM2 ; then
there exists a unique threshold bY2 2 (YF1; YL2); YT ¸ YL2; such that
ET
h
e¡½(TL2¡T)L2(YL2)
i
=
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ET
264 bT2Z
TL2
e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)R (q; q)¡ C2q] dt+ e¡½( bT2¡T)I2 ³bY2´
375 (2.35)
with TL2 = inf(t ¸ T jY (t) · YL2 ) and bT2 = inf(t ¸ T ¯¯¯Y (t) · bY2 ).
(i) If YL1 ¸ bY2 _ YL2 = YF1 ; then all strategy pro…les (GT1 (t) ; GT2 (t)) = (G1 (t) ; G2 (t))
such that
G1 (t) =
8<: 0 for t < TL1 ;1 for t ¸ TL1 ; and G2 (t) =
8<: 0 for t < T 02;1 for t ¸ T 02;
with T 02 = inf(t ¸ T
¯¯
Y (t) · Y 0
2
) ¸ TF1 = inf(t ¸ T jY (t) · YF1 ) are pure strategy
subgame perfect equilibria of the general capacity-reduction game.
(ii) If YL2 = YM2 ¸ bY1, then all strategy pro…les (GT1 (t) ; GT2 (t)) = (G1 (t) ; G2 (t)) such
that
G1 (t) =
8<: 0 for t < T 01;1 for t ¸ T 01; and G2 (t) =
8<: 0 for t < TL2 ;1 for t ¸ TL2 ;
with T 01 = inf(t ¸ T jY (t) · Y 01 ) ¸ TF1 are pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria of the
general capacity-reduction game.
(iii) If YL2 < bY1; then there does not exist any other pure strategy subgame perfect equi-
librium of the general capacity-reduction game than those proposed in part (i).
If YL1 = YS1 < bY2; then there does not exist any other pure strategy subgame perfect
equilibrium of the general capacity-reduction game than those proposed in part (ii).
Otherwise all elements of the union of sets of equilibria proposed in part (i) and (ii) are
pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria of the general capacity-reduction game.
Proof. See Appendix A.11.
Note that all strategy pro…les with GT2 (t) = Ift·Tg for T 2 [bT1; TF1); T · bT1, I
denoting the indicator function, in part (i) of the above proposition constitute Nash
equilibria of the general timing game. But they can be excluded by the requirement of
subgame perfection. The same argument applies with respect to all strategy pro…les such
that GT1 (t) = Ift·Tg for T 2 [bT2; TF1); T · bT2; in part (ii). Moreover, the multiplicity of
equilibria in part (i) and (ii), respectively, can be regarded as an artefact of the speci…c
construction of the payo¤ functions. We already justi…ed that view with respect to the
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continuum of asymmetric equilibria in the identical …rm case. Again, one can …nd a
continuum of equilibrium strategies of the follower, though we have a unique equilibrium
outcome in part (i) and (ii), respectively.
In the case of …rst-mover advantages the set of equilibrium strategy pro…les does not
vary, but the number of possible equilibrium outcomes increases. One might guess that
both asymmetric equilibria from the identical …rm model carry over to the general case
when just a small di¤erence in variable cost is introduced. Note that with a small cost
di¤erence Proposition 1 suggests that the low-cost (high-cost) …rm being preassigned to
the leader’s role …nds it optimal to move at YL1 = YM1 > YF1 (YL2 = YM2 > YL1). In the
following proposition the threshold eY2 2 (YF1 ; YL2) is de…ned such that the high-cost …rm
is indi¤erent between adopting the leader’s role at YL2 or following at eY2: If YL1 < eY2;
then the high-cost …rm prefers to attract the …rst-mover advantage rather than additional
market shares and always takes over the leader’s role. However, since YL2 # YL1 > YF1
and eY2 # YF1 for C2 # C1, the equilibrium that assigns the leader’s role to the low-cost
…rm survives the introduction of heterogeneity if the di¤erence in variable cost stays
su¢ciently small. Thus, by slightly departing from the identical …rm model one obtains
both asymmetric equilibria.
When the di¤erence in variable cost gets more signi…cant, one might expect that
the ”cost-pressure e¤ect” makes the high-cost …rm less patient in the sense that an
equilibrium assignment of roles with the high-cost …rm becoming the follower is observed
less likely. Proposition 8 reveals that this intuition indeed applies. With a high di¤erence
in variable cost Proposition 1 suggests that the low-cost …rm being preassigned to the
leader’s role …nds it optimal to move at YL1 = minfYS1; YF2g · YF2 : If YL1 < eY2, then
the sequential disinvestment equilibrium, where the high-cost …rm disinvests before its
rival, is unique. If YL1 ¸ eY2, then there exists an additional joint-reduction equilibrium
where the low-cost …rm adopts the leader’s role at YL1 but the high-cost …rm follows
immediately. Thus, the other sequential disinvestment equilibrium in which the high-
cost …rm delays capacity reduction compared to the low-cost …rm has vanished.
Proposition 8 Let C1 < C2 w.l.o.g. and suppose that condition (2.4) is satis…ed. Then
R1 < R2 < 1; YL1 = minfmaxfYM1 ; YF2g; YS1g and YL2 = YM2 according to Proposition
1. Let eT2 = inf(t ¸ T ¯¯¯Y (t) · eY2 ) and let T 01 and T 02 be de…ned as in Proposition 7. There
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exists a unique threshold eY2; YT ¸ YL2; such that
ET
h
e¡½(TL2¡T)L2(YL2)
i
=
ET
264 eT2Z
TL2
e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)R (q; q)¡ C2q] dt+ e¡½( eT2¡T)F2
³eY2´
375 (2.36)
if eY2 2 (YF2; YL2), and
ET
h
e¡½(TL2¡T)L2(YL2)
i
=
ET
264 eT2Z
TL2
e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)R (q; q)¡ C2q] dt+ e¡½( eT2¡T)I2
³eY2´
375 (2.37)
if eY2 2 (YF1; YF2 ].
(i) If YL1 ¸ eY2; then all strategy pro…les (GT1 (t) ; GT2 (t)) = (G1 (t) ; G2 (t)) such that
Gi (t) =
8<: 0 for t < TLi ;1 for t ¸ TLi ; and Gj (t) =
8<: 0 for t < T 0j ;1 for t ¸ T 0j ;
with T 0j ¸ TF1 ; i; j 2 f1; 2g, i 6= j, are pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria of the
general capacity-reduction game.
(ii) If YL1 < eY2; then there does not exist any other pure strategy subgame perfect equilib-
rium of the general capacity-reduction game than the equilibria proposed in part (i) that
satisfy i = 2 and j = 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.12.
There exist parameterizations of the closure timing model with …rst-mover advantages
where the joint-reduction outcome does not occur for any pair of cost parameters C1; C2;
C1 < C2, such that YL1 = minfYS1 ; YF2g. The inequality
R1
R2 ¡ 1¡R
¯¡2
2
µ
R1 + R2¡¯ ¡
1¡ ¯
¡¯
¶
< 0 (2.38)
that is derived from equation (2.36) represents a su¢cient condition for the non-occurrence
of the joint-reduction equilibrium. Let us brie‡y verify this assertion. Suppose that
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the model is parameterized such that YL1 attains a maximum with respect to C1 con-
ditionally on YL1 = minfYS1; YF2g. According to Proposition 1, this is ful…lled for
C = R2 ) YL1 = YF2 . Given the parameterization C = R2 the condition says that,
if the right-hand side of equation (2.36) is still greater than its left-hand side at the
greatest lower bound of eY2, eY2 = YF2 ; then eY2 > YL1 = YF2 for all C1; C2 such that
YL1 = minfYS1 ; YF2g. Inequality (2.38) is certainly not satis…ed if the …rst-mover ad-
vantage vanishes (R2 = 1). However, it is certainly valid if the …rst-mover advantage
increases without bound (R2 ! 0). This is the result that we have expected. Intuition
suggests that a higher …rst-mover advantage makes the occurrence of a ”di¤usion” equi-
librium outcome—one …rm adopts the leaders role, the other …rm follows ”later”—more
likely.
As in the model with second-mover advantages there are some Nash equilibria of
the supergame that do not satisfy subgame perfection. Moreover, the same multiplicity
regarding the follower’s equilibrium strategies arises due to the speci…c construction of
the players’ payo¤ functions.
A reasonable extension of the general capacity-reduction model is to allow …rms not
only to be heterogeneous with respect to variable cost but also with respect to initial
size. We will not develop a formal model but illustrate the main issues by discussing
some special cases. Let us assume that …rm 1 is initially bigger than …rm 2, i.e. q1 > q2.
The crucial relation that determines whether the same qualitative results—especially,
the same disinvestment sequence in equilibrium—as in Proposition 7 or Proposition 8
can be obtained is given by the ordering YF1 < YF2 . If YF1 > YF2 holds instead, then
the qualitative equilibrium outcomes still applies but with interchanged roles. So, let us
compare the thresholds,
YF1 < YF2 ,
(C2=½)
³
q2 ¡ q2
´
¡ E2
(C1=½)
³
q1 ¡ q1
´
¡ E1
>
R2
³
q2; q1
´
¡R2
³
q
2
; q
1
´
R1
³
q1; q2
´
¡R1
³
q
1
; q
2
´ ; (2.39)
where Ri(qi; qj) = D(qi + qj) ¢ qi; i; j 2 f1; 2g, i 6= j. Let us assume that the adjustment
cost depend linearly on the amount of reduced capacity, Ei = k ¢ (qi¡qi) with k denoting
the closure cost per retired unit. Further, suppose that analogous conditions on gross
revenues are satis…ed as in the identical …rm case, i.e. Ri(qi; qj) > Ri(qi; qj) > Ri(qi; qj)
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> Ri(qi; qj).
Example 2 Write q
i
= ciqi, ci 2 (0; 1), i 2 f1; 2g. Let us consider the special case,
where both …rms reduce capacity by the same percentage, i.e. c = c1 = c2. Then,
inequality (2.39) can be rewritten as
(C2=½)¡ k
(C1=½)¡ k >
D
³
q
1
+ q2
´
¡ cD
³
q
1
+ q
2
´
D
³
q1 + q2
´
¡ cD
³
q
1
+ q
2
´ > 1
due to q
1
+ q2 < q1+ q2. Thus, if …rm 1’s production technology is not su¢ciently better
than …rm 2’s technology, then YF1 > YF2. According to Proposition 7, in the case of
second-mover advantages, we either obtain a sequential equilibrium with the bigger …rm
closing …rst or a joint-reduction equilibrium. With …rst-mover advantages (see Propo-
sition 8) an additional equilibrium with the smaller …rm disinvesting …rst may prevail,
though its occurrence gets less likely if the di¤erence between …rms becomes more sig-
ni…cant. Though the set-up is di¤erent from the market exit model by Ghemawat and
Nalebu¤ (1985), the result turns out to be similar. Their model suggests that the big-
ger …rm quits …rst in the absence of economics of scale. The authors point out that
considerable economics of scale may soften or even reverse this equilibrium outcome.
Example 3 Next let us assume that q
1
= q
2
= q > 0. This setting is much closer to the
model by Ghemawat and Nalebu¤ than the one above. Notice that q
1
= q
2
= q = 0 would
represent an exit scenario. Nevertheless, it becomes signi…cantly less likely that the bigger
…rm moves …rst under the new assumption. This can be seen by applying the assumption
to inequality (2.39). We obtain
(C2=½)¡ k
(C1=½)¡ k >
D
¡
q2 + q
¢
q2 ¡D
¡
2q
¢
q
D
¡
q1 + q
¢
q1 ¡D
¡
2q
¢
q
¢ q1 ¡ q
q2 ¡ q
:
The right-hand side of this inequality is smaller than or equal to one if and only if
D
¡
q2 + q
¢
q2
¡
q1 ¡ q
¢¡D ¡q1 + q¢ q1 ¡q2 ¡ q¢¡D ¡2q¢ q (q1 ¡ q2) · 0:
Note that the …rst term is greater than the second one if D(¢) is downward slopping.
Nevertheless, due to the third term the inequality might well be satis…ed given that q > 0.
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In this case the di¤erence in variable cost does not have any e¤ect on the qualitative
equilibrium outcome that always excludes the bigger …rm from moving …rst in the case
of second-mover advantages. According to Proposition 7, either the smaller …rm moves
…rst or both …rms reduce capacity simultaneously even if the di¤erence in variable cost
C2 ¡ C1 > 0 becomes arbitrarily small. The same equilibrium outcomes prevail in the
closure timing model with …rst-mover advantages if the di¤erence in initial size q1¡q2 > 0
is not too small. These results contrast with the …ndings by Ghemawat and Nalebu¤.
2.5 Welfare Analysis
In this section we brie‡y address some welfare issues for the special case of identical …rms
(or production units). The social planner equipped with a chain of two closure options—
one option to reduce capacity from 2q to q+q and a subsequent option to reduce capacity
from q + q to 2q—maximizes consumers’ surplus net of production cost by timing the
exercise of these options optimally.17 Principally, the social planner may decide to reduce
capacity sequentially or to shut down both production units at the same time. That is,
either he chooses two distinct closure thresholds Y 0W and Y
00
W , Y
0
W > Y
00
W , or he exercises
both options simultaneously at YW . Suppose that a sequential disinvestment pattern is
socially optimal. Then Y 0W and Y
00
W are the solutions to the welfare maximization problem
maxY 0W ;Y 00W W
seq(YT) with
W seq (YT) = ET
264 T
0
WZ
T
2qZ
0
e¡½(t¡T) (Y (t)D (q)¡ C) dqdt
+
T 00WZ
T 0W
q+qZ
0
e¡½(t¡T) (Y (t)D (q)¡ C) dqdt
+
1Z
T 00W
2qZ
0
e¡½(t¡T) (Y (t)D (q)¡ C) dqdt
¡
³
e¡½(T
0
W¡T) + e¡½(T
00
W¡T)
´
E
i
;
17Since we assumed constant marginal cost of production, maximizing consumers’ surplus is equivalent
to maximizing total welfare.
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T 0W = inf(t ¸ T jY (t) · Y 0W ) and T 00W = inf(t ¸ T jY (t) · Y 00W ) and ½ denoting the social
discount rate. According to earlier …ndings we can explicitly express the welfare function
in terms of the closure thresholds,
W seq (YT) =
YT
±
2qZ
0
D (q) dq ¡ C ¢ 2q
½
¡
µ
Y 0W
YT
¶¡¯0B@Y 0W
±
2qZ
q+q
D (q) dq ¡ C
¡
q ¡ q¢
½
+ E
1CA
¡
µ
Y 00W
YT
¶¡¯0B@Y 00W
±
q+qZ
2q
D (q) dq ¡ C
¡
q ¡ q¢
½
+ E
1CA :
The …rst-order condition with respect to Y 0W ,
1¡ ¯
±
µ
Y 0W
YT
¶¡¯0B@ 2qZ
q+q
D (q) dq ¡ ¡¯±
1¡ ¯
(C=½)
¡
q ¡ q¢¡E
Y 0W
1CA = 0;
is satis…ed for Y 0W = 0, ¯ < ¡1, and
Y 0W =
¡¯±
1¡ ¯
(C=½)
¡
q ¡ q¢¡ER 2q
q+q
D (q) dq
: (2.40)
The second-order condition reveals that only the second value is a maximizer of social
welfare. With respect to Y 00W a similar result is obtained. The maximizing argument
turns out to be
Y 00W =
¡¯±
1¡ ¯
(C=½)
¡
q ¡ q¢¡ER q+q
2q
D (q) dq
: (2.41)
Now, suppose that the social planner …nds it optimal to exercise both options simulta-
neously at some threshold YW that is the solution to the maximization problem maxYW
W sim(YT) with
W sim (YT) = ET[
TWZ
T
2qZ
0
e¡½(t¡T) (Y (t)D (q)¡ C) dqdt
59
+1Z
TW
2qZ
0
e¡½(t¡T) (Y (t)D (q)¡ C) dqdt¡ 2e¡½(TW¡T)E]:
The welfare function can be rewritten as
W sim (YT) =
YT
±
2qZ
0
D (q) dq ¡ C ¢ 2q
½
¡
µ
YW
YT
¶¡¯0B@YW
±
2qZ
2q
D (q) dq ¡ 2C
¡
q ¡ q¢
½
+ 2E
1CA :
The …rst-order condition with respect to YW ,
(1¡ ¯)
±
µ
YW
YT
¶¡¯0B@ 2qZ
2q
D (q) dq ¡ ¡2¯±
1¡ ¯
(C=½)
¡
q ¡ q¢¡ E
YW
1CA = 0;
is satis…ed for YW = 0, ¯ < ¡1, and
YW =
¡2¯±
1¡ ¯
(C=½)
¡
q ¡ q¢¡ ER 2q
2q
D (q) dq
: (2.42)
The second-order condition reveals that only the second value is a maximizer of social
welfare. As one would expect, we have YW = Y 0W = Y
00
W , if and only if
R 2q
q+q
D(q)dq =R q+q
2q
D(q)dq. A …rst conclusion about the socially optimal timing of capacity reduction
can be drawn:
Proposition 9 The social planner exercises the closure options sequentially at Y 0W and
Y 00W as given by equations (2.40) and (2.41), respectively, if
2qZ
q+q
D (q) dq <
q+qZ
2q
D (q) dq:
He exercises both options simultaneously at YW as given by equation (2.42), if
2qZ
q+q
D (q) dq ¸
q+qZ
2q
D (q) dq:
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As the intervals [2q; q + q] and [q + q; 2q] are of equal length, a su¢cient condition
for the …rst inequality to be satis…ed is a downward slopping inverse demand function
on [2q; 2q]. Since we expect D(q) to be well-behaved in this sense, we conclude that
a sequential disinvestment pattern is likely to be observed under the social planner’s
regime.
Next, let us compare the socially optimal closure thresholds with the disinvestment
thresholds YP , YF , YM , YS¤, Y 0O and Y
00
O which are known from equations (2.21), (2.13),
(2.20), (2.27), (2.29) and (2.30), respectively. Note that the denominators of Y 0W and Y
00
W ,R 2q
q+q
D(q)dq and
R q+q
2q
D(q)dq, can be rewritten as
R 1
c
D((1+³)q)qd³ and
R 1
c
D((³+c)q)qd³
with c = q=q 2 (0; 1). Further assume that D is a downward slopping C1 function. To
order Y 0W and the price taker’s threshold YP by size, we compare the denominators,
YP R Y 0W ,
2qZ
q+q
D (q) dq R D (2q)
¡
q ¡ q¢
,
1Z
c
D ((1 + ³) q) qd³ R D (2q) (1¡ c) q:
For c ! 1; both sides of the latter inequality converge to zero, i.e. limc!1 YP =
limc!1 Y 0W = +1. However, for c ! 0 and D being strictly decreasing, the area under
the curve of D(q) given by the resulting left-hand side expression,
R 2q
q
D(q)dq; becomes
strictly greater than the area of the rectangle D(2q)q on the inequality’s right-hand side.
Moreover, by Leibniz’ rule,
d
·
1R
c
D ((1 + ³) q) qd³
¸
dc
= ¡D ((1 + c) q) q
<
d [D (2q) (1¡ c) q]
dc
= ¡D (2q) q = const:
for all c 2 (0; 1). The derivatives are equal for c! 1. This implies that Y 0W > YP holds
given a minimal set of assumptions on the inverse demand function D. The relevant
thresholds in the case of second-mover advantages can be ordered as follows,
0 < Y 00W < Y
0
W < YP < YM < YF < YS¤: (2.43)
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In the case of …rst-mover advantages it should be analyzed whether the social plan-
ner delays his disinvestment decision as compared to the equilibrium follower, since we
detected some ambiguity in the ordering of thresholds. We impose the additional as-
sumption that limm!+1D(m) ¢ m = 0. Further, note that the denominator of Y 00W ,R q+q
2q
D(q)dq, can be rewritten as
R ec
1
D((1+ ³)q)qd³ with ec = q=q 2 (1;+1). To compare
Y 00W with the follower’s threshold YF , we write
YF R Y 00W ,
q+qZ
2q
D (q) dq R D
¡
q + q
¢
q ¡D ¡2q¢ q
,
ecZ
1
D
¡
(1 + ³) q
¢
qd³ R D
¡
(1 + ec) q¢ecq ¡D ¡2q¢ q:
For ec ! 1; both sides of the latter inequality converge to zero, i.e. limec!1 YF =
limec!1 Y 00W = +1. However, for ec ! +1; D being strictly decreasing and m =
o(1=D(m)), the resulting left-hand side integral,
R +1
1
D((1+³)q)qd³, exists and is strictly
positive, while the expression on the right-hand side converges to ¡D(2q)q < 0. By Leib-
niz’ rule,
d
" ecR
1
D
¡
(1 + ³) q
¢
qd³
#
dec = D ¡(1 + ec) q¢ q
>
d
£
D
¡
(1 + ec) q¢ecq ¡D ¡2q¢ q¤
dec = D0 ¡(1 + ec) q¢ecq2 +D ¡(1 + ec) q¢ q
for all ec 2 (1;+1). This implies that Y 00W > YF holds if the inverse demand function D
satis…es the imposed conditions.
Next, let us compare Y 0W and YF : We introduce the additional assumption that con-
sumers have a …nite reservation price, i.e. D(0) < +1. One obtains
YF R Y 0W ,
2qZ
q+q
D (q) dq R D
¡
q + q
¢
q ¡D ¡2q¢ q
,
1Z
c
D ((1 + ³) q) qd³ R D ((1 + c) q) q ¡D (2cq) cq:
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For c ! 1; both sides of the latter inequality converge to zero, i.e. limc!1 YF =
limc!1 Y 0W = +1. However, for c! 0; D being strictly decreasing and D(0) < +1, the
left-hand side integral,
R 2q
q
D(q)dq; becomes strictly smaller than the resulting expression
on the right-hand side, D(q)q. By Leibniz’ rule,
d
·
1R
c
D ((1 + ³) q) qd³
¸
dc
= ¡D ((1 + c) q) q;
while the right-hand side’s derivative with respect to c is given by
D0 ((1 + c) q) q2 ¡D0 (2cq) 2cq2 ¡D (2cq) q:
Note that
lim
c!1
£
D0 ((1 + c) q) q2 ¡D0 (2cq) 2cq2 ¡D (2cq) q¤
> lim
c!1
[¡D ((1 + c) q) q], ¡D0 (2q) q2 > 0;
implying that there exists " > 0 such that YF > Y 0W for c 2 (1¡ "; 1). However, if c gets
small enough, then the reverse relation, YF < Y 0W , holds. The second derivative of the
expression on the right hand-side with respect to c,
q3 [D00 ((1 + c) q)¡ 4cD00 (2cq)¡ 4D0 (2cq)] ;
reveals that the right-hand side is strictly convex in c, if D00 is not too large in absolute
value. In this case there exists a unique c¤ such that YF > Y 0W for c > c
¤ and YF < Y 0W
for c < c¤. We conclude that the relevant thresholds in a closure timing model with
…rst-mover advantages can be ordered as follows,
Y 00W < Y
0
W < YP < min fYM ; Y 00Og < max fYM ; Y 00Og < YS¤ < Y 0O (2.44)
and
YF 2 (Y 00W ;min fYM ; Y 00Og) :
63
Moreover, we point out that the more the follower’s closure option resembles an exit
option the more likely it gets that the follower reduces capacity after the social planner
has exercised his …rst option. A similar result was obtained in section 2.2 with respect to
the ordering of YM and Y 00O , Thus, if c becomes su¢ciently small, we obtain the following
ordering of thresholds in the model with …rst-mover advantages,
Y 00W < YF < Y
0
W < YP < YM < Y
00
O < YS¤ < Y
0
O: (2.45)
Some conclusions can be drawn. First, by choosing a sequential rather than simulta-
neous disinvestment pattern, the social planner realizes the full value of owning a chain
of options rather than one single option. Notice that holding a chain of options—one
option to reduce capacity from 2q to q + q and a subsequent option to reduce capacity
from q + q to 2q—adds at least as much value to the owner’s position as just holding a
single option to reduce capacity from 2q to 2q. By exercising the chain of options simul-
taneously the holder may always realize the same disinvestment pattern as the holder of
the single option. The former option holder, however, can choose among an in…nite num-
ber of additional disinvestment patterns. Thus, he cannot be worse o¤. In contrast to
the monopolist’s value function, social welfare is not exposed to forces that work via the
deterministic part of the demand function and may reduce the additional option value
to zero. So the natural outcome is Y 00W < Y
0
W .
Second, the ordering (2.45) reveals that the standard real options theory rules are
not only inadequate when deriving the precise closure timing of duopolists. These rules
might not even serve as benchmarks. An intuitive approach might suggest that duopolists
reduce capacity earlier than price takers but later than a monopolist. According to the
ordering (2.45), this intuition does not have general validity.
Third, due to the fact that W seq > W sim and W sim strictly decreases, if one raises
YW above its optimal level (2.41), the ordering (2.43) together with Y 00W < YW < Y
0
W
implies that the closure timing of price taking and myopic …rms is socially preferable
to the equilibrium timing of two fully rational competitors in a duopoly with second-
mover advantages. Moreover, we conclude that the cooperative outcome YS¤ must be
even worse in terms of social welfare. The picture appears to be more ambiguous in the
case of …rst-mover advantages (see the ordering (2.44) and (2.45)). There might exist
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extreme scenarios—especially, if …rms’ closure decisions are almost equivalent to exit
scenarios—where (sequential) disinvestment in duopoly occurs even later on average than
disinvestment in a market with price-taking …rms. In these cases duopolistic competition
leads to a disinvestment pattern that might well be socially preferable to the closure
behavior of price-taking …rms. Of course, the closure timing of price takers compared to
the monopolist’s closure timing should be ranked with respect to social welfare as in the
case of second-mover advantage.
These considerations have some immediate implications for policy issues. The unique
symmetric equilibrium outcome YF in the case of second-mover advantages and the se-
quential disinvestment pattern (YF ; YM) in the case of …rst-mover advantages can be seen
as the best achievable cartels. Since the cooperative optima has been shown to be worse
than the cartel outcomes from the point of view of the social planner, regulation author-
ities should adopt a restrictive approach to the assessment of mergers and cooperation
in declining industries or markets with excess capacities. Our results contrast with the
…ndings of Weeds (2000) who recommends a loose regulation policy with respect to joint
ventures in R&D investment projects. We conclude that it depends on the industry’s
potential for future growth whether a restrictive or a loose regulation policy is socially
optimal.
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Chapter 3
Investment Options and Preemption
Games
In contrast to the optimal exercise policies for closure options, the related timing problem
of investment options in duopoly has been studied in the literature. In chapter 1 sev-
eral papers that derive and investigate the equilibrium investment thresholds in duopoly
were mentioned. We think that the recent working paper by Huisman and Kort (1999)
represents the most advanced contribution. The authors do not restrict their analysis to
pure strategies and, thereby, obtain additional equilibrium outcomes that are likely to
occur in an investment timing game with two identical …rms. For this reason we prefer to
discuss Huisman and Kort’s model rather than an alternative approach in this chapter.
Note, however, that we do not con…ne ourselves to review their …ndings, but supplement
some own results. First, we give formal de…nitions of strategy spaces and payo¤ functions
that are missing in Huisman and Kort’s paper. Second, to assess the strategic value of
investment and to compare the duopoly outcome with the predictions of the standard
real options theory, we investigate the behavior of a price-taking …rm and of a monopo-
list. Third, with respect to the electric utility industry in Germany we provide evidence
that a collusion-type equilibrium would prevail if the two largest utilities, RWE and Eon,
entered into an investment timing game.
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3.1 Model Set-Up
The model set-up resembles the one presented in section 2.1. However, some minor
changes have to be introduced—in particular, with respect to strategies and payo¤ func-
tions. Again, let us consider a duopolistic market in continuous time. As in section 2.1
we assume a constant output-to-capital ratio, i.e. the two risk neutral …rms currently
produce at the constant capacity level, qi =q, i 2 f1; 2g. The competitors contemplate
investment in new production facilities which irreversibly raises qi to the higher capacity
and output ‡ow level q. Firms are assumed to hold just a single investment option rather
than a chain of options. By extending its capacity by q¡q, …rm i incurs the lump-sum
cost1 E. For ease of exposition we con…ne ourselves to the case of identical …rms. More-
over, without loss of generality, we set the variable cost of production of …rm i to zero,
Ci = C = 0.
Firms face an inverse industry demand that is identical to the price model de…ned by
equation (2.1). The assumptions about …rm i’s gross revenue function also remain the
same as in section 2.1 with a single exception. Huisman and Kort (1999) stick to the
standard setting used in the literature and focus on the case of …rst-mover advantages.
So, in our notation we have
R
¡
q; q
¢¡R ¡q; q¢ > R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢ :
By analogy with chapter 2, this set-up also establishes a timing game in continuous
time under imperfect information. However, there is a crucial di¤erence. While the clo-
sure timing game of chapter 2 constitutes a war of attrition, the investment timing game
turns out to be a preemption game as will be explained in the next section. Fudenberg
and Tirole (1985) suggest a formalization of strategy spaces and payo¤s for preemption
games in continuous time under perfect information. They describe a player’s mixed
strategy as a tupel (Gti(s); ®
t
i(s)). The …rst entry, G
t
i(s), denotes the same cumulative
probability as in chapter 2. The tupel’s second entry, ®ti(s); represents the ”intensity”
with which players move at times ”just after” Gti(s) jumps to one. That is, ®
t
i(s) will
1For variables that have an analogous meaning to the quantities in the closure timing game, we use
the same notation as in chapter 2. Hopefully, there is no risk of confusion.
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represent the ”intensity” of an ”interval of consecutive atoms” according to Fudenberg
and Tirole (p.391).
Extending formerly common strategy spaces for timing games by a second dimen-
sion enables us to determine properly the continuous-time analogues of the equilibria of
discrete-time games of timing. Fudenberg and Tirole motivate this point by introducing
the ”grab-the-dollar-game” example. In what follows we present a modi…ed version of
this game.
Example 4 Suppose that there are two …rms with common discount rate ½ = 0 playing a
game of investment timing in discrete time s = 0; 1; 2; :::. The game ends in period s if at
least one …rm invests in s and no …rm has invested previously. Further, suppose that …rm
i’s investment probability, Gti(s), does not depend on s and t, i.e. G
t
i(s) = Gi = const:,
i 2 f1; 2g. Then G1 (G2) denotes the probability that …rm 1 (…rm 2) plays the …rst row
(the …rst column) in the matrix depicted in Table 3.1. Firm i yields a payo¤ of L if it
becomes the leading …rm in period s, i.e. the only …rm that invests in the current period.
In this case …rm j’s payo¤ is F , j 2 f1; 2g, j 6= i. If both …rms invest simultaneously, they
are paid I. Otherwise the game is repeated. The payo¤s can be ordered as I < F < L:
Since the leader’s payo¤ exceeds the follower’s payo¤, the timing game is of the preemption
type. Firm i’s expected payo¤ is given by
¤ ¢
1X
t=0
·
(1¡Gi) (1¡Gj)
1 + ½
¸t
=
¤
Gi +Gj ¡GiGj ;
where
¤ = GiGjI +Gi (1¡Gj)L+ (1¡Gi)GjF:
The unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium is (Gi; Gj) = (G¤; G¤) with G¤ = (L¡
F )=(L ¡ I) > 0. Consequently, a ”mistake”—an equilibrium outcome where both …rms
invest simultaneously—occurs with probability (G¤)2 > 0. Note that the probability that by
any positive time a …rm has tried to invest equals
P1
t=0(1¡G¤)2t[G¤(2¡G¤)] = 1. Thus,
as the period length goes to zero, ¢s ! 0, the probability that investment takes place in
period s = 0 converges to one implying that …rms’ strategies should be represented by a
unit mass at time zero, i.e. G0i (s) = 1 for all s ¸ 0, i 2 f1; 2g. It follows that a mistake
occurs almost surely at s = 0, though the limiting value of the probability of mistake is
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Table 3.1: Payo¤ Matrix of Investment Game
…rm 2
G2 1¡G2
G1 (I; I) (L;F )
…rm 1
1¡G1 (F; L) repeat game
P1
t=0(1¡G¤)2t(G¤)2 = G¤(2¡G¤)¡1 < 1. Further, G0i (s) = 1 implies that the probability
of …rm i being the only …rm that invests at s = 0 equals zero. However, the limiting value
of that probability is represented by
P1
t=0(1¡G¤)2tG¤(1¡G¤) = (1¡G¤)(2¡G¤)¡1 > 0.
The example makes evident that the speci…cation of strategy spaces and payo¤ func-
tions as used in wars of attrition—such as the closure timing game of chapter 2—should
not be applied in preemption games, since it does not allow the symmetric discrete-time
equilibrium, where coordination failure occurs with probability less than one, to ”sur-
vive” the transition into continuous time. According to Fudenberg and Tirole (p.390),
passing to the continuous-time limit involves a ”loss of information”.
For this reason it was suggested to extend the strategy space known from chapter
2 by the additional function ®ti(s). Let ¿ i(t) ¸ t denote the minimum time at which
Gti jumps to one, that is, G
t
i(¿ i(t)) = 1 and G
t
i(s) < 1 for s < ¿ i(t). Further, let
¿(t) = minf¿ 1(t); ¿2(t)g. Now, consider the game that is played just after ¿(t) has been
reached. The payo¤ functions à la Fudenberg and Tirole are constructed such that the
intensities ®t1(¿) = ®
t
2(¿) = ®
¤ = [L(¿) ¡ F (¿)]=[L(¿) ¡ I(¿)] replicate the symmetric
discrete-time equilibrium described in the above example in a continuous-time framework.
More generally, these payo¤ functions ensure that …rm i gets assigned to the leader’s role
at ¿ with probability ®ti(¿ )[1¡ ®tj(¿)]= [®t1(¿) + ®t2(¿) ¡ ®t1(¿)®t2(¿ )] and that a mistake
occurs at ¿ with probability ®t1(¿)®
t
2(¿ )= [®
t
1(¿ ) + ®
t
2(¿)¡ ®t1(¿ )®t2(¿)] which is less than
one if ®t1(¿) + ®
t
2(¿ ) < 2. If strategies are symmetric, one immediately obtains the
corresponding limiting values as computed in Example 4. Note that it is this probability
of mistake and the corresponding equilibrium outcome of coordination failure that is
explicitly taken into account by Huisman and Kort (1999) but ignored by Weeds (2000)
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and Grenadier (1996).
Due to the fact that …rms in the investment timing game introduced in this chapter
have imperfect information about future revenues, Fudenberg and Tirole’s concept has
to be modi…ed. Similar to chapter 2, the entries of the simple-strategy tupel (GTi (t; !);
®Ti (t; !)) with T(!) = inf(t ¸ 0 jY (t; !) · YT ) and ! 2 ­ do not denote ordinary
functions but stochastic processes. Precise de…nitions that are missing in the paper by
Huisman and Kort are provided in section 3.3.
3.2 Potential Roles
As in the closure timing game the …rms’ payo¤ functions are combinations of the roles’
payo¤ functions and the …rms’ strategies. Thus, as a prerequisite for describing the …rms’
payo¤s, the roles’ payo¤ functions have to be de…ned. According to Huisman and Kort
(1999) the expected value of the follower’s …rm conditionally on the process Y having
…rst reached the root of the (sub)game YT is given by2
F (YT) =
8><>:
YTR(q;q)
±
+
³
YT
YF
´¯ µYF (R(q;q)¡R(q;q))
±
¡ E
¶
for 0 · YT · YF ;
YTR(q;q)
±
¡ E for YT > YF ;
(3.1)
where the optimal exercise rule for the follower’s investment option is given by the unique
…xed threshold
YF =
¯
¯ ¡ 1 ¢
±E
R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢ ; (3.2)
and
¯ = ¯1 =
1
2
¡ ®
¾2
+
s·
®
¾2
¡ 1
2
¸2
+
2½
¾2
> 1: (3.3)
The ”markup” factor ¯=(¯¡ 1) that makes the di¤erence between the follower’s optimal
investment trigger, YF , and the corresponding threshold suggested by the net-present-
value (NPV) rule, Y NPVF = ±E=[R(q; q)¡R(q; q)], is strictly greater than one. Thus, by
adhering to the NPV rule, a …rm ignores the inherent uncertainty about future revenues
and the option value of waiting, and invests to early. In contrast to the corresponding
parameter in the closure timing model, the functional form of ¯ does not depend on the
2We do not use the original notation but adopt the notation introduced in chapter 2.
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sign of 2®¡ ¾2 according to Dixit and Pindyck (1994, section 5.2). We already provided
some intuition for this distinctive feature of the investment option in section 2.2.
The expected value of the leader’s …rm conditionally on Y having …rst reached YT is
L (YT) =
8<:
YTR(q;q)
±
¡E ¡
³
YT
YF
´¯ YF (R(q;q)¡R(q;q))
±
for 0 · YT · YF ;
YTR(q;q)
±
¡E for YT > YF ;
(3.4)
where YF and ¯ are given by equations (3.2) and (3.3), respectively. Since the follower’s
optimal action on the interval [YF ;1) is to invest immediately at YT, one obtains L (YT) =
F (YT) for YT ¸ YF . As the leader’s value function in the closure timing game, L(YT)
exhibits a kink at the follower’s investment threshold, YF .
According to Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), the de…ning property of a preemption
game is that there are times where the leader’s payo¤ exceeds the follower’s payo¤. The
criterion applies to perfect-information games of timing. To show that the property is
also satis…ed in the investment timing game suggested by Huisman and Kort, it has to be
modi…ed to …t the imperfect-information case. This can easily be managed by switching
from the (stopping) time domain to the threshold domain and computing expectations
over payo¤s. In contrast to section 2.3, there is no need to rewrite the roles’ payo¤s
as functions of the leader’s future stopping time, TL. One can resort directly to the
functions as de…ned by equations (3.1) and (3.4). Then it is su¢cient to show that
L (YT) > F (YT) for some YT 2 (0; YF ). Huisman and Kort (1999) proved that there
exists a unique threshold3 YRE such that L (YT) < F (YT) for YT < YRE, L (YT) = F (YT)
for YT = YRE, and L (YT) > F (YT) for YT 2 (YRE; YF ). Thus, the game of investment
timing indeed belongs to the class of preemption games.
The expected value of …rm i; i 2 f1; 2g, that arises from simultaneous investment at
YS conditionally on Y having …rst reached YT is
S (YT; YS) =
8><>:
YTR(q;q)
±
+
³
YT
YS
´¯ µYS(R(q;q)¡R(q;q))
±
¡E
¶
for 0 · YT · YS;
YTR(q;q)
±
¡E for YT > YS;
(3.5)
where ¯ is given by equation (3.3). From equation (3.5) one can immediately derive the
3Note that RE abbreviates ’rent equalization’.
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optimal joint investment trigger
YS¤ =
¯
¯ ¡ 1 ¢
±E
R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢ : (3.6)
Note that YS¤ > YF according to condition (2.3). Finally, the payo¤ from immediate and
simultaneous investment (at YT) is given by
I (YT) = S (YT; YT) =
YTR (q; q)
±
¡E: (3.7)
Equation (3.7) reveals that L(YT) = F (YT) = I(YT) for all YT ¸ YF . In section 3.4 below
we will explain why the relative size of L(YT) and S(YT; YS) determines which type of
equilibrium prevails in the investment timing game.
Huisman and Kort do not discuss how the standard real options theory is related
to the implications of their model. Though the value of a ”monopolistic” …rm and its
optimal investment threshold are derived, we would like to point out that this is not
the monopolistic scenario corresponding to the size of the market in their model. What
they label as ”monopolist” actually turns out to be the myopic …rm that should be well-
known from chapter 2.4 Recall that this …rm is myopic in the sense that it has static
expectations with respect to its rival’s actions. However, in contrast to a price-taking
…rm it takes the impact of its own investment decision on the price process into account.
Its optimal investment trigger is given by
YM =
¯
¯ ¡ 1 ¢
±E
R
¡
q; q
¢¡R ¡q; q¢ ; (3.8)
for YT · YM . Moreover, Huisman and Kort show that, if one …rm is given the leader’s
role beforehand, then it also …nds it optimal to invest at the myopic …rm’s threshold,
i.e. YL = YM . Note that YM < YF due to the assumption of …rst-mover advantages.
Intuitively, for YT 2 (0; YF ) the leader knows that its investment decision does not a¤ect
the optimal response of the follower. Thus, he ignores the rival and acts as a myopic
…rm.
4Huisman and Kort compute the optimal exercise threshold of a …rm equipped with a single option
and half of the total capacity that is available in the duopoly. So, this threshold cannot be compared
with the optimal exercise rules of a monopolist in that market.
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In the following proposition we describe the optimal investment pattern of a price-
taking …rm and the monopolist.
Proposition 10 (i) Suppose that a price-taking …rm facing an exogenous price process
P = Y D(2q) is equipped with the option to extend capacity from q to q. Then this …rm
maximizes its payo¤ by exercising the option at
YP =
¯
¯ ¡ 1 ¢
±E
D
¡
2q
¢ ¡
q ¡ q¢ (3.9)
if YT · YP , and at YT if YT > YP .
(ii) Suppose that a monopolist is equipped with a chain of options—an option to extend
capacity from 2q to q + q and a subsequent option to extend capacity from q + q to 2q.
Then the monopolist maximizes his payo¤ by exercising his options sequentially at
Y 0O =
¯
¯ ¡ 1 ¢
±E
R
¡
q; q
¢
+R
¡
q; q
¢¡ 2R ¡q; q¢ (3.10)
and
Y 00O =
¯
¯ ¡ 1 ¢
±E
2R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¡R ¡q; q¢ > Y 0O (3.11)
if YT < Y 0O, at YT and Y
00
O if Y
0
O < YT · Y 00O , and simultaneously at YT if YT ¸ Y 00O .
(iii) The investment thresholds can be ordered as follows,
YP < YM < min fYF ; Y 0Og < max fYF ; Y 0Og < YS¤ < Y 00O ; (3.12)
where YF , YS¤, and YM are de…ned by equations (3.2), (3.6), and (3.8), respectively.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
As will become clear below, we are also interested in the relation between the price
taker’s threshold, YP , and the ”rent equalization” threshold, YRE. The following propo-
sition states the required ordering.
Proposition 11 The price taker’s optimal investment threshold, YP , and the threshold
YRE that is implicitly de…ned by L(YRE) = F (YRE), YRE 2 (0; YF ), satisfy
YRE < YP :
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Proof. See Appendix B.2.
The importance of Propositions 10 and 11 will become obvious in section 3.4, where
the equilibria of the investment timing game are introduced. However, let us antici-
pate later considerations and point out that either a preemption-type equilibrium or a
collusion-type equilibrium will prevail depending on the relative size of the payo¤s L and
S. Suppose that YT < YRE. Then in the preemption-type equilibrium the equilibrium
prediction will be that one …rm becomes the leader at YRE while the other …rm follows
at YF , while the unique Pareto-dominant equilibrium of the collusion type suggests that
both …rms invest simultaneously at YS¤. For YT 2 (YRE; YF ) there exists an additional
outcome in the preemption equilibrium, where …rms make a mistake, i.e. both players
move at YT with positive probability.
The ordering (3.12) suggest that the standard real options theory might provide an
adequate approximation to the actual investment pattern observed in duopoly if the
Pareto-dominant joint-investment equilibrium, YS¤, prevails. Notice that Y 0O and Y
00
O
both converge to YS¤ if the …rst-mover advantage becomes small. Thus, in this case the
monopolist’s sequential capacity expansion and the joint investment of the duopolists
are likely to occur almost simultaneously. Of course, the approximation gets worse if the
…rst-mover advantage becomes more signi…cant.
In the case of preemption, where YRE < YP < YM < YF represents the relevant
ordering, an equivalent result cannot be obtained. Even if the …rst-mover advantage
turns out to be of marginal size and approaches zero (resulting in YF ¡ YM ! 0), the
price taker’s threshold, YP , may lie far away from any of the duopolistic equilibrium
investment triggers, YRE and YF for YT < YRE. For YT 2 (YRE; YP ) we additionally
get the outcome with positive probability that both …rms make a mistake and invest
simultaneously at YT. Thus, both duopolists might have …nished investment before the
price-taking …rms would prefer to invest. We conclude that, similar to the …ndings in the
closure timing game, the rules suggested by the standard real options theory cannot serve
as proper benchmarks in the sense that the speed of investment in duopoly is expected
to be increased compared to the monopoly case and to slow down when switching from
price-taking to fully rational …rms.
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3.3 Strategies and Payo¤s
Huisman and Kort (1999) neither present a precise de…nition of strategies nor a sketch of
the underlying payo¤ functions of …rms. By modifying the formalism of Fudenberg and
Tirole (1985) we …ll this gap. First, let us de…ne the notion of a ”simple strategy” of the
preemption-type game of investment timing.
De…nition 5 A simple strategy for …rm i in the subgame starting at T = inf(t ¸
0 jY (t) · YT ), YT > 0, is a pair of stochastic processes (GTi ; ®Ti ) : ([0;1) £ (­;F))2 !
[0; 1]2 satisfying for all !:
(i) GTi (¢; !) is non-decreasing and right-continuous,
(ii) ®Ti (t; !) > 0 implies G
T
i (t; !) = 1;
(iii) ®Ti (¢; !) is right-di¤erentiable,
(iv) if ®Ti (t; !) = 0 and t = inf(s ¸ T(!)
¯¯
®Ti (s; !) > 0), then ®
T
i (¢; !) has positive right
derivative.
Condition (i) to (iv) represent the natural extension of the de…nition by Fudenberg
and Tirole (1985, p.392) to the imperfect information world. In section 3.1 we provided
some intuition for the above de…nition. Let us suppress the upper index, T, and the
second functional argument, !; of Gi and ®i for the ease of notation. Let the time of the
…rst ”interval of atoms” in …rm i’s strategy be de…ned as
¿ i (T) =
8<: 1 if ®i (t) = 0 8t ¸ Tinf (t ¸ T j®i (t) > 0) else ;
and let ¿(T) = minf¿ 1(T); ¿ 2(T)g with T denoting the root of the subgame. Due to
condition (ii) in the above de…nition, at least one …rm invests in capacity by time ¿ (T)
in the subgame starting at T almost surely. Finally, let G¡i (t) = lims"tGi(s) and impose
G¡i (T) ´ 0, i 2 f1; 2g, i.e. the probability that …rm i moves before the (sub)game has
started equals zero. Then …rm i’s expected payo¤ conditionally on Y having …rst reached
YT is given by
V (YT; (Gi; ®i) ; (Gj ; ®j))
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= ET
24 ¿(T)Z
T
e¡½(t¡T)Y (t)R
¡
q; q
¢
(1¡Gi (t)) (1¡Gj (t)) dt
+
¿(T)Z
T
e¡½(t¡T)L (Y (t)) (1¡Gj (t)) dGi (t)
+
¿(T)Z
T
e¡½(t¡T)F (Y (t)) (1¡Gi (t)) dGj (t) (3.13)
+
X
t<¿(T)
e¡½(t¡T)
¡
Gi (t)¡G¡i (t)
¢ ¡
Gj (t)¡G¡j (t)
¢
I (Y (t))
+e¡½(¿(T)¡T)
¡
1¡G¡i (¿ (T))
¢ ¡
1¡G¡j (¿ (T))
¢£
£W (¿ (T) ; (Gi; ®i) ; (Gj ; ®j))] ;
where j 2 f1; 2g; i 6= j, and F (¢) ; L (¢), and I (¢) are de…ned by equations (3.1), (3.4), and
(3.7), respectively. Comparing equation (3.13) with the corresponding payo¤ function in
Fudenberg and Tirole reveals that we have extended their concept. We account for the
inherent uncertainty regarding future revenues by taking expectations contingent on the
information that is available at the root of the subgame T (or, equivalently, YT).
One will not …nd an expression in the payo¤ functions à la Fudenberg and Tirole that is
equivalent to the second line of equation (3.13) representing the expected revenues ex ante
to investment. The reason is that in the standard timing-game literature these revenues
are already captured by the roles’ payo¤ functions, while they are treated explicitly in
the model by Huisman and Kort and our approach. The third and the fourth line of
this formula give …rm i’s expected payo¤ from becoming the leader and the follower,
respectively, when i extends its production facilities with probability Gi, while …rm j
moves with probability Gj. The …fth line of (3.13) determines …rm i’s payo¤ if both
…rms move simultaneously with positive probability before ¿(T) is reached. Finally, the
last two lines and the related formulas for W de…ne what …rm i yields, after the …rst
player has moved with probability one and the …rst interval of atoms has begun. Note
that, if ¿ i(T) 6= ¿ j(T); then
W (¿ ; (Gi; ®i) ; (Gj; ®j))
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=8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
Gj(¿)¡G¡j (¿)
1¡G¡j (¿)
[(1¡ ®i (¿))F (Y (¿)) + ®i (¿ ) I (Y (¿))]
+ 1¡Gj(¿)
1¡G¡j (¿)
L (Y (¿ )) for ¿ i (T) < ¿ j (T) ;
Gi(¿)¡G¡i (¿)
1¡G¡i (¿)
[(1¡ ®j (¿))L (Y (¿ )) + ®j (¿) I (Y (¿))]
+ 1¡Gi(¿)
1¡G¡i (¿)
F (Y (¿)) for ¿ i (T) > ¿ j (T) ;
and, if ¿ i(T) = ¿ j(T), then
W (¿ ; (Gi; ®i) ; (Gj; ®j))
=
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
I (Y (¿ ))
for ®i (¿ ) = ®j (¿ ) = 1;
®i(¿)(1¡®j(¿))L(Y (¿))+®j(¿)(1¡®i(¿))F (Y (¿))+®i(¿)®j(¿)I(Y (¿))
®i(¿)+®j(¿)¡®i(¿)®j(¿)
for 0 < ®i (¿ ) + ®j (¿ ) < 2;
®0i(¿)L(Y (¿))+®
0
j(¿)F (Y (¿))
®0i(¿)+®
0
j(¿)
for ®i (¿ ) = ®j (¿ ) = 0:
In Fudenberg and TiroleW is chosen such that the payo¤s from playing with intensities ®i
and ®j during the …rst interval of atoms equal the payo¤s that would arise if …rms played
the discrete-time game of investment timing described in Example 4 with probabilities
of investment ®i and ®j. In the case that ®i(¿) = ®j(¿ ) = 0, Fudenberg and Tirole
suggest a …rst-order (or, alternatively, higher-order) Taylor expansion. It remains to
be de…ned what is understood by a Nash equilibrium, by a closed-loop strategy and
by a subgame perfect equilibrium of the investment-timing game. However, we refrain
from stating explicit de…nitions, since they are just straightforward modi…cations of the
corresponding de…nitions in section 2.3 (see also Fudenberg and Tirole, 1985, p.392).
3.4 Equilibria
As we already mentioned, the relative size of the leader’s payo¤, L, compared to the
payo¤ from joint investment, S, determines which set of equilibria arises. Huisman and
Kort distinguish between the following two cases—the preemption and the collusion case:
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1. There are incentives to become the leader, i.e.
9YT 2 (0; YF ) ; such that L (YT) ¸ S (YT; YS¤) : (3.14)
2. There are no incentives to become the leader, i.e.
L (YT) · S (YT; YS¤) 8YT 2 (0; YF ) : (3.15)
The shape of the roles’ payo¤ functions in the preemption and the collusion case
are depicted in Figures 3-1 and 3-2, respectively.In the preemption case each …rm would
YT
L(YT)
F(YT)
I(YT)
S(YT,YS*)
YL= YM YF YS*
YRE
- E
Exp.Profit
Figure 3-1: Graphs of F , L, S, and I in the Preemption Case.
like to become the leader at YL = YM , where the payo¤ from taking over the leader’s
role attains its maximum. Suppose …rm i, i 2 f1; 2g; plans to invest at YL: The best
response of …rm j, j 2 f1; 2g, j 6= i, is to preempt …rm i by investing just before …rm
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i at YL ¡ ". Certainly, …rm i knows …rm j’s best response and, therefore, will try to
invest at YL ¡ 2". By backward induction, if YT < YRE, the …rst investment option
will be exercised no later than YRE, where …rms are indi¤erent between taking over the
leadership and getting assigned to the follower’s role. Moreover, investment will not take
place earlier than YRE due to F (YT ) < L(YT ) for YT < YRE. This is the principle of rent
equalization introduced by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) that applies in the preemption-
type equilibrium (GT1 (t) ; ®
T
1 (t)) £ (GT2 (t) ; ®T2 (t)) = (G (t) ; ® (t))2 with
G (t) =
8<: 0 for t < TRE;1 for t ¸ TRE; and ® (t) =
8>>><>>>:
0 for t < TRE;
L(Y (t))¡F (Y (t))
L(Y (t))¡I(Y (t)) for TRE · t < TF ;
1 for t ¸ TF ;
(3.16)
and TRE = inf(t ¸ T jY (t) · YRE ). In Example 4 the intensity ® = (L¡F )=(L¡ I) has
been shown to maximize the …rms’ payo¤s in the discrete-time game of investment timing
as given by Table 3.1. Further, note that ® (TRE) = 0 implying that the probability of
mistake as derived in Example 4 for symmetric strategies equals [® (TRE)]2=[2¡® (TRE)] =
0 at YRE. However, the probability that …rm i is the only …rm that invests at YRE equals
[1 ¡ ® (TRE)]=[2 ¡ ® (TRE)] = 1=2. Thus, for YT · YRE there exist two equilibrium
outcomes each occurring with probability 1=2. In the …rst scenario …rm 1 takes over
the leadership by investing at YRE, while …rm 2 gets assigned to the follower’s role
and invests at YF . The second scenario is identical but with interchanged roles. For
YT 2 (YRE; YP ) the probability of coordination failure attains positive values. Thus,
either …rm 1 becomes the leader at YT and …rm 2 follows at YF , or roles are interchanged,
or both …rms erroneously invest at YT and, thereby, yield I(YT) < F (YT) < L(YT).
Finally, if the subgame starts beyond the optimal follower’s threshold, YT ¸ YF , then
joint investment is the unique outcome and …rms again are paid o¤ I(YT).
In the collusion case the strategy pro…le given by equation (3.16) still represents a
subgame perfect equilibrium of the investment timing game, but it is no longer unique.
There additionally exists a continuum of equilibria involving that …rms invest late and
jointly. Recall that YS = YS¤ denotes the unique maximizer of the payo¤ from simultane-
ous investment, S(YT; YS), implying that S(YT; YS) < S(YT; YS¤) for all YS 6= YS¤. Now,
let eY < YS¤ be de…ned as the minimal threshold such that the payo¤ from becoming
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Figure 3-2: Graphs of F , L, S, and I in the Collusion Case.
the leader at YT never exceeds the payo¤ that arises from joint investment at eY , i.e.
L(YT) · S(YT; eY ) · S(YT; YS¤) for all YT. As sketched in Figure 3-2, the functional
forms of L and S imply that YF < eY · YS¤. Then the continuum of collusion-type equi-
libria is given by the strategy pro…les (GT1 (t) ; ®
T
1 (t)) £ (GT2 (t) ; ®T2 (t)) = (G (t) ; ® (t))2
with
G (t) =
8<: 0 for t < T;1 for t ¸ T; and ® (t) =
8<: 0 for t < T;1 for t ¸ T; (3.17)
T = inf(t ¸ T jY (t) · YT ) and YT 2 [eY ; YS¤]. From the de…nition of YS¤ it follows that
YT = YS¤ Pareto-dominates all ”earlier” simultaneous investment equilibria. This result
prompts Huisman and Kort (1999, p.17) to call YT = YS¤ the ”most reasonable outcome”
in the collusion case.
Huisman and Kort determine whether the preemption or the collusion case applies
depending on the size of the drift and the volatility parameter of the price function.
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They …nd that the preemption-type (collusion-type) equilibrium occurs more likely if
volatility decreases (increases) and the drift grows (diminishes). Increasing volatility and
a decreasing drift raise the option value of waiting which in turn has a negative impact
on the pro…tability of preemption, and, thereby, on the speed of investment.
Moreover, they point out that the option value of waiting is also inversely related
to the …rms’ discount rate, ½. That is, the pro…tability of waiting increases, if …rms
become more patient. Since the number of (sustainable) equilibrium outcomes increases
when switching from the preemption case to the collusion case, this feature is consistent
with the general …ndings by Dutta (1995). There it is shown that for a large class of
dynamic games in discrete time, any equilibrium outcome that is sustainable by less
patient players is also an equilibrium outcome when players are more patient.
Figure 3-3: Collusion vs. Preemption—Comparison of f(¯1) with g(¯1).
Huisman and Kort’s comparative static analysis is based on the comparison of two
quantities, f and g, that are written as functions of the positive root, ¯1, of the funda-
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mental quadratic equation (see section 3.2). According to equation (3.3), ¯1 depends on
the variables of interest, i.e. on the drift and volatility parameters, ® and ¾. Huisman
and Kort show that a preemption equilibrium prevails whenever f(¯1) < g(¯1): Other-
wise the collusion case applies. In the next chapter, in section 4.2, we provide estimates
of the drift and the volatility of the price process in the German electric power market.
Then, with our knowledge about the size of ® and ¾ and by using a reasonable bench-
mark value for the …rm’s discount rate, ½, we can compute ¯1. However, the information
is not su¢cient to determine the sign of f(¯1) ¡ g(¯1), since f and g are also a¤ected
by the inverse demand elasticity, ´; and the ratio of capacity ex ante to investment to
capacity ex post to investment, c = q=q: In Figure 3-3 both quantities; f and g, are
plotted against the ratio c. We implicitly use the estimate of ´ given in section 4.2 to
approximate the elasticity’s ”true” value. The …gure reveals that there is a signi…cant
and stable di¤erence between f and g, i.e. f(¯1) > g(¯1). We would like to consider
this result as strong evidence in favor of the collusion case as the relevant scenario that
applies in the German electricity sector.
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Chapter 4
Empirical Issues—The Electric
Power Market in Germany
The task of this chapter is to investigate whether the strategic dimension of option-timing
problems as analyzed in the previous chapters bears any practical relevance for commod-
ity traders and managers in electricity markets. One may argue that the costs of building
and implementing richer real options models that properly depict the competition among
utilities are likely to be higher than the gains from explicitly taking strategic interaction
in the electricity sector into account. In particular, if the ”true” values of the model
parameters suggest that there is little scope for strategic behavior and that the strate-
gic value of investment is small, then it might be a more recommendable strategy for
utilities to act as price takers rather than fully rational players. As will be shown, this
”pessimistic” view has to be rejected with respect to the German electric power market.
4.1 Best Response
Let us start o¤ with some remarks. First, in chapter 1 we already motivated why a
duopoly model with identical …rms represents an adequate approximation of the Ger-
man electric utility industry. Second, note that the assumption of perfect strategic sub-
stitutability of the …rms’ products imposed in chapters 2 and 3 appears to be highly
natural in electricity markets, since almost homogeneous products are traded. Third,
in this section and in section 4.4 we are not interested in equilibrium predictions but
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in the gain in pro…ts that a utility yields by playing a best response to its rival rather
than following the standard real options theory, i.e. the price taker’s rule. Thereby, we
implicitly assume that utilities usually behave as price takers. As we justi…ed in chapter
1, this assumption about today’s electricity markets does not seem to be too unrealistic.
Finally, due to the fact that the electricity sector in Germany is currently equipped with
a considerable amount of excess capacity (see chapter 1), we consider the optimal timing
of capacity reduction to be the more urgent problem compared to the optimal timing of
investment projects. Therefore, this chapter is dedicated to closure options.
To ”test” the adequacy and signi…cance of our approach, we begin with determining
the best response of a duopolist (called utility 1 henceforth) who faces a price-taking
rival with identical variable cost. The best response Y ¤ of utility 1 (that can be written
more precisely as GT1 (t) = Ift·T¤g for T ¤ = inf(t ¸ T jY (t) · Y ¤ )) is the solution to
the payo¤ maximization problem maxfY ¤g V1(YT; Y ¤; YP ) with YT > maxfY ¤; YPg and
YP denoting the optimal closure threshold of a price taker (see equation (2.21)). Suppose
that Y ¤ > YP . Clearly, this assertion has to veri…ed below. Then
V1 (YT; Y
¤; YP ) = ET
24 T ¤Z
T
e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)R (q; q)¡ Cq] dt
+
TPZ
T ¤
e¡½(t¡T)
£
Y (t)R
¡
q; q
¢¡ Cq¤ dt
+
1Z
TP
e¡½(t¡T)
£
Y (t)R
¡
q; q
¢¡ Cq¤ dt¡ e¡½(T ¤¡T)E
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according to chapter 2. From earlier derivations it is known that this conditional expec-
tation can be rewritten as
YTR (q; q)
±
¡ Cq
½
¡
µ
Y ¤
YT
¶¡¯ ÃY ¤ ¡R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
¡ C
¡
q ¡ q¢
½
+ E
!
+
µ
YP
YT
¶¡¯ YP ¡R ¡q; q¢¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
:
By substituting (YM=±)(R(q; q) ¡ R(q; q)) for (C=½)(q ¡ q) ¡ E, the derivative @V1(YT;
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Y ¤; YP ) = @Y ¤ becomes
¡R (q; q)¡R
¡
q; q
¢
±
¢
µ
Y ¤
YT
¶¡¯ µ
1¡ YM
Y ¤
¶
:
The expression has one root at Y ¤ = 0, ¯ < ¡1, and another root at the myopic …rm’s
threshold Y ¤ = YM . However, the second-order condition reveals that only the second
root is a maximizer of V1 (YT; Y ¤; YP ). Moreover, in chapter 2 we showed that YM > YP
holds in both cases—…rst-mover and second-mover advantages. This veri…es our initial
assertion.
Since we are interested in the improvement in utility 1’s payo¤ position that it achieves
by switching from the price taker’s disinvestment trigger to the optimal closure threshold
of the myopic …rm, we compute the corresponding di¤erence in payo¤s,
V1 (YT; YM ; YP )¡ V1 (YT; YP ; YP ) =
¡ET
24 TPZ
TM
e¡½(t¡T)
£
Y (t)
¡
R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¢¡ C ¡q ¡ q¢¤ dt
35
¡ET
£
e¡½(TM¡T) ¡ e¡½(TP¡T)¤ ¢ E
=
µ
YM
YT
¶¡¯ YM ¡R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
"
1
¡¯ ¡
µ
YP
YM
¶¡¯ µ
1¡ ¯
¡¯ ¡
µ
YP
YM
¶¶#
Of course, this expression is strictly positive for all YT ¸ YM . Let us de…ne c = q=q 2
(0; 1). Then the payo¤ di¤erence can be simpli…ed to
V1 (YT; YM ; YP )¡ V1 (YT; YP ; YP ) =µ
YM
YT
¶¡¯ ¡¯
1¡ ¯
µ
(1¡ c)Cq
½
¡ E
¶
£
£
24 1
¡¯ ¡
Ã
1¡ D((1+c)q)
D(2q)
c
1¡ c
!¡¯ Ã
1¡ ¯
¡¯ ¡
1¡ D((1+c)q)
D(2q)
c
1¡ c
!35 :
The latter transformation reveals that the magnitude of the gain in pro…ts at its maximum
YT = YM depends on the marginal production cost C, on the total adjustment cost E,
on the …rm’s discount factor ½, on the drift and volatility parameters ® and ¾ (via ¯),
on the current capacity level q, on the ratio of ex-post to ex-ante capacity c and on
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the functional form of the inverse demand function D. A numerical assessment of the
impact of the proposed best response on pro…ts requires that we …nd realistic values
for the parameters and an adequate speci…cation of D. A nonparametric estimation
of D based on the demand equation, P = Y ¢ D(Q), is out of question due to the
nonstationarity of the involved variables, measurement errors in variables (see below)
and the limited number of observations. Similar problems occur when trying to estimate
general nonlinear parameterizations of this function. These di¢culties resolve if one
assumes D to be isoelastic, i.e. D(Q) = Q¡´ with ´ = ¡D0(Q)Q=D(Q) = const.> 0. In
this case the gain in pro…ts can be written as
V1 (YT; YM ; YP )¡ V1 (YT; YP ; YP ) =µ
YM
YT
¶¡¯ ¡¯
1¡ ¯
µ
(1¡ c)Cq
½
¡ E
¶
£
£
24 1
¡¯ ¡
Ã
1¡ ¡ 2
1+c
¢´
c
1¡ c
!¡¯ Ã
1¡ ¯
¡¯ ¡
1¡ ¡ 2
1+c
¢´
c
1¡ c
!35 : (4.1)
An isoelastic inverse demand function has another appealing feature. One can easily
distinguish between …rst-mover and second-mover advantages as the following calcula-
tions indicate. According to condition (2.4) (condition (2.5)), if
(q)1¡´ +
¡
q
¢1¡´ ¡ 2´ ¡q + q¢1¡´
is smaller (greater) than zero, then …rms face …rst-mover advantages (second-mover ad-
vantages). Again, by expressing the ratio q=q by the constant c; these terms can be
written as ¡
1 + c1¡´
¢¡ 2´ (1 + c)1¡´ :
The di¤erence would be zero if c was equal to one. However, c 2 (0; 1) and
@
£
(1 + c1¡´)¡ 2´ (1 + c)1¡´¤
@c
= (1¡ ´) c¡´
·
1¡
µ
2c
1 + c
¶´¸
R 0 for ´ R 1:
Thus, with an inverse demand function given by D(Q) = Q¡´, the assumption of …rst-
mover advantages (second-mover advantages) is satis…ed if and only if ´ > 1 (´ 2 (0; 1)).
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4.2 The Empirical Model
The must crucial parameters in standard option pricing models—such as the Black and
Scholes model—are the drift ® that captures the rate of certain demand growth in our
model and the volatility ¾ that represents a measure for the uncertainty in demand.
In the context of Cournot competition in duopoly the quantity elasticity ´ is at least
equally important. In order to roughly assess the ”correct” size of these parameters and
to generate a ”real-world” benchmark, we would like to estimate the price or inverse
demand model (2.1), P = Y ¢D(Q).
However, several di¢culties arise. First, the stochastic trend in this level equation,
Y , is not observable. Nevertheless, an estimable equation can be obtained by deriving
the discrete-time analogue of a model of growth rates rather than levels and assuming
that the inverse demand function is isoelastic and time-invariant. Second, electricity
demand itself is unobservable. All that is available are data about market equilibria.
This implies that a simultaneous equation system with an inverse demand and a supply
equation has to be formulated. Third, if the system should be estimated simultaneously,
not only the inverse demand model but also the supply equation must be set up in
growth rates. This di¤erencing naturally results in a loss of information. Alternatively,
one can search for a supply model that just depends on one of the endogenous variables,
price, P , and quantity, Q. The system of equations would become triangular and could
be estimated recursively implying that the supply equation need not to be written in
growth rates. Fortunately, there exists a reasonable supply model that only depends on
price, P . Finally, to use the …tted values of the price series resulting from the estimated
supply equation, a model of demand rather than inverse demand is required. ”Inverting”
the inverse demand equation inevitably results in a demand model with measurement
errors in variables. In what follows we elaborate on each of these di¢culties but in a
di¤erent order.
Let us come back to our starting point and consider the price model (2.1). Recall
that Y intuitively represents the unstable long-term evolution of consumers’ preferences.
We modelled this component of electricity demand by a geometric Brownian motion with
drift. As mentioned above, the stochastic trend in Y is not observable. However, Y and,
thereby, P are known to be lognormally distributed. Then lnP is normally distributed
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and, due to dY = ®Y dt+ ¾Y dB;
d lnP =
dD
D
+
dY
Y
¡ dY
2Y 2
= d lnD +
µ
®¡ ¾
2
2
¶
dt+ ¾dB (4.2)
by the Itô lemma. Moreover, by assuming that D is isoelastic and time-invariant, one
yields
d lnD (Q) =
D0 (Q)Q
D (Q)
dQ
Q
= ¡´d lnQ:
This allows us to write the discrete-time analogue of equation (4.2) as
¢lnPt = e®¡ ´¢ lnQt + "t;
where e® = ®¡ ¾2=2 and "t denotes the demand shock that is normally distributed with
mean zero and variance ¾2. For reasons that we explained above, we do not want to
estimate inverse demand but the demand function itself. Thus, we obtain the following
empirical model of electricity demand,
¢ lnQt = Á0 + Á1 ("t ¡¢ lnPt) + ut; (4.3)
with Á0 = e®=´ and Á1 = 1=´. The error term ut; E(ut) = 0 and var(ut) = ¾2u, should
capture any unexpected changes of exogenous variables that are not explicitly modelled
but in‡uence electricity demand. Unexpected non-permanent deviations of weather from
its regular seasonal pattern may serve as an example.1
Equation (4.3) establishes a linear regression model with (stochastic) additive mea-
surement error, "t, in the variables. The e¤ect of measurement error in a simple univari-
ate linear regression is to bias the standard slope estimate in the direction of zero. An
(asymptotic) bias of this kind is commonly referred to as attenuation (see, for example,
Fuller, 1987). Note that an ordinary least-squares (OLS) estimate of ¢ lnQt on ¢ lnPt
is a consistent estimate not of Á1, but instead of Á
¤
1 = ¸Á1, where
¸ =
¾2X
¾2X + ¾
2
< 1 and Xt = "t ¡¢ lnPt.
1Note that we seasonally adjusted our data before running the estimation procedures. See section
4.3 below.
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The factor ¸ is called the reliability ratio (Fuller, 1987, p.3). The model (4.3) cannot be
consistently estimated without additional information (there are more parameters—Á0,
Á1, ¾
2, ¾2X , and ¾
2
u—than pieces of information). Of course, if either ¾
2
u or the reliability
ratio were known, we could easily construct a consistent (but not e¢cient) method-of-
moments estimator for Á1.
Another well publicized estimation method for linear regression in the presence of
measurement error is orthogonal regression (Fuller, 1987, section 1.3.3). The estimator
minimizes not the vertical but the orthogonal distance of (¢ lnQt;¢ lnPt) to Á0+Á1Xt,
weighted by the ratio · = ¾2u=¾
2 which is assumed to be known. However, we neither have
any information about the reliability ratio and ¾2u nor about ·. As we already mentioned,
the OLS estimate of Á1, bÁOLS1 , is biased towards zero. Thus, ¯¯¯bÁOLS1 ¯¯¯ · ¯¯¯bÁ1 ¯¯¯, where bÁ1
denotes the (consistent) orthogonal least-squares estimator of Á1. Moreover, by ignoring
the measurement error, we get a OLS slope estimate in the inverse regression that is bi-
ased upwards, i.e. the so-called inverse (ordinary) least-squares estimate, bÁINV1 , satis…es¯¯¯bÁ1 ¯¯¯ · ¯¯¯bÁINV1 ¯¯¯ (Schneeweiß and Mittag, 1986, section 2.2.2). Therefore, by calculatingbÁOLS1 and bÁINV1 , we may obtain some useful benchmarks if the interval h¯¯¯bÁOLS1 ¯¯¯ ; ¯¯¯bÁINV1 ¯¯¯i
is not too large. The results of this computational exercise will be given in the next
section.
Consistent estimates of Á1 and the other parameters can also be obtained by us-
ing an instrumental variable (IV) estimator (Fuller, 1987, section 2.2.4). A variable Z
that is correlated with ¢ lnP but not with the measurement error ", may serve as an
instrumental variable. Then the ratio bÁIV1 = P(Zt¢ lnQt)=P(Zt¢ lnPt) provides a
consistent estimator of the slope parameter Á1. In the next subsection we will present
such IV estimates of the relevant parameters.
Errors in the model variables are not the only di¢culty that occurs when estimating
our demand function. As discussed above, another problem is that electricity demand
itself cannot be observed. The only data sets that are available include ex post market
equilibria, i.e. points of balanced supply and demand. Thus, without introducing further
assumptions a two-dimensional simultaneous equation system has to be estimated. This
raises the question which kind of aggregate supply function is consistent with our idea
about the (dis)investment behavior of …rms. Suppose that utilities use three input factors
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in the production of electricity, capitalK, labor L and fuel F . Further, let the production
function be of the Cobb-Douglas type, Q = AKaLbF c with the coe¢cients A; a; b; c > 0.
Then the least-cost factor combinations are given by
rK¤
a
=
wL¤
b
=
fF ¤
c
or L¤ (K) =
br
aw
K and F ¤ (K) =
cr
af
K;
where r denotes the real rental cost of capital, w is the real wage of workers in the electric
power generation industry and f symbolizes the de‡ated market price of fuel. Plugging
these expressions into the utility’s pro…t function yields
¦ (K) = P (K) ¢ A
µ
br
aw
¶bµ
cr
af
¶c
Ka+b+c ¡
µ
1 +
b
a
+
c
a
¶
rK:
We already stressed that utilities in the German electricity market can be considered
as being price takers. In this case the …rst-order condition for a pro…t-maximizing level
of capital is given by
P ¢ A (a+ b+ c)
µ
br
aw
¶bµ
cr
af
¶c
Ka+b+c¡1 =
µ
1 +
b
a
+
c
a
¶
r:
Further, the models proposed in chapters 2 and 3 require that the output-to-capital ratio
is constant in the long run. So we should observe a constant-returns-to-scale technology
on the …rm level as well as the aggregate (sector) level. One obtains the following long-run
supply function of the …rm written in logs and with time indices
lnPt = ln
b¡bc¡c
A (1¡ b¡ c)1¡b¡c + (1¡ b¡ c) ln rt + b lnwt + c ln ft: (4.4)
In the short run, however, the individual …rm’s output-to-capital ratio should be allowed
to ‡uctuate around its constant long-run level due to the impact of supply shocks. Thus,
an error term v = vi + vA has to be introduced to the long-run relation in order to
capture the impact of the ideosynchratic shock, vi, and the aggregate shock, vA, on
the deviations of …rm i’s production from its long-run output level. The investment
and closure timing models proposed in the previous chapters suggest that a …rm invests
(disinvests) if the …rm’s cash ‡ow has reached an individually optimal upper (lower)
barrier. This conclusion holds irrespective of the sector’s supply side structure. Thus,
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the individual …rm adjusts its capacity if the deviation from the optimal long-run output
level, jvj, is large enough such that the …rm’s cash ‡ow hits either the upper or the lower
barrier. This reveals that our understanding of equilibrium capacity adjustment on the
…rm level amounts to a (S; s)model of aggregate investment dynamics with heterogeneous
…rms as proposed, for example, by Caballero et al. (1995) and Caballero and Engel
(1999). In these papers …rms are heterogenous with respect to their adjustment cost
(sunk investment or closure cost). To estimate the sector’s distribution of adjustment
cost, detailed information about the behavior of the individual …rm, i.e. panel data sets,
are required. Such data are not available with respect to the German electric power
market. We have to content ourselves with time series on the aggregate level.
A simplifying condition has to be imposed to get a rough impression about the util-
ities’ supply even though there is a lack of information. The utilities that had had the
legal status of regional monopolists before the deregulation of the German electric power
sector are assumed to face the same output price level during the sample period (1977
to 1989). This does not seem to be too much of an abstraction from reality, since the
political sector in Germany has always reacted very sensitive to price changes in energy
markets. Thus, due to political pressure diverging price paths in di¤erent regional mar-
kets are very unlikely. With this simpli…cation the aggregate supply function resembles
the individual …rm’s supply function (4.4) and we obtain the following regression model,
lnPt = °0 + °1 ln rt + °2 lnwt + °3 ln ft + vt: (4.5)
The coe¢cients are de…ned as °0 = ln b
¡bc¡c¡ lnA(1¡ b¡ c)1¡b¡c, °1 = 1¡ b¡ c, °2 = b
and °3 = c. Of course, the error term, vt, in equation (4.5) now captures the sector’s
investment dynamics. Since investment in or retirement of power generation units is
likely to be lumpy in nature even on an aggregate level, the deviations from the long-run
supply function cannot be normally distributed.
The inverse demand function, lnP = lnY + lnD(Q), as well as the supply function
suggest stationary linear combinations between nonstationary variables (see section 4.3).
So, the model of market equilibrium is a system of cointegrating relations. However,
as we already argued above, inverse demand cannot be estimated in levels, since the
stochastic trend in Y is not observable. For that reason we derived a regression model of
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electricity demand in …rst di¤erences as given by equation (4.3). To estimate the system
simultaneously, the supply equation (4.5) must also be written in …rst di¤erences. If the
variables in equation (4.5) are indeed cointegrated, then di¤erencing results in a loss of
information. Fortunately, the supply equation includes only one endogenous variable—
the price. Thus, the equations can be estimated recursively. We …rst estimate the supply
model (in levels) by ordinary least squares (OLS) which guarantees superconsistent co-
e¢cient estimators.2 Then the …tted values of the price series, \¢ lnP t, derived from the
supply regression are plugged into the di¤erenced demand model (4.3) with measurement
errors. This clari…es why we have to estimate the demand function rather than inverse
demand. Finally, the desired parameter estimates are derived as discussed above. Note
that, by substituting \¢ lnP t for ¢ lnPt, the interpretation of the measurement error, ",
changes. Now, it does not any longer capture demand shocks exclusively but also supply
shocks.
Irrespective of the drawback that simultaneous estimation requires di¤erencing of
the supply equation, the standard system estimation methods, i.e. full-information
maximum-likelihood (FIML), are not e¢cient. The reason is that at least the errors
in the supply equation are not normally distributed (see, for example, Greene, 2000).
Though these methods may still provide adequate quasi-maximum-likelihood estimates,
one might prefer OLS anyway because of its simplicity and robustness.
4.3 Data and Estimation Results
Our sample consists of six time series that contain data of monthly frequency ranging
from January 1977 to December 1989. We chose the producers’ price index of electric
power sold to the manufacturing sector and the corresponding volume series to represent
the electricity price, P; and the traded quantity, Q, respectively. Unit capital costs, r,
unit labor costs, w, and unit fuel costs, f , should be measured by the market interest rate
of industrial bonds with a minimum maturity of ten years, the standard wage per hour of
workers in public utilities and the manufacturer’s price index of hard coal, respectively.
2The superconsistency of OLS estimators of cointegrating relations was shown by Stock (1987).
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Finally, we use the consumers’ price index to de‡ate the other price series.3 All series
are drawn from the database of the German ”Statistisches Bundesamt” and correspond
to the former territory of West Germany.
Though more recent data samples are available, we decide to cut o¤ the series at
December 1989. Especially, the evolution of the electricity price series dropping down
in 1990 points to the existence of a structural break that is induced by the German
uni…cation in that year. The price crash might be explained by the considerable increase
in excess capacity that resulted after the huge East German brown-coal based power
plants had been integrated into the national electricity grid. Since we are not interested
in the speci…c behavior of the supply side but in consumers’ preferences, it seems to be
an adequate measure to cut o¤ the original sample before 1990. A total number of 156
observations per series results.
A test for seasonal integration as proposed by Beaulieu and Miron (1993) for monthly
data reveals that all logarithmized series exhibit unit roots at zero frequency.4 Only in the
quantity series and the wage series, however, we …nd evidence on the presence of seasonal
unit roots. The results are reported in Table 4.1.5 Note that we test for the presence of
complex conjugated seasonal unit roots by applying an F test to the two corresponding
coe¢cient estimates in the underlying regression equation. Our …ndings suggest that
the nonstationary stochastic seasonal component in the wage series can be removed by
applying the …lter 1 + B +B2 with B denoting the backshift operator. With respect to
the quantity series there is some ambiguity whether it exhibits two, four or six seasonal
unit roots. We decide in favor of six roots, because the resulting estimates of the supply
and demand models are the most plausible ones. Then the …lter that has to be applied to
the quantity series is given by 1+B2+B3+B5. The de‡ated and seasonally adjusted logs
of all series are depicted in Figure 4-1.It should be stressed that our estimation results
respond highly sensitive to a change in the seasonal adjustment procedure. Suppose, for
3To obtain the real interest rate, we compute a (moving-window) proxy for the in‡ation rate that
is expected to prevail at the end of the following ten-years period. This expectation is the relevant
benchmark for holders of bonds with a maturity of ten years. To derive the proxy, the series of the
consumers’ price index is required to range up to December 1999.
4This test is based on the well-known HEGY procedure developed by Hylleberg et al. (1990) for
quarterly data.
5The results are derived by including a constant in the corresponding regression equation. All de-
terministic components like constant, trend or dummies in‡uence the asymptotic as well as the …nite
sample distributions.
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Table 4.1: Results from Test for Unit Roots at Zero and Seasonal Frequencies
Frequency lnP lnQ ln r lnw ln f
0 o o o o o
¼ + o¤ + + +
§¼=2 + o¤¤ + + +
¨2¼=3 + + + o +
§¼=3 + o + + +
¨5¼=6 + + + + +
§¼=3 + + + + +
o = H0 (unit root) accepted at all conventional signi…cance levels,
+ = H0 rejected at all conventional signi…cance levels,
o* = H0 accepted at 5 per cent level, rejected at 10 per cent level ,
o** = H0 accepted at 2.5 per cent level, rejected at 5 per cent level.
example, one chooses the standard …lter (1¡B12) /(1¡B) for lnQ and lnw. It removes
all seasonal unit roots if they exist, but leads to overdi¤erencing and loss of information
if they do not exist. In this case our estimation model suggests strong and signi…cant
second-mover advantages, while in the present case we found …rst-mover advantages as
will be shown below.
Table 4.2 summarizes the estimation results. It does not contain the estimates of
the production elasticities a, b and c: We have ba = 0:0884, bb = 0:5284 and bc = 0:0688.
The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test clearly rejects the null hypothesis that the
cointegration errors still contain a unit root indicating that the suggested supply function
indeed is a cointegrating vector. The estimated coe¢cients ba; bb and bc sum up to 0:6856:
This value might indicate that our constant-returns-to-scale production technology is
a misspeci…cation. However, we think that the production elasticities of capital and
fuel are underestimated. The chosen series seem to be bad proxies for the underlying
variables in these two cases. The real interest rate, for example, appears to be too volatile
to represent the return-on-capital of long-term bonds. One reason might be that our
de‡ation procedure does not remove a su¢cient amount of nominal volatility. Regarding
the hard coal price series we stress that a regression based on a slightly modi…ed seasonal
…lter leads to signi…cantly higher coe¢cient estimate of c.
The method-of-moments estimates, b´OLS = ¡(bÁOLS1 )¡1 and b´INV = ¡(bÁINV1 )¡1 (see
section 4.2), that should establish an upper and a lower bound for the consistent elasticity
estimator b´; respectively, lie fairly close to each other. However, the interval [b´INV ; b´OLS]
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Figure 4-1: The De‡ated and Seasonally Adjusted Time Series in Logarithms
is not su¢ciently narrow to exclude either …rst-mover or second-mover advantages as a
reasonable model assumption from the analysis. A naive IV estimate with the constant
and the …rst lag of dlnP as instruments yields b´ < 1 which might be interpreted as
evidence in favor of second-mover advantages. However, any inference based on the b¾2u
about the signi…cance of bÁ0 and bÁ1 is invalidated by the presence of strong …rst-order serial
correlation in the residuals, bu (see the DW statistic). Moreover, least squares estimation
is at least ine¢cient in this case. Whether it is also inconsistent depends on the amount
of residual autocorrelation across observations (Greene, 2000, section 13.2.2). Recall that
we have introduced instrumental variables that are independent of the measurement error,
", to obtain consistent OLS estimates. Though we used lagged regressors as instrumental
variables, this approach is not invalidated by the serial correlation of the disturbances,
u, as long as the measurement errors are not autocorrelated.
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Table 4.2: Coe¤cient Estimates - Di¤erent Estimation Methods
Parameter MM IV (p-value) IV with FGLS (p-value)bÁ0 - 0:00211 (0:1803) 0:00187 (0:0128)bÁOLS1 ¡0:54575 - - - -bÁINV1 ¡116:74219 - - - -bÁ1 - ¡1:14310 (0:2264) ¡0:73856 (0:0254)b¾u - 0:01703 - 0:01715 -b´OLS 1:83234 - - - -b´INV 0:00857 - - - -b´ - 0:87481 - 1:35399 -be® - 0:00185 - 0:00253 -b¾ - 0:01562 - 0:01095 -b® - 0:00197 - 0:00259 -
DW - 3:21552 - 2:34364 -
R2 - 0:01160 - 0:38477 -
p-value = signi…cance of H0: "coe¢cient=0",
MM = Method of Moments, IV = Instrumental Variables,
FGLS = Feasible Generalized Least Squares,
DW = Durbin-Watson test statistic for …rst-oder serial autocorrelation.
If the shocks, u, can be approximated by an AR(1) model, ut = ½ut¡1+³t with j½j < 1
and ³t being i.i.d. with mean zero, then the …rst-round ordinary least squares estimates of
Á0 and Á1 are consistent and we can correct for autocorrelated disturbances by applying
the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure of feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) (Greene,
2000, section 15.7). The estimates resulting from the FGLS method are reported in the
last two columns of Table 4.2. The null hypothesis bÁ1 = 0 is rejected—at least at the 5
per cent signi…cance level. Thus, we obtain b´ > 1 which clearly supports the assumption
of …rst-mover advantages. The coe¢cient, bÁ0, and, therefore, the drift estimate be® are
signi…cantly greater than zero suggesting that ® > ¾2=2 and ¯ = ¯2 according to Lemma
1 in chapter 2.
Since utilities do not decide about the retirement of power generation units on a
month-by-month basis, we are interested in the long-run levels of the coe¢cients. Thus,
it remains to calculate the estimated annual drift and volatility. We get b® = 0:03109
and b¾ = 0:03795 for the parameters of the geometric Brownian motion Y . Note that ¾ is
overestimated by b¾, since the measurement error, ", captures demand and supply shocks
in our model. So, b¾ should be understood as an upper bound of the ”true” estimate of
the demand shock’s volatility. Further, it is likely that the price elasticity of electricity
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Figure 4-2: Q-Q Plots of Residuals—Geom. Browian Motion vs. Cournot Model
demand, ´¡1, increases also with the time horizon, since …rms in the manufacturing
sector may substitute ”externally acquired electricity” by ”insourcing” electric power
production in the long run, but not in the short run. Hence, b´ may be interpreted as an
upper bound for the annual inverse demand elasticity. This implies that even a scenario
with second-mover advantages may occur when switching from months to years as basic
units of time. The next section that investigates the pro…tability of strategic closure
timing rules, includes a sensitivity analysis with respect to the parameter ´.
Finally, we raise the question whether our model …ts ”reality” also in a statistical
sense. In Figure 4-2 and Table 4.3 some distributional characteristics of our price model
(called Cournot model) are compared to the characteristics of a standard price model—a
geometric Brownian motion. Both models require that the residuals from the logarith-
mized discrete-time analogue are normally distributed. Obviously, the residuals from our
model satisfy this requirement much better than the disturbances of the standard model.
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Table 4.3: Charateristics of Empirical Distribution of Model Residuals
Empirical Moment ¢ lnP ¢ lnP + b´¢ lnQ
standard deviation 0:00658 0:02508
skewness 1:56774 ¡0:14062
(p-value) (0:0000) (0:4528)
excess kurtosis 8:33692 ¡0:52708
(p-value) (0:0000) (0:1643)
Especially the quantile-to-quantile (Q-Q) plots in Figure 4-2 reveal that our residual
distribution does not exhibit fat tails, while the distribution of the geometric Brownian
motion does. We conclude that combining a geometric Brownian motion as a model
for exogenous demand shocks with a deterministic model of supply variations seems to
generate a price model that …ts the ”real world” much better than a single geometric
Brownian motion does.
4.4 Superiority of Strategic Timing—An Example
Let us return to the initial question whether the gains in pro…ts of utility 1 are of signif-
icant size when it switches from the price taker’s closure rule suggested by the standard
real options theory, YP , to the best-response threshold, YM . Resorting to numerical solu-
tions illustrates that the answer must be a clear ’yes’—at least with respect to the closure
scenario ”RWE versus Eon” that we introduced in chapter 1.
Whether to shut down an entire plant or not is certainly a long-run decision. For
that reason, we express all parameters in annual rather than monthly or quarterly terms
henceforth. Further, the numerical speci…cations of the model parameters as detailed
below were either given by experienced energy managers6 or derived from the estimation
model of the German electricity market presented in the last sections. Thus, the …gures
should be considered as plausible approximations of the ”true” values. Nevertheless, we
will provide a sensitivity analysis for most of the parameters to ensure that our conclusions
are drawn on a …rm base. Unless we explicitly refer to a di¤erent set of parameter values,
the computations in this section use the following speci…cation. Each utility controls
6I am grateful to Stefan Florek and Thomas Niedrig from RWE Trading for providing the details.
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Figure 4-3: Net Gain ¢ for Various Values of c; ® and ´.
for 30; 000 MW of power generation capacity.7 Assuming an average annual utilization
rate of 10 per cent amounts to an average annual power production of q = 26:28 million
MWh.8 Both duopolists plan to close 15 per cent of their total capacity. Thus, we have
c = q=q = 0:85. Let us assume that the sunk cost of capacity reduction, E, are linear
in the reduced quantity, i.e. E = k(q ¡ q); and that the marginal adjustment cost, k,
equal DM 66; 667 per retired MW.9 The variable cost (capital, fuel and labor cost) per
generated MWh are given by C = DM 80:00 and the annual discount rate by ½ = 0:10.
Together with the estimates of ®, ¾ and ´, this set of parameter values establishes a
complete numeric assessment of the closure scenario as brought up by RWE and Eon
in the German electric power market. Moreover, it numerically speci…es the function ¢
7See Table 1.1 in chapter 1 for the available capacity of RWE and Eon.
8An average utilization rate of 10 per cent is set relatively high if the power generation units that
should be closed belong to the peak load segment. It is set comparatively low if the units are base load
plants.
9This amounts to adjustment cost of DM 10 million per 150 MW of retired capacity.
99
which is de…ned as the net payo¤ that utility 1 gains by switching from YP to YM (see
equation (4.1)) contingent on YT = YM . We will show that ¢ attains very signi…cant
values not only for this speci…cation.
Figure 4-4: Net Gain ¢ for Various Values of c; ¾ and ´.
Before investigating utility 1’s gain in pro…ts, it is useful to develop some intuition
about the impact of the di¤erent parameters on the closure thresholds, YP and YM ,
rather than on ¢. Both thresholds are decreasing functions of the drift, ®. The higher
the certain demand growth the more likely the event occurs that demand will recover
soon. Consequently, …rms become more reluctant to exercise their closure option. If ®
approaches the discount rate, ½; from below, then YP ; YM ! 0. The reason is that for
® ¸ ½ the ”fundamental value” of each utility equals in…nity implying that no …rm would
ever exercise its closure option independent of what the rival does. YM and YF are not
only decreasing in ®, but also in the volatility, ¾. This is a well-known feature of exercising
rules in standard option pricing theory (see, for example, Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, section
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6.2). In the limit, if ¾ becomes large, both thresholds approach zero and so does their
di¤erence. The intuition is clear: the value of waiting and keeping the option to resolve
the ongoing uncertainty increases with the volatility in demand. Thus, …rms prefer to
delay capacity reduction and the corresponding thresholds shrink. Due to E = k(q ¡ q)
the thresholds are linear in the variable cost, C, the ratio c and the marginal adjustment
cost, k. Moreover, YM and YF are proportional to (C=½) ¡ k and the total capacity ex
ante to capacity reduction, q. Of course, if the adjustment cost, k(q¡ q), converge to the
present value of the operating cost arising from in…nite production, (C=½)(q ¡ q), then
the thresholds go to zero, YP ; YM ! 0, since the value of the closure option becomes
worthless.
Figure 4-5: Net Gain ¢ for Various Values of C, k and ´.
Of course, our main concern is about pro…ts rather than thresholds. Figure 4-3
depicts utility 1’s net gain in payo¤s, ¢, as a function of the inverse demand elasticity,
´, for various values of the ratio c and the drift ® (c 2 f0:05; 0:25; 0:50; 0:75; 0:95g and
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® 2 fb® = 0:03109; 2b®; 0:5b®: ¡ b®g). In contrast to the thresholds YM and YP , ¢ is not
uniformly decreasing in c and ®. However, Figure 4-3 suggests that there exist functions
´1(®) and ´2(c) such that ¢(c = c
l; ®; ´) > ¢(c = ch; ®; ´) for all cl < ch, ´ > ´1(®),
® 2 R, and ¢(c; ® = ®l; ´) > ¢(c; ® = ®h; ´) for all ®l < ®h, ´ > ´2(c), c 2 (0; 1).
Thus, for ´ large enough, ¢ is decreasing in c and ®. It should be clear that the price
taker’s closure option as well as the closure option of utility 1 get worthless if the retired
quantity becomes marginal, c ! 1. So, ¢ approaches zero in this case. If ® gets large,
than …rms become more and more reluctant to exercise their closure option, since the
probability that demand will recover soon grows rapidly. Again, the options lose value
and ¢ ! _0. Figure 4-3 also reveals that ¢ seems to converge to an upper bound if ´
increases. ¢ converges faster for small values of c and ® ceteris paribus.
In Figure 4-4 ¢ is again plotted as a function of ´, but we use varying values for c and
the volatility ¾. For small values of ´ the impact of ¾ on ¢ is ambiguous too. However,
if ´ becomes su¢ciently large, then it seems that ¢ always increases with ¾. The more
volatile the underlying price the higher the value of the option that allows to hedge the
price risk. Further, the rate of convergence of ¢ in ´ declines with ¾.
Finally, Figure 4-5 reveals that the net gain in pro…ts that utility 1 yields by playing
a best response against its price-taking rival, utility 2, reacts very insensitive to changes
in the inverse demand elasticity, ´, for ´ > 0:6. The thick line depicts ¢ as a function of
´ given that the other parameters attain the ”real-world” benchmark values as detailed
above. It shows that utility 1 can gain about ¢ = DM 68 million by choosing the best-
response trigger, YM , rather than adhering to the price taker’s disinvestment threshold,
YP . Further, ¢ does not change signi…cantly even if the ”true” ´ lies far below its
estimate b´ = 1:35399. As compared to the total disinvestment cost, E, that equal DM
300million we consider¢ as being of remarkable size. These …ndings strongly support the
relevance of our approach. They make evident that accounting for strategic interaction
in closure-option timing problems is not just an exercise in game theory being merely of
academic interest. This view obviously pays o¤ and, therefore, should not be ignored by
practitioners in the electric power generation sector.
The other curves in Figure 4-5 also represent plots of ¢ as a function of ´, but for
distinct values of the marginal operating cost, C, and the marginal adjustment cost, k.
The plots indicate that ¢ is in‡uenced rather strongly by ‡uctuations in C; while the
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impact of k appears to be much less signi…cant. The reason is clear; C=½ is about ten
times as large as k. Thus, doubling C should have a much stronger e¤ect on ¢ than
doubling k.
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Chapter 5
Summary
In chapter 2 we analyzed the set of subgame perfect equilibria of a disinvestment timing
game in a market that is subject to aggregate shocks. We found that the timing game
with identical …rms and second-mover advantages exhibits a unique symmetric subgame
perfect equilibrium and, moreover, a unique equilibrium outcome with …rms reducing
capacity jointly. In equilibrium …rms are involved in a prisoners’ dilemma. They reduce
capacity late and simultaneously to avoid that their rival attracts additional market
shares and yields the second-mover advantage. A di¤erent set of equilibria is obtained
for the disinvestment timing game with identical …rms and …rst-mover advantages. In
that case there exist two asymmetric pure strategy equilibria, where one …rm becomes
the leader at the myopic …rm’s threshold and, thereby, yields the …rst-mover advantage,
while the other …rm follows later and attracts additional market shares.
The result obtained in the game with …rst-mover advantages is somewhat unsatis-
factory as it leaves undetermined which …rm actually chooses the ”…rst-mover strategy”
and, thereby, takes over the leadership. With identical …rms we would like to obtain
a symmetric equilibrium, since identical equilibrium strategies solve this coordination
problem. As we discussed in chapter 3, Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) show the existence
of a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium of the preemption type in a game of invest-
ment timing. Though equilibrium strategies are identical, the equilibrium outcome of
”di¤usion”—one …rm invests early and the other follows later—occurs with probability
one.1 We showed, however, that an analogous equilibrium where strategies are discrete
1As we explained in chapter 3, this statement only holds for those subgames that start before the
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lotteries over thresholds, does not exist in the game of closure timing. The reason is that
the leading and the following …rm’s payo¤ do not equalize in equilibrium, i.e. in contrast
to the preemption equilibrium of the investment timing game we do not observe ”rent
equalization”.2
By assuming a linear inverse demand function that implies …rst-mover advantages,
Baldursson (1998) succeeded in deriving analytical expressions for the optimal investment
and disinvestment triggers of …rms in a n-…rm oligopoly. He obtains identical thresholds
for identical …rms. This is not in line with our main proposition that identical …rms
are likely to behave very asymmetric if they face …rst-mover advantages. The reason
for this discrepancy is that in Baldursson’s incremental investment model the process
of adjusting the capital stock is shaded o¤ in adding or removing small units, while we
are concerned with discrete large changes in the stock of capital. In the (dis)investment
timing games of the previous chapters, however, the leader’s optimal adjustment trigger
would also converge to the follower’s optimal threshold if the di¤erence between capacity
ex post and capacity ex ante to (dis)investment approached zero and if the inverse demand
function was well-behaved. Note that …rms prefer to adjust their capital stock in small
units if …rms face decreasing returns to capital, while with increasing returns to capital
the capital stock is optimally altered in large units. Thus, the model by Baldursson is
addressed to a di¤erent kind of industry.
In both cases, with …rst-mover as well as second-mover advantages, the equilibrium
strategy pro…les imply that …rms generally should not move as suggested by the standard
real options theory. In a duopoly, where …rms face second-mover advantages, they bring
forward their disinvestment as compared to a price-taking …rm. Thus, the e¤ect of the
strategic value of investment is to increase the speed of investment. Moreover, we found
point of rent equalization is reached.
2Our analysis of the case of …rst-mover advantages does not exclude the existence of a symmetric
equilibrium where strategies are continuous or mixed distributions over thresholds. In chapter 2 we men-
tioned that the di¤usion outcome reminds us of the principle of ”maximum di¤erentiation” introduced
by d’Aspremont et al. (1979) in Hotelling’s model of spacial competition. Bester et al. (1996) show
that due to coordination failure the location game exhibits an in…nity of asymmetric mixed strategy
Nash equilibria that do not involve maximum di¤erentiation as a possible equilibrium outcome. Addi-
tionally, they detect a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium where strategies are mixed distributions
over the space of locations. The distributions possess discrete mass at the endpoints. Unfortunately, the
approach by Bester et al. cannot be applied to our closure timing game. It requires the validity of two
symmetry conditions that are not satis…ed by our payo¤ functions. Of course, the fact that we do not
observe rent equalization in the di¤usion equilibrium of the closure timing is just a consequence of this
more fundamental asymmetry of payo¤ functions.
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that the rivals delay capacity reduction as compared to a monopolist. In a duopoly with
…rst-mover advantages we detected closure scenarios where the equilibrium follower delays
his disinvestment as compared to a price-taking …rm. In particular, such an outcome is
likely to occur if the rivals plan to shut down large parts of their production facilities. As
a consequence, the standard rules cannot even serve as benchmarks in the sense that the
speed of disinvestment in duopoly is expected to be generally higher than in a market
with price-taking …rms and lower than in monopoly. If the follower exercises his closure
option before a price taker would do, then the strategic value of investment speeds up
disinvestment. Otherwise its e¤ect is ambiguous.
In chapter 2 we also investigated the investment timing game with heterogeneous
…rms. In the case of second-mover advantages the unique equilibrium outcome of the
identical-…rm model ”survives” the transition to the general model if the degree of het-
erogeneity remains relatively small. The intuition that underlies the simultaneous closure
equilibrium, however, is not quite the same as before. Due to its higher e¢ciency the low-
cost …rm has the scope to avoid the extreme prisoners’ dilemma outcome arising in the
identical-…rm case. It disinvests a little bit earlier and, thereby, adopts the leader’s role.
A simultaneous closure scenario nevertheless occurs, since the high-cost …rm is known to
follow immediately. The payo¤ from joint disinvestment is an increasing function of the
disinvestment trigger in that region. Thus, both …rms can raise their payo¤s above the
level that would result from the extreme prisoners’ dilemma outcome.
If the di¤erence in variable cost grows, one obtains an additional ”di¤usion” equilib-
rium in which the high-cost …rm chooses the leader’s role and the low-cost …rm follows
later. This equilibrium with successive disinvestment dates becomes unique when the
cost di¤erence rises even more. The intuition is that the high-cost …rm being exposed to
a strong ”cost-pressure e¤ect” can only avoid this pressure by reducing capacity early.
We also showed that in the case of …rst-mover advantages it is not su¢cient to in-
troduce just a small cost di¤erence between …rms to solve the coordination problem of
assigning the leader’s role. Again, one obtains two asymmetric equilibria that correspond
to the equilibria of the model with identical …rms. Of course, if the degree of hetero-
geneity is raised su¢ciently high, the same cost pressure as in the case of second-mover
advantages guarantees a unique equilibrium with the high-cost …rm adopting the leader’s
role. If the di¤erence in variable cost attains intermediate values, it depends on the pa-
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rameters of the model whether a joint-disinvestment equilibrium additionally exists. As
we expected, a su¢ciently small …rst-mover advantage ensures its existence. We conclude
that the set of equilibria might be richer than in the game with second-mover advantages.
Fine and Li (1989) stress that the multiplicity of equilibria arising from their discrete-
time model of exit timing is an immediate consequence of a discretely jumping demand
process.3 The intuition behind this result is appealing. In an asymmetric duopoly in a
continuously declining industry there will be an initial period of time where both …rms
are viable as duopolists. In the subsequent period the stronger …rm is still viable as a
duopolist, but the weaker …rm is not. It could, however, survive as monopolist. In the
following period both …rms are only viable as monopolist. In the fourth period even
monopoly pro…ts are not su¢cient to prevent the weaker …rm from exiting and in the
…fth period the same applies to the stronger …rm. Intuition suggests that there exists
a unique (subgame perfect) equilibrium where the weaker …rm exits the market in the
second period and the stronger …rm follows in the …fth period. On a heuristic level
this approach characterizes the continuous-time games of exit timing by Ghemawat and
Nalebu¤ (1985) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1986).
Now, suppose that demand does not decline continuously but jumps discretely. Then
a scenario might occur where both …rms has been viable as duopolists before some time
t. At t …rms’ revenues drop su¢ciently sharp such that none of the …rms is still viable as
a duopolist afterwards. In this case intuition suggests that there exist two asymmetric
equilibria. In the …rst equilibrium the weak …rm exits …rst and the strong …rm follows
later. In the other equilibrium roles are interchanged. So, by allowing the demand process
to be discontinuous, one obtains a multiplicity of equilibria as in the model by Fine and Li.
They conclude that the equilibrium uniqueness in the models by Ghemawat and Nalebu¤
and Fudenberg and Tirole could be destroyed if the assumption of a continuously declining
demand were relaxed and discrete (stochastic or deterministic) jumps were allowed. In
our closure timing game with heterogeneous …rms, however, we also obtain multiple
asymmetric equilibria of the above kind, though our inverse demand process is perfectly
continuous.4
3”Jumps”, i.e. discontinuities in demand naturally occurs in such a discrete-time framework.
4Of course, if the degree of heterogeneity becomes su¢ciently large, we obtain a unique equilibrium.
But an equivalent result also holds in the model by Fine and Li. There the intuition is that if the weak
…rm becomes su¢ciently weak, the length of the third period converges to zero, i.e. the strong …rm is
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One might guess that the multiplicity of equilibria in our model is due to fact that
we consider closure decisions rather than the extreme case of …rm exit. But this con-
jecture turns out to be wrong. We modi…ed our model and analyzed the case of …rm
exit. However, multiple equilibria were still obtained. We were not able to resolve the
apparent inconsistency between Fine and Li’s …ndings and our result. The puzzle has to
be dedicated to future research.
The non-stochastic model of …rm exit by Ghemawat and Nalebu¤ (1985) provides
some evidence that the bigger …rm quits earlier than the smaller rival. Moreover, if
economics of scale are su¢ciently large, this equilibrium pattern of disinvestment might
be reversed. Our results contrast with these …ndings. Using a model set-up that is almost
analogous to the one by Ghemawat and Nalebu¤, we showed that for a wide range of
parameter values either the smaller …rm reduces capacity before the big …rm or both …rms
shut down production facilities simultaneously. Moreover, the outcome is independent of
the magnitude of the di¤erence in variable cost. As we discussed in chapter 2, our result
di¤ers from that of Ghemawat and Nalebu¤ because we assumed …rms to be still active
after capacity reduction, while they are concerned with the extreme case of …rm exit. This
does not necessarily imply that in the limit, when the ”activity level” of …rms ex post
to capacity reduction converges to zero, our timing game generates the same outcome as
Ghemawat and Nalebu¤’s model. Results do qualitatively coincide if consumers have a
…nite reservation price.
Turning to policy issues, our welfare analysis provides some evidence that regula-
tion authorities should adopt a restrictive approach to the assessment of mergers, joint
ventures and cooperation in declining industries or markets with excess capacities. Our
results contrast with the …ndings of Weeds (2000) who recommends a loose regulation
policy with respect to joint ventures in R&D investment projects. This implies that the
socially optimal regulation policy should depend on the industry’s potential for future
growth.
In chapter 3 we discussed the corresponding investment timing game with identical
…rms as proposed by Huisman and Kort (1999). There, either an equilibrium of the
preemption type or of the collusion type prevails depending on the parameter values.
still viable as a duopolist when only monopoly pro…ts can guarantee the survival of the weak …rm.
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While trying to preempt each other, …rms might invest simultaneously, leaving them
o¤ with the worst possible payo¤. Weeds (2000) and Grenadier (1996) restrict on pure
strategies and, thereby, avoid the outcome of erroneous joint investment. Huisman and
Kort deal with this kind of coordination failure by using the appropriate strategy spaces
as suggested by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985). They prove that erroneous joint investment
indeed occurs with positive probability in the preemption equilibrium of any subgame
that starts after the point of rent equalization has been passed.
We demonstrated that a monopolist equipped with two investment options—one
from each …rm in duopoly—exercises the …rst option earlier and the second later than
duopolists do in the Pareto-optimal equilibrium of the collusion type. We argued that,
if …rst-mover advantages are small, the actual timing of investment in duopoly might
be very similar to the optimal investment sequence in monopoly. Empirical evidence
was provided that points to the collusion case rather than the preemption case in the
German electric utility industry. Moreover, in chapter 4 we presented estimates of the
inverse demand elasticity that suggests rather moderate …rst-mover advantages. These
facts probably imply that in the German electric power market the practical relevance of
the game-theoretic approach to investment options is limited as compared to the stan-
dard real options theory—the discrepancy between the monopolist’s investment pattern
and the equilibrium investment timing in duopoly might be negligible; the strategic value
of investment seems to be small.
In chapter 4 we investigated the closure scenario ”RWE versus Eon” in the German
electric power market. Our main concern was the empirical relevance of the ”strategic real
options approach” propagated in the previous chapters. We analytically derived the gain
in pro…ts that a utility yields when switching from a standard real-options-theory rule
to the best response against its price-taking rival. For the purpose of computing realistic
values for this gain, we estimated the main parameters of our model with respect to the
German electricity sector. By using the estimates and some other reasonable benchmark
values, it was shown that a utility can increase its pro…ts by a very remarkable amount
if it follows our suggestions rather than the standard real options theory. Further, we
provided some evidence that, with respect to its distributional characteristics, our price
model …ts the theoretical requirements much better than the conventional price model.
That is, the residuals from our model follow a normal distribution, while the residuals
109
from the discrete-time analogue of the geometric Brownian motion do not. Finally, a
primitive model of aggregate investment (and disinvestment) in the German electricity
sector was derived.
We did not compare numerically the utilities’ payo¤s that result if both competitors
play the equilibrium strategy pro…le with their payo¤s from jointly sticking to the price-
taker’s rule. From an analytical point of view, however, the equilibrium payo¤s Pareto-
dominate the price takers’ payo¤s in the case of identical …rms facing second-mover
advantages. The reason is that price takers (jointly) disinvest later than …rms do in the
unique joint-closure equilibrium outcome and that the payo¤ from simultaneous closure
decreases with the time of disinvestment in that region. In the game with …rst-mover
advantages our …ndings are more ambiguous. In the case that the equilibrium follower
disinvests earlier than a price taker, the equilibrium payo¤s of the follower and the leader
are greater than a price taker’s payo¤. This can be veri…ed as follows. Suppose the
equilibrium leader deviates to the equilibrium follower’s threshold. Then both …rms
yield a strictly smaller return on closure than in equilibrium. By moving simultaneously
at the equilibrium follower’s threshold, however, they are still better o¤ than the price
takers. Again, the reason is that the payo¤ from simultaneous closure decreases with
the time of disinvestment in that region. In the case that the equilibrium follower moves
later than a price taker, this line of arguments does not apply any longer. It cannot
be excluded that the equilibrium leader is worse o¤ than a price taker with a rival that
shows the same irrational behavior.
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Appendix A
Proofs of Chapter 2
A.1 Conditional Expectations
In the text we make extensive use of the conditional expectations
f (YT) = ET
£
e¡½(T¡T)
¤
;
g (YT) = ET
24 1Z
T
e¡½(t¡T)Y (t) dt
35 and h (YT) = ET
24 TZ
T
e¡½(t¡T)Y (t) dt
35 ;
where ET[¢] = E [¢ jFT;T <1 ] and YT and YT are some …xed thresholds. T and T denote
the corresponding …rst-passage or stopping times, i.e. T = inf(t ¸ 0 jY (t) · YT ) and
T = inf(t ¸ T jY (t) · YT ). Further, note that FT = fA 2 F : A \ fT(!) · tg 2 Ftg.
Intuitively, FT is the set of all events whose occurrence or non-occurrence is known at
the time of stopping. First, let us formally state the results in the following lemma.
Lemma 6 For YT, YT , T, T and ET [¢] de…ned as above it holds that
f (YT) =
µ
YT
YT
¶¡¯
; g (YT) =
YT
±
and h (YT) =
YT
±
¡
µ
YT
YT
¶¡¯
YT
±
;
where ± = ½¡ ® and
¯ =
8<: ¯2 = 12 ¡ ®¾2 ¡
q£
®
¾2
¡ 1
2
¤2
+ 2½
¾2
< 0 for ® < ¾
2
2
;e¯
2 = ¯2 + 1¡ (2®=¾2) < 0 for ® ¸ ¾22 :
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The remaining part of this appendix contains the proof of Lemma 6. To keep the
exposition simple we focus on deriving explicit expressions for f(Y0); g(Y0); and h(Y0),
where Y0 is assumed to be the initial value of the underlying geometric Brownian motion
fY (t); t ¸ 0g and E0[¢] = E [¢ jY (0) = Y0 ]: This simpli…cation requires to clarify in which
sense the latter expectations are equivalent to the former ones. For this purpose we need
a version of the strong Markov property (e.g., see Harrison, 1985, p.5).
Theorem 1 Let T < 1 be a stopping time, and de…ne Z¤(t) = Z(T + t) for t ¸ 0.
Then Z¤ is a (¹; ¾2) Brownian motion with starting state ZT and Z¤ is independent of
FT = fA 2 F : A \ fT (!) · tg 2 Ftg.
Let X(t) = lnY (t) = lnY0 + (® ¡ (¾2=2))t + ¾B(t) with fB(t); t ¸ 0g denoting
standard Brownian motion. Notice that fX(t); t ¸ 0g is a ((® ¡ (¾2=2); ¾2) Brownian
motion with starting state lnY0. Now, de…ne X¤(t) = X(T + t) and Y ¤(t) = Y (T + t):
Then not only X¤(t), but also Y ¤(t) is independent of FT.
Regarding the simplest expectation f de…ne T ¤ = inf(t ¸ 0 jY ¤(t) · YT ) and Y ¤0 =
YT. Then it follows immediately that
f (YT) = ET
£
e¡½(T¡T)
¤
= E £e¡½T ¤ jY ¤ (0) = Y ¤0 ¤ = f (Y ¤0 ) :
Next, we analyze the expectation h. We have
h (YT) = ET
24 T¡TZ
0
e¡½tY ¤ (t) dt
35 = ET
24 T ¤Z
0
e¡½tY ¤ (t) dt
35 :
>From the strong Markov property of Y ¤ it follows that
ET
24 T ¤Z
0
e¡½tY ¤ (t) dt
35 = E
24 T ¤Z
0
e¡½tY ¤ (t) dt
¯¯¯¯
¯¯Y ¤ (0) = Y ¤0
35 = h (Y ¤0 ) :
Finally, the corresponding equivalence with respect to g can be shown by setting T =1
in the formula for h. To conclude, w.l.o.g. the expectations can be calculated contingent
on the event that Y0 rather than YT is the root of the (sub)game.
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Let us start o¤ with the computation of f(Y0) by drawing partially from Karlin and
Taylor (1975, p.357f.).1 The key result that is needed in order to solve f(Y0) is the
Martingale Stopping Theorem (e.g., see Harrison, 1985, p.130),
Theorem 2 Let (­;F; P ) be a …ltered probability space and T a stopping time on this
space. If (i) Z(t) is a martingale with right-continuous sample paths, (ii) T < 1 al-
most surely, and (iii) fZ (T ^ t) ; t ¸ 0g is uniformly bounded, then the stopped process
fZ (T ^ t) ; t ¸ 0g is also a martingale and it holds that E [Z (T )] = E [Z (0)] :
For notational convenience we write T ^ t instead of minfT; tg. Unfortunately,
condition (ii), i.e. T < 1 almost surely, is not necessarily satis…ed here. By The-
orem 5.3 in Karlin and Taylor (1975, p.361) the probability that X(t) = lnY (t) =
lnY0 + (® ¡ (¾2=2))t + ¾B(t) ever reaches XT = lnYT < X0 = lnY0 (or, equivalently,
that T <1) is given by
lim
a!1
µ
1¡ exp (¡ (2®¡ ¾
2)X0=¾
2)¡ exp (¡ (2®¡ ¾2)XT=¾2)
exp (¡ (2®¡ ¾2) a=¾2)¡ exp (¡ (2®¡ ¾2)XT=¾2)
¶
:
For ® < ¾2=2 this probability converges to one, i.e. T < 1 almost surely. When
® ¸ ¾2=2; however, T is in…nite with positive probability (Karlin and Taylor, 1975,
p.361). Let us summarize,
Pr fT <1g =
8>>><>>>:
1 for ® < ¾
2
2
;
exp (¡ (2®¡ ¾2) (X0 ¡XT ) =¾2)
= (YT=Y0)
(2®=¾2)¡1
for ® ¸ ¾2
2
:
(A.1)
Hence, we have well de…ned what is understood by the following transformation of f(Y0),
E0
£
e¡½T
¤
= Pr fT <1g ¢ E0
£
e¡½T ;T <1¤+ Pr fT =1g ¢ E0 £e¡½T ;T =1¤ :
1Note that Karlin and Taylor calculate this expectation under the assumptions that 0 < X(0) =
x < lnYT rather than x > lnYT (see below) and that Yt = Y0 exp[®t ¡ ¾B(t)] rather than Yt =
Y0 exp[(®¡ ¾2)t¡ ¾B(t)]: Both assumptions are of major importance for the solution. In this appendix
we put emphasis on the formal aspects of the computation. For a more intuitive, but heuristic derivation,
see Dixit and Pindyck (1994, appendix of chap.9).
113
Since the discount rate ½ is positive by assumption, E0[e¡½T ;T =1] = 0 and
f (Y0) = Pr fT <1g ¢ E0
£
e¡½T ;T <1¤ :
Now, we can focus on the computation of E0[e¡½T ;T < 1]. In what follows the con-
tingency on the event fT < 1g is suppressed for ease of notation. Let us de…ne
V (t) = exp(¯X(t) ¡ °t), where ° = ¯(® ¡ (¾2=2)) + ¯2(¾2=2): The so-called Wald
martingale V (t) is chosen such that it satis…es the martingale property. We have
E [V (t+ s) jY (r) ; r · t ]
= e¡°(t+s) ¢ E £e¯(X(t+s)¡X(t)) ¢ e¯X(t) jY (r) ; r · t¤
= V (t) ¢ e¡°s ¢ E £e¯(X(t+s)¡X(t)) jY (r) ; r · t¤
= V (t) ¢ e¡¯2(¾2=2)s ¢ E £e¯¾(B(t+s)¡B(t)) jY (r) ; r · t¤ ;
with t; s > 0. Due to the independence of B(t + s) ¡ B(t) with respect to the ¾-
algebra ¾(Y (r); r · t), the self-similarity property of Brownian motion, and the fact that
B(1) » N(0; 1); one yields (e.g. see Mikosch, 1998, p.42)
Et
£
e¯¾(B(t+s)¡B(t)) jY (r) ; r · t¤
= E £e¯¾(B(t+s)¡B(t))¤ = E £e¯¾B(s)¤ = E he¯¾psB(1)i = e¯2(¾2=2)s :
Thus E [V (t+ s) jY (r) ; r · t ] = V (t) : From the martingale property it follows
E [V (t)] = E [V (0)] and E [V (T ^ t)] = E [V (0)] :
However, we are interested in E [V (T )] rather than E [V (T ^ t)]. Since T <1 is implicitly
assumed, limt!1 V (T ^ t) = V (T ) holds generally. Further, in order to ensure that
E
h
lim
t!1
V (T ^ t)
i
= lim
t!1
E [V (T ^ t)], E [V (T )] = E [V (0)]
is satis…ed, we additionally need V (T ^ t) = exp(¯X(T ^ t)¡ °(T ^ t)) to be uniformly
bounded. Fortunately, the restrictions ¯ · 0 and ° ¸ 0 , ¯ · 1 ¡ 2®=¾2 guarantee
uniform boundedness of V (T ^ t), because in that case 0 < V (T ^ t) · e¯ lnYT almost
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surely (again contingent on T <1). One yields
E [V (T )] = E [V (0)]
, E [exp (¯ lnYT ¡ °T )] = exp (¯ lnY0)
, E [exp (¡°T )] =
µ
YT
Y0
¶¡¯
:
Recall that we still have to relate f(Y0) = E0[V (T )]j°=½ with E [V (T )]. Since V (t) is a
martingale, the conditional expectation E0[V (T )] satis…es
E0 [V (T )] = V (0) = E [V (T )]
, E0 [V (T )] = (YT )¡¯ E0
£
e¡°T
¤
= (YT )
¡¯ E £e¡°T ¤
This leaves us with the desired result E0
£
e¡°T
¤
= E £e¡°T ¤. Setting ° equal to the
discount rate ½ gives f(Y0) = (YT=Y0)¡¯. It remains to relate ¯ and ° = ½ by the
so-called ”fundamental quadratic equation” (e.g., see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), 0 =
¯2(¾2=2) + ¯(®¡ (¾2=2))¡ ½; the two roots of which are given by
¯1;2 =
1
2
¡ ®
¾2
§
s·
®
¾2
¡ 1
2
¸2
+
2½
¾2
:
While ¯1 turns out to be greater than one, ¯ = ¯2 satis…es ¯ · 0 and ° ¸ 0. So we
…nally obtain
f (Y0) = Pr fT <1g ¢
µ
YT
Y0
¶¡¯2
=
8><>:
³
YT
Y0
´¡¯2
for ® < ¾
2
2
;³
YT
Y0
´¡¯2+(2®=¾2)¡1
for ® ¸ ¾2
2
:
To guarantee the general validity of the equilibria derived in section 2.4, it is of essential
importance to see that not only ¯2 turns out to be negative, but also e¯2 = ¯2¡(2®=¾2)+
1 < 0 given that ® ¸ ¾2=2.
Next let us compute g(Y0). A basic condition for the existence of g(Y0) is that
R1
0
e¡½t
E0[jY (t)j]dt < 1. Due to the fact that the geometric Brownian motion Y is a positive
process as Y0 > 0, we have jY (t)j = Y (t). Then the conditional expectation can be
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written as
E0 [jY (t)j] = E0 [Y (t)] = Y0 ¢ e(®¡(¾2=2))t ¢ E0
£
e¾B(t)
¤
Above we have already shown that Et[exp(¾B(t))] = exp((¾2=2)t) holds. One obtains
1Z
0
e¡½tE0 [jY (t)j] dt = Y0 ¢
1Z
0
e¡(½¡®)tdt:
Obviously, the integral is well-de…ned if ± = ½ ¡ ® > 0, which is assumed hereafter. By
Tonelli’s Theorem—a version of Fubini’s Theorem (e.g., see Harrison, 1985, p.131) that
requires the integrand to be a positive process (which is satis…ed by eY (t) = e¡½tY (t))—,
the original function g(Y0) can be transformed as follows,
g (Y0) = E0
24 1Z
0
e¡½tY (t) dt
35 = 1Z
0
e¡½tE0 [Y (t)] dt
= Y0 ¢
1Z
0
e¡(½¡®)tdt =
Y0
±
:
Finally, we compute h(Y0): Again, one has to take into account that Y (t) might never
reach YT such that T =1 with positive probability. Therefore
h (Y0) = Pr fT <1g ¢ (g (Y0)¡ l (Y0)) + Pr fT =1g ¢ g (Y0)
= g (Y0)¡ Pr fT <1g ¢ l (Y0) ;
where
l (Y0) = E0
24 1Z
T
e¡½tY (t) dt;T <1
35 :
The probability that T < 1 (or equivalently that X(t) ever reaches XT ) has already
been computed in equation (A.1). Further note that Y (t) = exp(X(t)). Then l(Y0) can
be transformed as follows,
l (Y0) = E0
24 1Z
T
e¡½teX(t)dt;T <1
35 = E0
24e¡½T 1Z
0
e¡½teX
¤(t)dt;T <1
35 :
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Since E0[¢] = E0[E [¢ jFT ]] and exp(¡½T ) is measurable with respect to FT ; one obtains
l (Y0) = E0
24e¡½T ¢ E0
24 1Z
0
e¡½teX
¤(t)dt
¯¯¯¯
¯¯FT
35 ;T <1
35 :
Then by the strong Markov property we get
E0
24 1Z
0
e¡½teX
¤(t)dt
¯¯¯¯
¯¯FT
35 = E0
24 1Z
0
e¡½teX
¤(t)dt
35 = g (YT ) ;
and l(Y0) becomes
l (Y0) = E0
£
e¡½Tg (YT ) ;T <1
¤
= g (YT ) ¢ f (Y0) = YT
±
¢
µ
YT
Y0
¶¡¯2
:
We can conclude that
h (Y0) =
8><>:
Y0
±
¡
³
YT
Y0
´¡¯2 YT
±
for ® < ¾
2
2
;
Y0
±
¡
³
YT
Y0
´¡e¯2 YT
±
for ® ¸ ¾2
2
;
with ¯2 = 0:5¡ (®=¾2)¡ [(0:5¡ ®=¾2)2 + 2½=¾2]2 and e¯2 = ¯2 ¡ (2®=¾2) + 1 < 0.
A.2 Leader’s Value Function
Let us prove the assertion that there exists a discontinuity of L
0
(YT) at YF . The r-limit
YT # YF of L0 (YT) is given by
lim
YT#YF
L
0
(YT) = lim
YT#YF
"
R
¡
q; q
¢
±
+ ¯
µ
YF
YT
¶1¡¯ R ¡q; q¢¡R ¡q; q¢
±
#
= (1¡ ¯) R
¡
q; q
¢
±
+ ¯
R
¡
q; q
¢
±
R 0 for
R
¡
q; q
¢
R
¡
q; q
¢ R ¡¯
1¡ ¯ :
The l-limit YT " YF turns out to be limYT"YF L0(YT) = R(q; q)=± > 0. It follows that
there indeed exists a discontinuity of L
0
(YT) at YF , since limYT#YF L
0
(YT) < R(q; q)=± =
limYT"YF L
0
(YT): One can quickly verify the general validity of this inequality by recalling
that R(q; q) > R(q; q).
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Throughout this proof we assume that roles are exogenously preassigned to …rms.
Proof of part (i): We have to distinguish between the three cases (a) R1 · C · R2,
(b) C < R1, and (c) C > R2:
Case (a): Let us start with the assertion YL ¸ YF . Clearly we have to prove below
that this assertion is correct. Since we exogenously assign roles to players, the leader’s
threshold YL can be derived equivalently to the follower’s threshold YF . According to
equation (2.17) the …rm that decides to become the leader at YT; YL ¸ YT > YF ; yields
the expected revenues ¤ (YT) net of the option’s strike price E,
L (YT) = ¤ (YT)¡E =
YTR
¡
q; q
¢
±
¡ CLq
½
¡E
+
µ
YF
YT
¶¡¯ YF ¡R ¡q; q¢¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
:
>From our considerations about the follower’s value we know that the value of the leader’s
…rm in the region YT > YL can be determined by assuming implicitly that YL is known.
For YT > YL one obtains
L (YT) = e¤ (YT) = ET
24 TLZ
T
e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)R (q; q)¡ CLq] dt
35
+ET
£
e¡½(TL¡T) (¤ (YL)¡ E)
¤
:
Note that, since YL represents a predetermined threshold, ¤ (YL) is constant and mea-
surable with respect to the ¾-algebra FT. Thus, after rearranging, we can write
e¤ (YT) = R (q; q) ¢ h (YT)jT=TL ¡ CLq½ +
µ
CLq
½
+ ¤(YL)¡ E
¶
¢ f (YT)jT=TL :
By using the expectation formulas from Lemma 6 in Appendix A.1, we get
e¤ (YT) = YTR (q; q)
±
¡ CLq
½
¡
µ
YL
YT
¶¡¯ µ
YLR (q; q)
±
¡ CLq
½
¡ ¤ (YL) + E
¶
:
As for the follower, the leader’s optimal closure threshold can be determined by maxi-
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mizing e¤ with respect to YL. The …rst derivative is given by
@e¤
@YL
= (1¡ ¯)
µ
YL
YT
¶¡¯ R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢
±
µ
YF
YL
¢ CR2 ¡ 1
¶
(A.2)
Since we assumed that C · R2, @e¤=@YL is negative for all YL > YF . In that case it
follows that either YL = YF or our initial assertion, YL ¸ YF ; turns out to be wrong.
To decide about this we consider the complementary assumption YL < YF : Under this
scenario the follower will reduce his capacity immediately after the leader has done so
(at YL). Consequently, for YT > YL; the leader’s value function is given by
L (YT) = ¤ (YT) = ET
24 TLZ
T
e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)R (q; q)¡ CLq] dt
35
+ET
24 1Z
TL
e¡½(t¡T)
£
Y (t)R
¡
q; q
¢¡ CLqdt¤¡ e¡½(TL¡T)E
35 :
Again, by using the expectation formulas from Lemma 6 in Appendix A.1, we get
¤ (YT) =
YTR (q; q)
±
¡ CLq
½
¡
µ
YL
YT
¶¡¯
£
£
Ã
YL
¡
R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
¡ CL
¡
q ¡ q¢
½
+ E
!
:
Since CL ¡ CF is assumed to be not too negative, i.e. C ¸ R1 is satis…ed, the …rst
derivative with respect to YL,
@¤
@YL
= (1¡ ¯)
µ
YL
YT
¶¡¯ R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢
±
µ
YF
YL
¢ CR1 ¡ 1
¶
; (A.3)
is greater than zero for all YL < YF . So, if R1 · C · R2; then YL = YF is indeed the
optimal exercise threshold of the …rm that gets preassigned to the leader’s role.
Case (b): If the leader’s cost is low compared to the follower’s cost, i.e. C < R1 is
satis…ed, then the derivative in equation (A.3) has roots at YL = 0, ¯ < ¡1; and
YL =
¡¯±
1¡ ¯ ¢
(CL=½)
¡
q ¡ q¢¡ E
R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢ = YSijCi=CL < YF :
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The second-order condition shows that ¤ exhibits a saddle point at YL = 0, while the
other solution indeed maximizes ¤. Moreover, the derivative in equation (A.2) is negative
for all YL ¸ YF . So, if C < R1; then YL = YSijCi=CL < YF is the optimal exercise threshold
of the …rm that gets preassigned to the leader’s role.
Case (c): If the leader’s and the follower’s variable cost satisfy C > R2, then the
derivative in equation (A.2) has roots at YL = 0, ¯ < ¡1; and
YL =
¡¯±
1¡ ¯ ¢
(CL=½)
¡
q ¡ q¢¡ E
R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢ = YM jCM=CL > YF :
The second-order condition shows that e¤ exhibits a saddle point at YL = 0, while the
other solution maximizes e¤. Moreover, the derivative in equation (A.3) is positive for all
YL < YF . So, if C > R2; then YL = YM jCM=CL > YF is the optimal exercise threshold of
the …rm that gets preassigned to the leader’s role.
Proof of part (ii): Imagine a myopic …rm that faces constant marginal cost of pro-
duction CM and that is equipped with the option to reduce capacity from q to q: If YT is
greater than its optimal closure threshold YM ; the myopic …rm has the following value,
M (YT) = ET
24 TMZ
T
e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)R (q; q)¡ CMq] dt
35
+ET
24 1Z
TM
e¡½(t¡T)
£
Y (t)R
¡
q; q
¢¡ CMq¤ dt
35¡ ET £e¡½(TM¡T)E¤
=
YTR (q; q)
±
¡ CMq
½
¡
µ
YM
YT
¶¡¯
£
£
Ã
YM
¡
R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
¡ CM
¡
q ¡ q¢
½
+ E
!
;
where TM = inf(t > T jY (t) · YM ). The partial derivative of M (YT) with respect to
YM ;
@M
@YM
= (1¡ ¯)
µ
YM
YT
¶¡¯ R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢
±
Ã
¡¯±
1¡ ¯
(CM=½)
¡
q ¡ q¢¡ E
YM
¡
R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¢ ¡ 1
!
;
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exhibits roots at
YM =
¡¯±
1¡ ¯ ¢
(CM=½)
¡
q ¡ q¢¡E
R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢
and YM = 0, ¯ < ¡1. Again, from the second-order condition, YM > 0 is known to be
the unique local maximizer, i.e. the high-cost …rm that gets preassigned to the leader’s
role reduces capacity when the myopic …rm’s reduction threshold is hit.
The result in part (iii) follows from a simple modi…cation of the proof of part (ii), i.e.
substitute R(q; q) for D(2q)q. Finally, let us prove part (iv). The inequality YM > YF
(YM < YF ) immediately follows from condition (2.4) (condition (2.5)). Moreover, YM >
YP is an implication of the fact thatD(2q)(q¡q) > R(q; q)¡R(q; q) ,D(2q) < D(q+q).
This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof of part (i) and (ii): Principally, the monopolist may decide to reduce capacity
sequentially or to shut down both production units at the same time. I.e. either he
chooses two distinct closure thresholds Y 0O and Y
00
O , Y
0
O > Y
00
O , or he exercises both options
simultaneously at YO. Suppose that a sequential disinvestment pattern is optimal. Then
Y 0O and Y
00
O ; Y
0
O > Y
00
O , are the solutions to the maximization problem maxY 0O;Y 00O O
seq(YT)
with
Oseq (YT) = ET[
T 0OZ
T
e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)D (2q)¡ C] 2qdt
+
T 00OZ
T 0O
e¡½(t¡T)
£
Y (t)D
¡
q + q
¢¡ C¤ ¡q + q¢ dt
+
1Z
T 00O
e¡½(t¡T)
£
Y (t)D
¡
2q
¢¡ C¤ 2qdt
¡
³
e¡½(T
0
O¡T) + e¡½(T
00
O¡T)
´
E];
T 0O = inf(t ¸ T jY (t) · Y 0O ) and T 00O = inf(t ¸ T jY (t) · Y 00O ). According to earlier
…ndings we can express the monopolist’s value function explicitly in terms of the closure
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thresholds,
Oseq (YT) =
2YTR (q; q)
±
¡ C ¢ 2q
½
¡
µ
Y 0O
YT
¶¡¯ ÃY 0O ¡2R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
¡ C
¡
q ¡ q¢
½
+ E
!
¡
µ
Y 00O
YT
¶¡¯ ÃY 00O ¡R ¡q; q¢+R ¡q; q¢¡ 2R ¡q; q¢¢
±
¡ C
¡
q ¡ q¢
½
+ E
!
:
The …rst-order condition with respect to Y 0O,
0 =
1¡ ¯
±
µ
Y 0O
YT
¶¡¯
£
£
Ã
2R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¡R ¡q; q¢¡ ¡¯±
1¡ ¯
(C=½)
¡
q ¡ q¢¡ E
Y 0O
!
;
is satis…ed for Y 0O = 0, ¯ < ¡1, and
Y 0O =
¡¯±
1¡ ¯
(C=½)
¡
q ¡ q¢¡ E
2R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¡R ¡q; q¢ :
The second-order condition reveals that only the second value is a maximizer of Oseq.
With respect to Y 00O a similar result is obtained. The maximizing argument turns out to
be
Y 00O =
¡¯±
1¡ ¯
(C=½)
¡
q ¡ q¢¡ E
R
¡
q; q
¢
+R
¡
q; q
¢¡ 2R ¡q; q¢ :
Substracting the denominator in the expression for Y 00O from the denominator of Y
0
O yields
2
£
R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¡R ¡q; q¢+R ¡q; q¢¤
which is smaller (greater) than zero if condition (2.4) (condition (2.5)) holds. Thus, in
the case of …rst-mover advantages we have Y 0O > Y
00
O verifying our initial assumption.
However, with second-mover advantages one obtains Y 0O < Y
00
O contradicting our initial
assumption. In this case a simultaneous rather than a sequential disinvestment pattern
must be optimal for the monopolist. The corresponding simultaneous exercising threshold
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YO is the solution to the maximization problem maxYO O
sim(YT) with
Osim (YT) = ET[
TOZ
T
e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)D (2q)¡ C] 2qdt
+
1Z
TO
e¡½(t¡T)
£
Y (t)D
¡
2q
¢¡ C¤ 2qdt¡ 2e¡½(TO¡T)E]:
The monopolist’s value function can be rewritten as
Osim (YT) =
2YTR (q; q)
±
¡ C ¢ 2q
½
¡
µ
YO
YT
¶¡¯Ã2YO ¡R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
¡ 2C
¡
q ¡ q¢
½
¡ 2E
!
:
The …rst-order condition with respect to YO,
2 (1¡ ¯)
±
µ
YO
YT
¶¡¯ Ã
R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¡ ¡¯±
1¡ ¯
(C=½)
¡
q ¡ q¢¡ E
YO
!
= 0;
is satis…ed for YO = YS¤ = YSijCi=C.
Proof of part (iii): Note that YF < YS¤ as well as YM < YS¤ immediately follow from
condition (2.3). These inequalities hold irrespective of the occurrence of …rst-mover or
second-mover advantages. Moreover, the validity of Y 00O < YS¤ < Y
0
O was already proved
above. It remains to be shown that YF < Y 00O . This requires that
R
¡
q; q
¢¡R ¡q; q¢ > R ¡q; q¢+R ¡q; q¢¡ 2R ¡q; q¢, R ¡q; q¢ > R ¡q; q¢ ;
which is satis…ed according to condition (2.3). This completes the proof of Proposition
2.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof of part (i): First, L (YT) = S (YT; YS¤) = F (YT) for YT · YF and C = C1 = C2
is an obvious implication of equations (2.12), (2.18), (2.26), and (2.28). Second, L (YT),
F (YT) ; and S (YT; YS¤) are (at least) C2-functions for YT > YF and continuous for all YT.
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Third, L
0
(YT) < @S (YT; YS¤) =@YT < F
0
(YT) for YT > YF will be shown immediately.
As a prerequisite the derivatives have to be computed. The slope of F (YT) for YT > YF
turns out to be
F
0
(YT) =
R
¡
q; q
¢
±
¡
µ
YF
YT
¶1¡¯ R ¡q; q¢¡R ¡q; q¢
±
;
which is smaller than R(q; q)=±, but greater than R(q; q)=±. The partial derivative of
S (YT; YS¤) with respect to YT for YT > YS¤ can be written as
@S (YT; YS¤)
@YT
=
R (q; q)
±
¡
µ
YS¤
YT
¶1¡¯ R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢
±
;
which is smaller than R(q; q)=±, but greater than R(q; q)=±. The slope of L (YT) for
YT > YS¤ is given by
L
0
(YT) =
R
¡
q; q
¢
±
+ ¯
µ
YF
YT
¶1¡¯ R ¡q; q¢¡R ¡q; q¢
±
:
If ¯ is small enough, then L
0
(YT) might become negative. However, for YT becoming
large it approaches R(q; q)=±.
Now we can show that L
0
(YT) < @S (YT; YS¤) =@YT < F
0
(YT) generally holds for
YT > YF under the assumption of identical variable cost, i.e. C1 = C2 = C. Let us begin
with the …rst inequality. For YT > YS¤ we get
L
0
(YT) <
@S (YT; YS¤)
@YT
, R
¡
q; q
¢
±
+ ¯
µ
YF
YT
¶1¡¯ R ¡q; q¢¡R ¡q; q¢
±
<
R (q; q)
±
¡
µ
YS¤
YT
¶1¡¯ R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢
±
( R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢ > µYS¤
YT
¶1¡¯ ¡
R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¢
( R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢ > R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢ ;
which is satis…ed, since R(q; q) < R(q; q). For YF < YT · YS¤ we have
L
0
(YT) <
@S (YT; YS¤)
@YT
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, R
¡
q; q
¢
±
+ ¯
µ
YF
YT
¶1¡¯ R ¡q; q¢¡R ¡q; q¢
±
<
R
¡
q; q
¢
±
, ¯
µ
YF
YT
¶1¡¯
< 0:
The inequality is valid due to ¯ < 0.
Next, we examine the second assertion for YT > YS¤,
@S (YT; YS¤)
@YT
< F
0
(YT)
, R (q; q)
±
¡
µ
YS¤
YT
¶1¡¯ R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢
±
<
R
¡
q; q
¢
±
¡
µ
YF
YT
¶1¡¯ R ¡q; q¢¡R ¡q; q¢
±
(
µ
YS¤
YT
¶1¡¯ ¡
R
¡
q; q
¢¡R (q; q)¢ < R ¡q; q¢¡R (q; q) ;
which is satis…ed by assumption. For YF < YT · YS¤ we get
@S (YT; YS¤)
@YT
< F
0
(YT)
, R
¡
q; q
¢
±
<
R
¡
q; q
¢
±
¡
µ
YF
YT
¶1¡¯ R ¡q; q¢¡R ¡q; q¢
±
,
µ
YF
YT
¶1¡¯ ¡
R
¡
q; q
¢¡R ¡q; q¢¢ < R ¡q; q¢¡R ¡q; q¢ ;
which is obviously true, since YT > YF by assumption. It follows that L (YT) < S (YT; YS¤) <
F (YT) for YT > YF .
Proof of part (ii): The shape of F (YT) for YT > YF is given by
F
00
(YT) = (1¡ ¯)
µ
YF
YT
¶1¡¯ R ¡q; q¢¡R ¡q; q¢
YT±
> 0:
Thus, F (YT) is strictly convex for YT > YF . The shape of S (YT; YS¤) with respect to YT
for YT > YS¤ is strictly convex,
@2S (YT; YS¤)
(@YT)
2 = (1¡ ¯)
µ
YS¤
YT
¶1¡¯ R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢
±YT
> 0:
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The shape of L (YT) for YT > YF is strictly convex,
L
00
(YT) = ¡¯ (1¡ ¯)
µ
YF
YT
¶1¡¯ R ¡q; q¢¡R ¡q; q¢
±YT
> 0.
This completes the proof of Lemma 4.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 3
For ease of notation let YT denote player i’s pure strategy GTi (t) = Ift·Tg with T =
inf(t ¸ T jY (t) · YT ) and I denoting the indicator function.
Proof of part (i): We start by pointing out that the equilibrium strategies satisfy
the intertemporal consistency condition in De…nition 3. Let us compute the expected
equilibrium payo¤s of the …rm that chooses the leader’s role in equilibrium (called the
”equilibrium leader” henceforth) and of the …rm that gets assigned to the follower’s role
in equilibrium (called the ”equilibrium follower” henceforth) for later references. First,
let YT > YL = YM . Then one gets
V ¤L = VL (YT; YL; YF )
= ET
24 TMZ
T
e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)R (q; q)¡ Cq] dt+ e¡½(TM¡T)L (YM)
35 (A.4)
and
V ¤F = VF (YT; YF ; YL)
= ET
24 TMZ
T
e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)R (q; q)¡ Cq] dt+ e¡½(TM¡T)F (YM)
35
Second, for 0 < YT · YL the corresponding equilibrium payo¤s turn out to be
V ¤L = L (YT) and V
¤
F = F (YT) :
Note that F and L are de…ned in equations (2.12) and (2.18), respectively.
Next, we prove the proposition by showing that neither the equilibrium leader nor
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the equilibrium follower have an incentive to deviate. Let us start o¤ with the leader.
Proposition 1 implies that, if a …rm gets assigned to the leader’s role, then its payo¤
attains a unique global maximum at YL = YM . Thus, the equilibrium leader does not
have any incentive to deviate to some exercise threshold YT > YM or YT 2 (YF ; YM):
Moreover, by deviating to the some YT · YF , the equilibrium leader yields S(YT; YF ).
So, for YL = YM to be an equilibrium threshold, V ¤L ¡ S(YT; YF ) ¸ 0 should be satis…ed.
The di¤erence on the left-hand side can be written as
ET
24 TMZ
T
e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)R (q; q)¡ Cq] dt+ e¡½(TM¡T)L (YM)
35
¡ET
24 TFZ
T
e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)R (q; q)¡ Cq] dt+ e¡½(TF¡T)I (YF )
35
= ET
24¡ TFZ
TM
e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)R (q; q)¡ Cq] dt
35
+ET
£
e¡½(TM¡T)L (YM)¡ e¡½(TF¡T)I (YF )
¤
= ¡R (q; q) ET
24 TFZ
TM
e¡½(t¡T)Y (t) dt
35+ Cq
½
¡
f(YT)jT=TM ¡ f(YT)jT=TF
¢
+L (YM) f(YT)jT=TM ¡ I (YF ) f(YT)jT=TF : (A.5)
The functions L and I are de…ned by equations (2.18) and (2.28), respectively, and the
Laplace transform f(YT) has been calculated in Lemma 6 in Appendix A.1. Due to the
linearity of the conditional expectations operator the expectation of the Riemann-Stieltjes
integral can be rewritten as the di¤erence of two standard expressions,
ET
24 TFZ
TM
e¡½(t¡T)Y (t) dt
35 = ET
24 TFZ
T
e¡½(t¡T)Y (t) dt
35¡ ET
24 TMZ
T
e¡½(t¡T)Y (t) dt
35 :
The conditional expectations on the right-hand side are known from Lemma 6 in Ap-
pendix A.1, i.e. they equal g(YT)jT=TF and g(YT)jT=TM , respectively. We obtain for the
di¤erence in payo¤s
V ¤L ¡ S(YT; YF ) =
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¡
µ
YM
YT
¶¡¯ µ
YMR (q; q)
±
¡ Cq
½
¶
+
µ
YF
YT
¶¡¯ µ
YFR (q; q)
±
¡ Cq
½
¶
+
µ
YM
YT
¶¡¯ ÃYMR ¡q; q¢
±
¡ Cq
½
¡E
!
+
µ
YF
YT
¶¡¯ YF ¡R ¡q; q¢¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
+
µ
YF
YT
¶¡¯ ÃYFR ¡q; q¢
±
¡ Cq
½
¡E
!
or after rearranging
V ¤L ¡ S(YT; YF ) =
¡
µ
YM
YT
¶¡¯ÃYM ¡R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
¡ C
¡
q ¡ q¢
½
+ E
!
+
µ
YF
YT
¶¡¯ÃYF ¡R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
¡ C
¡
q ¡ q¢
½
+ E
!
;
which is greater than zero. The validity of the inequality becomes more apparent if we
replace (C(q ¡ q)=½) ¡ E by ((1 ¡ ¯)=YM(R(q; q) ¡ R(q; q))=(¡¯±) and divide through
by ¡±(YT)¯=(R(q; q)¡R(q; q)): This yields
(YM)
¡¯
µ
YM ¡ 1¡ ¯¡¯ YM
¶
< (YF )
¡¯
µ
YF ¡ 1¡ ¯¡¯ YM
¶
:
If YF = YM , both sides would be equal. However, YF < YM by the assumption of
…rst-mover advantages (2.4) and
@
h
(YF )
¡¯
³
YF ¡ 1¡¯¡¯ YM
´i
@YF
= (1¡ ¯) (YF )¡¯
µ
1¡ YM
YF
¶
< 0:
Hence, the inequality holds and the suggested deviation from the equilibrium strategy
decreases the equilibrium leader’s payo¤.
So far we have shown that there does not exist any pro…table deviation strategy for
the equilibrium leader. Let us analyze the equilibrium follower. First, suppose that the
equilibrium follower deviates to some threshold YT 2 (0; YF ) [ (YF ; YM). Since a player
conditionally on being assigned to the follower’s role at some YT ¸ YF reduces capacity
at YF anyway (see Lemma 1), the equilibrium follower’s payo¤ is not a¤ected by this
modi…ed choice of the adoption date of the leader’s role. Second, if the equilibrium
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follower deviates to the leader’s threshold YT = YM , then …rms move simultaneously
and the equilibrium follower yields S(YT; YM). For YF to be an equilibrium threshold
V ¤F ¡ S(YT; YM) ¸ 0, should be satis…ed. The di¤erence on the left-hand side is given by
ET
24 TMZ
T
e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)R (q; q)¡ Cq] dt+ e¡½(TM¡T)F (YM)
35
¡ET
24 TMZ
T
e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)R (q; q)¡ Cq] dt+ e¡½(TM¡T)I (YM)
35
= ET
£
e¡½(TM¡T) [F (YM)¡ I (YM)]
¤
:
Since Lemma 4 implies that F (YT ) > I(YT ) for all YT > YF , the inequality holds and the
suggested deviation from the equilibrium strategy decreases the equilibrium follower’s
payo¤. Finally, if the equilibrium follower deviates to even ”earlier” exercise thresholds
YT > YM , then it becomes the leader at YT implying that the other …rm will follow
at YF . Again, conditionally on getting assigned to the leader’s role at YT , from the
above derivations, the equilibrium follower cannot do better than reducing capacity at
YM . Thus, the equilibrium leader’s payo¤, V ¤L , is a least upper bound to the equilibrium
follower’s payo¤ from deviating to some threshold YT > YM . It follows that V ¤F ¡V ¤L ¸ 0
must be satis…ed in order to guarantee that the proposed strategy pro…les are indeed
Nash equilibria. The di¤erence on the inequality’s left-hand side can be written as
ET
24 TMZ
T
e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)R (q; q)¡ Cq] dt+ e¡½(TM¡T)F (YM)
35
¡ET
24 TMZ
T
e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)R (q; q)¡ Cq] dt+ e¡½(TM¡T)L (YM)
35
= ET
£
e¡½(TM¡T) [F (YM)¡ L (YM)]
¤
:
Since Lemma 4 implies that F (YT ) > L(YT ) for all YT > YF , the inequality holds and the
suggested deviation from the equilibrium strategy decreases the equilibrium follower’s
payo¤.
The requirement of subgame perfection remains to be discussed. It is su¢cient to
show that
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(1.)
L (YT) ¸ ET
24 TZ
T
e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)R (q; q)¡ Cq] dt+ e¡½(T ¡T)L (YT )
35
for YM > YT > YT > YF ;
(2.)
L(YT) ¸ S(YT; YF )
for YM > YT > YF ; and
(3.)
S (YT; YT) = I (YT) ¸ ET
24 TZ
T
e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)R (q; q)¡ Cq] dt+ e¡½(T ¡T)F (YT )
35
for YF ¸ YT > YT > 0. Proposition 1 says that the equilibrium leader’s payo¤ attains
a unique global maximum at YL = YM and strictly increases in the leader’s adoption
threshold YL if YL < YM . Hence, the …rst inequality holds. The second inequality can be
shown to hold by replacing YM by YT and TM by T in equation (A.5). Lemma 4 indicates
that F (YT ) = I(YT ) for all YT · YF . Thus, the third inequality can be written as
I (YT) ¸ ET
24 TZ
T
e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)R (q; q)¡ Cq] dt+ e¡½(T ¡T)I (YT )
35
, ¡YT
¡
R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
+
C
¡
q ¡ q¢
½
¡ E
+
µ
YT
YT
¶¡¯ ÃYT ¡R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
¡ C
¡
q ¡ q¢
½
+ E
!
¸ 0
, ¡ (YT)¡¯
µ
YT ¡ 1¡ ¯¡¯ YS¤
¶
+ (YT )
¡¯
µ
YT ¡ 1¡ ¯¡¯ YS¤
¶
¸ 0;
where we replaced (C(q¡ q)=½)¡E by ((1¡¯)=YS¤(R(q; q)¡R(q; q))=(¡¯±): Note that
YS¤ = YSi jCi=C with YSi de…ned in equation (2.27). If YT = YT, both sides would be
equal. However, YT < YT by assumption and
@
h
(YT )
¡¯
³
YT ¡ 1¡¯¡¯ YS¤
´i
@YT
= (1¡ ¯) (YT )¡¯
µ
1¡ YS¤
YT
¶
< 0;
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since YT < YF < YS¤ according to Lemma 4. Hence, the third inequality is satis…ed too.
This completes the proof of part (i).
Proof of part (ii): Again, we start by stressing that the suggested equilibrium strate-
gies satisfy the intertemporal consistency condition in De…nition 3. For later references
let us state the (expected) equilibrium payo¤ of …rm i, i 2 f1; 2g: We have
V ¤i = Vi (YT; YF ; YF ) =
8<: S (YT; YF ) for YT > YFI (YT) for YT · YF ;
where S and I are de…ned by equations (2.26) and (2.28), respectively. We prove this
part by showing that …rm i has no incentive to deviate. First, if …rm i deviates to
some ”earlier” threshold YT > YF , then it becomes the leader at YT and its payo¤ from
deviation can be written as
eVi = Vi (YT; YT ; YF )
= ET
24 TZ
T
e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)R (q; q)¡ Cq] dt+ e¡½(T ¡T)L (YT )
35 :
Substracting eVi from V ¤i should give a non-negative valued function. We have
V ¤i ¡ eVi = ET[ TFZ
T
e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)R (q; q)¡ Cq] dt
+e¡½(TF¡T)I (YF )¡ e¡½(T ¡T)L (YT )];
where L is de…ned by equation (2.18). Following the same procedure as applied to
equation (A.5) in part (i) gives
V ¤i ¡ eVi =µ
YT
YT
¶¡¯ µ
YTR (q; q)
±
¡ Cq
½
¶
¡
µ
YF
YT
¶¡¯ µ
YFR (q; q)
±
¡ Cq
½
¶
+
µ
YF
YT
¶¡¯ ÃYFR ¡q; q¢
±
¡ Cq
½
¡E
!
¡
µ
YT
YT
¶¡¯ ÃYTR ¡q; q¢
±
¡ Cq
½
¡E
!
¡
µ
YF
YT
¶¡¯ YF ¡R ¡q; q¢¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
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or after rearranging
V ¤i ¡ eVi =µ
YT
YT
¶¡¯ ÃYT ¡R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
¡ C
¡
q ¡ q¢
½
+ E
!
¡
µ
YF
YT
¶¡¯ ÃYF ¡R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
¡ C
¡
q ¡ q¢
½
+ E
!
;
which is strictly greater than zero. The validity of the inequality becomes more apparent,
if we replace (C(q¡q)=½)¡E by ((1¡¯)=YM(R(q; q)¡R(q; q))=(¡¯±) and divide through
by ±(YT)¯=(R(q; q)¡R(q; q)): This yields
(YT )
¡¯
µ
YT ¡ 1¡ ¯¡¯ YM
¶
> (YF )
¡¯
µ
YF ¡ 1¡ ¯¡¯ YM
¶
:
If YT = YF , both sides would be equal. However, YT > YF and
@
h
(YT )
¡¯
³
YT ¡ 1¡¯¡¯ YM
´i
@YT
= (1¡ ¯) (YT )¡¯
µ
1¡ YM
YT
¶
> 0;
since YF > YM by the assumption of second-mover advantages (2.5). Hence, the inequal-
ity holds and the suggested deviation from the equilibrium strategy decreases …rm i’s
payo¤.
Second, suppose …rm i deviates to some ”later” threshold YT < YF : Then it gets
assigned to the follower’s role at YF . However, this strategy does not change …rm i’s
payo¤, since F (YT ) = I(YT ) for all YT · YF according to Lemma 4. Thus, …rm i has no
incentive to deviate.
Subgame perfection follows from
S (YT; YT) = I (YT)
¸ ET
24 TZ
T
e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)R (q; q)¡ Cq] dt+ e¡½(T ¡T)F (YT )
35
= ET
24 TZ
T
e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)R (q; q)¡ Cq] dt+ e¡½(T ¡T)I (YT )
35
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for YF ¸ YT > YT > 0 what we already proved to be satis…ed in part (i). This completes
the proof of Proposition 3.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof of part (i): We show that there does not exist any symmetric pure strategy equi-
librium in the timing game with identical …rms and …rst-mover advantages. Suppose
the contrary, i.e. suppose that the strategy pro…le (Y ¤; Y ¤) with Y ¤ 6= YF is a Nash
equilibrium of the capacity-reduction game starting at YT > Y ¤. Three cases have to be
distinguished, Y ¤ > YF ; Y ¤ < YF , and Y ¤ = YF . First, if Y ¤ > YF , then for (Y ¤; Y ¤) to
be a Nash equilibrium the deviation strategy YF should not increase …rm i’s payo¤, i.e.
V ¤i = Vi (YT; Y
¤; Y ¤) ¸ eVi = Vi (YT; YF ; Y ¤)
must hold for i 2 f1; 2g. We have
V ¤i ¡ eVi =
YTR (q; q)
±
¡ Cq
½
¡
µ
Y ¤
YT
¶¡¯ µ
Y ¤R (q; q)
±
¡ Cq
½
¡ I (Y ¤)
¶
¡YTR (q; q)
±
+
Cq
½
+
µ
Y ¤
YT
¶¡¯ µ
Y ¤R (q; q)
±
¡ Cq
½
¡ F (Y ¤)
¶
:
Since I(YT ¤) < F (YT¤) for YT ¤ > YF , the inequality V ¤i ¸ eVi does not hold proving that
(Y ¤; Y ¤), Y ¤ > YF , is not a Nash equilibrium.
Second, if Y ¤ < YF , then for (Y ¤; Y ¤) to be a Nash equilibrium the deviation strategy
YF should not increase …rm i’s payo¤, i.e.
V ¤i = Vi (YT; Y
¤; Y ¤) ¸ bVi = Vi (YT; YF ; Y ¤)
must hold for i 2 f1; 2g. We have
V ¤i ¡ bVi =
YTR (q; q)
±
¡ Cq
½
¡
µ
Y ¤
YT
¶¡¯ µ
Y ¤R (q; q)
±
¡ Cq
½
¡ I (Y ¤)
¶
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¡YTR (q; q)
±
+
Cq
½
+
µ
YF
YT
¶¡¯ µ
YFR (q; q)
±
¡ Cq
½
¡ L (YF )
¶
:
Since YT ¤ < YF , it holds that I(YT ¤) = F (YT ¤) = L(YT¤) and I(YF ) = F (YF ) = L(YF ).
Thus,
V ¤i ¡ bVi = ¡µY ¤YT
¶¡¯ µ
Y ¤R (q; q)
±
¡ Cq
½
¡ I (YT¤)
¶
+
µ
YF
YT
¶¡¯ µ
YFR (q; q)
±
¡ Cq
½
¡ I (YF )
¶
=
µ
YF
YT
¶¡¯ÃYF ¡R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
¡ C
¡
q ¡ q¢
½
+ E
!
¡
µ
Y ¤
YT
¶¡¯ÃY ¤ ¡R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
¡ C
¡
q ¡ q¢
½
+ E
!
< 0 ;
which is strictly smaller than zero. The validity of the inequality becomes more obvious
if one replaces (C(q ¡ q)=½)¡E by ((1¡ ¯)=YS¤(R(q; q)¡R(q; q))=(¡¯±) such that
V ¤i < bVi , (YF )¡¯ µYF ¡ 1¡ ¯¡¯ YS¤
¶
¡ (Y ¤)¡¯
µ
Y ¤ ¡ 1¡ ¯¡¯ YS¤
¶
< 0
If Y ¤ was equal to YF , then V ¤ = bV . However, Y ¤ < YF by assumption and
@
h
¡ (Y ¤)¡¯
³
Y ¤ ¡ 1¡¯¡¯ YS¤
´i
@Y ¤
= ¡ (1¡ ¯) (Y ¤)¡¯
µ
1¡ YS¤
Y ¤
¶
> 0;
since YF < YS¤. Hence, V ¤i < bVi holds indeed, and the suggested deviation from the
equilibrium candidate (Y ¤; Y ¤); Y ¤ < YF , is pro…table.
Third, if Y ¤ = YF , then for (Y ¤; Y ¤) to be a Nash equilibrium the deviation strategy
YL = YM should not increase …rm i’s payo¤, i.e.
V ¤i = Vi (YT; YF ; YF ) ¸ V i = Vi (YT; YM ; YF )
must hold for i 2 f1; 2g. We have
V ¤i ¡ V i = S (YT; YF )¡ V ¤L ;
134
where V ¤L denotes the equilibrium leader’s payo¤ in the proof of Proposition 3 (see equa-
tion (A.4)). There, V ¤L ¡ S (YT; YF ) was shown to be strictly positive if the condition of
…rst-mover advantages is satis…ed. Thus, YL represents a pro…table deviation strategy
proving that (Y ¤; Y ¤) = (YF ; YF ) cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
Proof of part (ii): We show that there does not exist any other symmetric pure
strategy equilibrium than the one that is suggested in Proposition 3 if strategic interaction
is driven by second-mover advantages. In contrast to part (i) only two cases have to be
distinguished, Y ¤ > YF and Y ¤ < YF . In both cases YF turns out to be a pro…table
deviation strategy from the equilibrium candidate (Y ¤; Y ¤). The proofs are identical to
the corresponding proofs of part (i). This completes the proof of Proposition 4.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 5
We show that there does not exist any symmetric non-degenerate mixed strategy equi-
librium in the timing game with identical …rms. This is done by making extensive use of
the following well-known fundamental lemma,
Lemma 7 Let YT denote player i’s pure strategy GTi (t) = Ift·Tg with T = inf(t ¸
T jY (t) · YT ) and I denoting the indicator function. Further, let supp(Gi ¡G¡i ) denote
the set of closure thresholds that player i plays with positive probability in the mixed
strategy pro…le G = (G1; G2). Strategy pro…le G is a Nash equilibrium in the closure
timing game if and only if 8i; j 2 f1; 2g, i 6= j;
Vi (YT; YT ; Gj) = Vi (YT; Y
0
T ; Gj)
8YT ; Y 0T 2 supp(Gi ¡G¡i );
Vi (YT; YT ; Gj) ¸ Vi (YT; Y 0T ; Gj)
8YT 2 supp(Gi ¡G¡i ); Y 0T =2 supp(Gi ¡G¡i ).
As our concern is exclusively dedicated to symmetric mixed strategy equilibria, we
can set i = 1 and j = 2 without loss of generality. Of course, symmetry of equilibrium
strategies means that G1 = G2.
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It seems to be a major di¢culty to derive explicit expressions for the …rms’ payo¤s
as player i’s strategy, Gi, can take on any general functional form that represents a
cumulative distribution function. Consider, however, the following partition
£K : YT (K) < YT (K¡1) < ::: < YT (1) < YT (0)
of the deterministic interval [YT (K); YT (0)] and the corresponding partition
¿K : T (0) < T (1) < ::: < T (K ¡ 1) < T (K)
of the stochastic interval [T (0); T (K)], where YT (0); :::; YT (K), is a sequence of …xed thresh-
olds with mesh(£K) ! 0 for K ! 1 and T (k) = inf(t > T (k ¡ 1)
¯¯
Y (t) · YT (k) );
k = 1; :::;K, T (0) = T is a sequence of stopping times with mesh(¿K)
a:s:! 0 for K !1.
Then there exists a step function
¡i (t) =
8>>>>><>>>>>>:
0 for t < T (0)
Gi (T (k))¡Gi (T (k ¡ 1)) for T (k) · t < T (k + 1) ;
and k 2 f0; :::; K ¡ 1g
1 for t ¸ T (K)
with Gi(T (¡1)) ´ 0 such that limK!1 ¡i(t) = Gi(t)¡ G¡i (t) 8t 2 [0;1) almost surely.
Thus, we can express the cumulative distribution function Gi(¢) as a limit of a sequence
of values, Gi(T (0)); :::; Gi(T (K)): These functions of stopping times are measurable with
respect to the information set that is available at the root of the timing game. In what
follows it is assumed w.l.o.g. that YT (0) = maxfYT 2 supp(Gi ¡ G¡i )g and YT (K) =
minfYT 2 supp(Gi ¡G¡i )g.
Proof of part (i): The proof works as follows. In subpart (a) we show that there does
not exist any symmetric non-degenerate mixed strategy pro…le that has at least partial
support on [T; TM) or (YM ; YT]; respectively, and constitutes an equilibrium. Then, in
subpart (b), it is proved that there does not exist any symmetric non-degenerate mixed
strategy pro…le that has at least partial support on the interval (TF ;1) or (0; YF ), and
that is an equilibrium. Finally, in subpart (c) we show that there does not exist any
symmetric non-degenerate mixed strategy pro…le with exclusive support on the remaining
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interval [TM ; TF ] or [YF ; YM ], and is an equilibrium. In the last subpart, however, we have
to con…ne ourselves to mixed strategies that are discrete lotteries over the space of closure
thresholds.
Proof of subpart (a): Suppose that there exists a symmetric non-degenerate mixed
strategy equilibrium G with supp(G1 ¡G¡1 )\ (YM ; YT] nonempty. Two cases have to be
distinguished. First, suppose that T (K) < TM : Then
V1
¡
YT; YT (K); G2
¢
= V1
¡
YT; YT (k); G2
¢
(A.6)
should be satis…ed 8YT (k) 2 fYT (0); :::; YT (K¡1)g ½ supp(G2¡G¡2 ) in equilibrium: For ease
of notation let us de…ne
¦ (t) ´ e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)R (q; q)¡ Cq] :
Then, we can write
V1
¡
YT; YT (K); G2
¢¡ V1 ¡YT; YT (k); G2¢
= ET[
T (K)Z
T
¦(t) (1¡G2 (t)) dt+
T (K)Z
T
e¡½(t¡T)F (Y (t)) dG2 (t)
+e¡½(T (K)¡T)
¡
1¡G¡2 (T (K))
¢
I
¡
YT (K)
¢
]
¡ET[
T (k)Z
T
¦ (t) (1¡G2 (t)) dt+
T (k)Z
T
e¡½(t¡T)F (Y (t)) dG2 (t) + e¡½(T (k)¡T) £
£©¡G2 (T (k))¡G¡2 (T (k))¢ I ¡YT (k)¢+ (1¡G2 (T (k)))L ¡YT (k)¢ª]:
After rearrangement one obtains
V1
¡
YT; YT (K); G2
¢¡ V1 ¡YT; YT (k); G2¢
= ET[
T (K)Z
T (k)
¦ (t) (1¡G2 (t)) dt+
T (K)Z
T (k)
e¡½(t¡T)F (Y (t)) dG2 (t)
+e¡½(T (K)¡T)
¡
1¡G¡2 (T (K))
¢
I
¡
YT (K)
¢¡ e¡½(T (k)¡T) £
£©¡G2 (T (k))¡G¡2 (T (k))¢ I ¡YT (k)¢+ (1¡G2 (T (k)))L ¡YT (k)¢ª]:
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According to the above considerations about limit representations of the cumulative
distribution function G2, the di¤erence of payo¤s can be rewritten as
V1
¡
YT; YT (K); G2
¢¡ V1 ¡YT; YT (k); G2¢
= ET[
T (K)Z
T (k)
¦(t) dt¡ lim
K!1
K¡1X
m=k
G2 (T (m))
T (m+1)Z
T (m)
¦ (t) dt
+ lim
K!1
K¡1X
m=k
¡2 (T (m)) e
¡½(T (m)¡T)F
¡
YT (m)
¢
+ lim
K!1
¡2 (T (K)) e
¡½(T (K)¡T)I
¡
YT (K)
¢
¡e¡½(T (k)¡T)
n
lim
K!1
¡2 (T (k)) I
¡
YT (k)
¢
+ (1¡G2 (T (k)))L
¡
YT (k)
¢o
]:
Note that
K¡1X
m=k
G2 (T (m))
T (m+1)Z
T (m)
¦ (t) dt
=
K¡1X
m=k
G2 (T (m))
T (m+1)Z
T (m)
¦ (t) dt+
K¡1X
m=k¡1
G2 (T (m))
T (K)Z
T (m+1)
¦(t) dt
¡
K¡1X
m=k
G2 (T (m¡ 1))
T (K)Z
T (m)
¦(t) dt
=
K¡1X
m=k
¡2 (T (m))
T (K)Z
T (m)
¦ (t) dt+G2 (T (k ¡ 1))
T (K)Z
T (k)
¦ (t) dt
and
1 = G2 (T (K)) = G2 (T (k ¡ 1)) + ¡2 (T (k)) +
K¡1X
m=k+1
¡2 (T (m)) + ¡2 (T (K)) :
By inserting the former transformation and applying the latter one to the terms
R T (K)
T (k)
¦(t)dt
and exp(¡½(T (k)¡ T))L(YT (k)), we can summarize
V1
¡
YT; YT (K); G2
¢¡ V1 ¡YT; YT (k); G2¢
= ET
h
lim
K!1
¡2 (T (k)) ¢ e¡½(T (k)¡T)
©
F
¡
YT (k)
¢¡ I ¡YT (k)¢ªi
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+ET[ lim
K!1
K¡1X
m=k+1
¡2 (T (m))£
£
8><>:
T (m)Z
T (k)
¦ (t) dt+ e¡½(T (m)¡T)F
¡
YT (m)
¢¡ e¡½(T (k)¡T)L ¡YT (k)¢
9>=>;]
+ET[ lim
K!1
¡2 (T (K))£
£
8><>:
T (K)Z
T (k)
¦(t) dt+ e¡½(T (K)¡T)I
¡
YT (K)
¢¡ e¡½(T (k)¡T)L ¡YT (k)¢
9>=>;]:
Since the expressions to the right of each limes operator—especially the sums—turn out
to be bounded, the Fubini Theorem applies and one is allowed to put the limes in front
of the conditional expectation. Moreover, the functions of stopping times are measurable
with respect to the information set at T such that we end up with
V1
¡
YT; YT (K); G2
¢¡ V1 ¡YT; YT (k); G2¢
= lim
K!1
¡2 (T (k)) ¢ ET
£
e¡½(T (k)¡T)
©
F
¡
YT (k)
¢¡ I ¡YT (k)¢ª¤
+ lim
K!1
K¡1X
m=k+1
¡2 (T (m))£
£ET
264 T (m)Z
T (k)
¦(t) dt+ e¡½(T (m)¡T)F
¡
YT (m)
¢¡ e¡½(T (k)¡T)L ¡YT (k)¢
375
+ lim
K!1
¡2 (T (K))£
£ET
264 T (K)Z
T (k)
¦ (t) dt+ e¡½(T (K)¡T)I
¡
YT (K)
¢¡ e¡½(T (k)¡T)L ¡YT (k)¢
375 : (A.7)
It remains to be shown that the conditional expectations are non-negative and at least one
is strictly positive. In this case we can conclude that the di¤erence in payo¤s is greater
than zero, since the limes of weighted sums of exclusively non-negative terms and at least
one positive term also attains a strictly positive value. From F (YT ) > I(YT ) 8YT > YF
and YT (k) > YT (K) > YM > YF , one can immediately conclude that the expectation in
the second line is strictly positive. Moreover, due to I(YT ) ¸ L (YT ) 8YT ; a lower bound
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of the conditional expectation in line six is given by
ET
264 T (K)Z
T (k)
¦ (t) dt+ e¡½(T (K)¡T)L
¡
YT (K)
¢¡ e¡½(T (k)¡T)L ¡YT (k)¢
375 : (A.8)
>From previous considerations it is known that this expression can be written as
µ
YT (K)
YT
¶¡¯ ÃYT (K)R ¡q; q¢
±
¡ Cq
½
¡ E
!
+
µ
YF
YT
¶¡¯ YF ¡R ¡q; q¢¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
¡
µ
YT (k)
YT
¶¡¯ ÃYT (k)R ¡q; q¢
±
¡ Cq
½
¡ E
!
¡
µ
YF
YT
¶¡¯ YF ¡R ¡q; q¢¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
+
µ
YT (k)
YT
¶¡¯ µYT (k)R (q; q)
±
¡ Cq
½
¶
¡
µ
YT (K)
YT
¶¡¯ µYT (K)R (q; q)
±
¡ Cq
½
¶
:
Rearrangement yields
R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢
±
£
£
"µ
YT (k)
YT
¶¡¯ µ
YT (k) ¡ 1¡ ¯¡¯ YM
¶
¡
µ
YT (K)
YT
¶¡¯ µ
YT (K) ¡ 1¡ ¯¡¯ YM
¶#
:
Note that this expression would equal zero if YT (k) = YT (K). However, YT (k) > YT (K) > YM
and
@
µ³
YT (k)
YT
´¡¯ ³
YT (k) ¡ 1¡¯¡¯ YM
´¶
@YT (k)
= (1¡ ¯)
µ
YT (k)
YT
¶¡¯ µ
1¡ YM
YT (k)
¶
> 0.
Thus, the lower bound (A.8) and the conditional expectation in line six of equation
(A.7) are strictly positive. The same outcome results if we replace YT (K) by YT (m) with
m 2 fk+1; :::; K¡1g. Moreover, since F (YT ) > I(YT ) 8YT > YF , not only the conditional
expectation in line six, but also the one in line four of equation (A.7),
ET
264 T (m)Z
T (k)
¦(t) dt+ e¡½(T (m)¡T)F
¡
YT (m)
¢¡ e¡½(T (k)¡T)L ¡YT (k)¢
375 ;
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turns out to be strictly positive. So far we have shown that equation (A.6) cannot be
satis…ed for any YT (k) 2 fYT (0); :::; YT (K¡1)g ½ supp(G2 ¡G¡2 ), T (K) < TM :
Second, in the complementary case we have T (K) ¸ TM : Then, in equilibrium
V1
¡
YT; YT (k); G2
¢
= V1
¡
YT; YT (l); G2
¢
(A.9)
should be satis…ed 8YT (k); YT (l) 2 fYT (0); :::; YT (K¡1)g ½ supp(G2 ¡G¡2 ), YT (k+1) < YM ·
YT (k) < YT (l). We have
V1
¡
YT; YT (k); G2
¢¡ V1 ¡YT; YT (l); G2¢
= ET[
T (k)Z
T
¦ (t) (1¡G2 (t)) dt+
T (k)Z
T
e¡½(t¡T)F (Y (t)) dG2 (t) + e¡½(T (k)¡T)£
£©¡G2 (T (k))¡G¡2 (T (k))¢ I ¡YT (k)¢+ (1¡G2 (T (k)))L ¡YT (k)¢ª]
¡ET[
T (l)Z
T
¦ (t) (1¡G2 (t)) dt+
T (l)Z
T
e¡½(t¡T)F (Y (t)) dG2 (t) + e¡½(T (l)¡T) £
£©¡G2 (T (l))¡G¡2 (T (l))¢ I ¡YT (l)¢+ (1¡G2 (T (l)))L ¡YT (l)¢ª]:
After rearrangement one obtains
V1
¡
YT; YT (k); G2
¢¡ V1 ¡YT; YT (l); G2¢
= ET[
T (k)Z
T (l)
¦ (t) (1¡G2 (t)) dt+
T (k)Z
T (l)
e¡½(t¡T)F (Y (t)) dG2 (t) + e¡½(T (k)¡T)£
£©¡G2 (T (k))¡G¡2 (T (k))¢ I ¡YT (k)¢+ (1¡G2 (T (k)))L ¡YT (k)¢ª
¡e¡½(T (l)¡T) £
£©¡G2 (T (l))¡G¡2 (T (l))¢ I ¡YT (l)¢+ (1¡G2 (T (l)))L ¡YT (l)¢ª]:
By proceeding equivalently as above we get
V1
¡
YT; YT (k); G2
¢¡ V1 ¡YT; YT (l); G2¢
= ET
264 T (k)Z
T (l)
¦(t) dt¡ lim
K!1
k¡1X
m=l
G2 (T (m))
T (m+1)Z
T (m)
¦ (t) dt
141
+ lim
K!1
k¡1X
m=l
¡2 (T (m)) e
¡½(T (m)¡T)F
¡
YT (m)
¢
+e¡½(T (k)¡T)
n
lim
K!1
¡2 (T (k)) I
¡
YT (k)
¢
+ (1¡G2 (T (k)))L
¡
YT (k)
¢o
¡e¡½(T (l)¡T)
n
lim
K!1
¡2 (T (l)) I
¡
YT (l)
¢
+ (1¡G2 (T (l)))L
¡
YT (l)
¢oi
:
Analogous to the procedure that we followed above the term
lim
K!1
k¡1X
m=l
G2 (T (m))
T (m+1)Z
T (m)
¦ (t) dt
can be written as
lim
K!1
k¡1X
m=l
¡2 (T (m))
T (k)Z
T (m)
¦ (t) dt+G2 (T (l ¡ 1))
T (k)Z
T (l)
¦ (t) dt:
Moreover, if the probability-weight transformation
1 = G2 (T (l ¡ 1)) + ¡2 (T (l)) +
kX
m=l+1
¡2 (T (m)) + 1¡G2 (T (k))
is applied to the terms
R T (k)
T (l)
¦(t)dt and exp(¡½(T (l)¡ T))L(YT (l)); then the payo¤ dif-
ference can be written as
V1
¡
YT; YT (k); G2
¢¡ V1 ¡YT; YT (l); G2¢
= lim
K!1
¡2 (T (l)) ET
£
e¡½(T (l)¡T)
©
F
¡
YT (l)
¢¡ I ¡YT (l)¢ª¤
+ lim
K!1
k¡1X
m=l+1
¡2 (T (m))£
£ET
264 T (m)Z
T (l)
¦(t) dt+ e¡½(T (m)¡T)F
¡
YT (m)
¢¡ e¡½(T (l)¡T)L ¡YT (l)¢
375
+ lim
K!1
¡2 (T (k))£
£ET
264 T (k)Z
T (l)
¦(t) dt+ e¡½(T (k)¡T)I
¡
YT (m)
¢¡ e¡½(T (l)¡T)L ¡YT (l)¢
375
+ lim
K!1
(1¡G2 (T (k)))£
142
£ET
264 T (k)Z
T (l)
¦(t) dt+ e¡½(T (k)¡T)L
¡
YT (k)
¢¡ e¡½(T (l)¡T)L ¡YT (l)¢
375 :
Obviously, the conditional expectation in line two is strictly positive. Comparing the
conditional expectation in line eight to the expectation in equation (A.8) reveals that
the expressions are identical if we substitute YT (k) for YT (K) and YT (l) for YT (k). It im-
mediately follows that the conditional expectation in line eight is strictly positive. The
same outcome results if we replace YT (k) by YT (m) with m 2 fl + 1; :::; k ¡ 1g. Moreover,
since F (YT ) > L(YT ) 8YT > YF and I(YT ) ¸ L(YT ) 8YT ¸ YF , not only the conditional
expectation in line eight, but also those in line four and line six turn out to be strictly pos-
itive. Thus, equation (A.9) cannot be satis…ed for any YT (k); YT (l) 2 fYT (0); :::; YT (K¡1)g ½
supp(G2 ¡G¡2 ), YT (k+1) < YM · YT (k) < YT (l): This completes the proof of subpart (a).
Proof of subpart (b): In subpart (a) we have shown that a symmetric non-degenerate
mixed strategy equilibrium cannot have support on YT > YM . In the following part of the
proof we concentrate on mixed strategies that are lotteries with at least partial support
on the interval (0; YF ]: Contrary, to subpart (a) the structure of the payo¤ functions
does not require to distinguish between the analogous cases YT (0) · YF and YT (0) > TF .
Again, we start o¤ by assuming that there exists a symmetric mixed strategy pro…le with
support on fYT (0); :::; YT (K)g, YT (K) < YF , and is an equilibrium. Then
V1
¡
YT; YT (k); G2
¢
= V1
¡
YT; YT (l); G2
¢
(A.10)
should be satis…ed 8YT (l), l 2 fk + 1; :::; Kg; in any equilibrium with
YT (k) =
8<: YT (0) for YT (0) · YF ;max©YT 2 fYT (0); :::; YT (K)g : YT · YFª for YT (0) > YF :
Again, we focus on the di¤erence of payo¤s2,
V1
¡
YT; YT (k); G2
¢¡ V1 ¡YT; YT (l); G2¢
2If T (k) = T (0), then G¡2 (T (k)) = G2(T (k ¡ 1)) = G2(T (¡1)) = 0.
143
= ET[
T (k)Z
T
¦ (t) (1¡G2 (t)) dt+
T (k)Z
T
e¡½(t¡T)F (Y (t)) dG2 (t) + e¡½(T (k)¡T)£
£©¡G2 (T (k))¡G¡2 (T (k))¢ I ¡YT (k)¢+ (1¡G2 (T (k)))L ¡YT (k)¢ª]
¡ET[
T (l)Z
T
¦ (t) (1¡G2 (t)) dt+
T (l)Z
T
e¡½(t¡T)F (Y (t)) dG2 (t) + e¡½(T (l)¡T) £
£©¡G2 (T (l))¡G¡2 (T (l))¢ I ¡YT (l)¢+ (1¡G2 (T (l)))L ¡YT (l)¢ª]:
Recall that F (YT ) = L(YT ) = I(YT ) 8YT · YF . Thus, one obtains
V1
¡
YT; YT (k); G2
¢¡ V1 ¡YT; YT (l); G2¢
= ET[¡
T (l)Z
T (k)
¦ (t) (1¡G2 (t)) dt¡
T (l)Z
T (k)
e¡½(t¡T)I (Y (t)) dG2 (t)
+e¡½(T (k)¡T)
¡
1¡G¡2 (T (k))
¢
I
¡
YT (k)
¢¡ e¡½(T (l)¡T) ¡1¡G¡2 (T (l))¢ I ¡YT (l)¢]
after rearrangement. By using the limit representation of the cumulative distribution
function G2, the di¤erence of payo¤s can be rewritten as
V1
¡
YT; YT (k); G2
¢¡ V1 ¡YT; YT (l); G2¢
= ET[¡
T (l)Z
T (k)
¦ (t) dt+ lim
K!1
l¡1X
m=k
¡2 (T (m))
T (l)Z
T (m)
¦(t) dt
+ lim
K!1
G2 (T (k ¡ 1))
T (l)Z
T (k)
¦ (t) dt¡ lim
K!1
l¡1X
m=k
¡2 (T (m)) e
¡½(T (m)¡T)I
¡
YT (m)
¢
+e¡½(T (k)¡T)
³
1¡ lim
K!1
G2 (T (k ¡ 1))
´
I
¡
YT (k)
¢
¡e¡½(T (l)¡T)
³
1¡ lim
K!1
G2 (T (l ¡ 1))
´
I
¡
YT (l)
¢
]:
Consider the following transformations of probability weights,
1 =
KX
m=l
¡2 (T (m)) +
l¡1X
m=k
¡2 (T (m)) +G2 (T (k ¡ 1))
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and
G2 (T (l ¡ 1)) =
l¡1X
m=k
¡2 (T (m)) +G2 (T (k ¡ 1)) :
If one applies the former probability-weight transformation to¡ R T (l)
T (k)
¦(t) and exp(¡½(T (k)¡
T))I(YT (k)), and both transformations to (1¡ limK!1 G2(T (l¡1))) ¢ exp(¡½(T (l)¡T))
I(YT (l)), it results that
V1
¡
YT; YT (k); G2
¢¡ V1 ¡YT; YT (l); G2¢
= lim
K!1
KX
m=l
¡2 (T (m))£
£ET
264¡ T (l)Z
T (k)
¦ (t) dt+ e¡½(T (k)¡T)I
¡
YT (k)
¢¡ e¡½(T (l)¡T)I ¡YT (l)¢
375
+ lim
K!1
l¡1X
m=k
¡2 (T (m))£
£ET
264¡ T (m)Z
T (k)
¦ (t) dt+ e¡½(T (k)¡T)I
¡
YT (k)
¢¡ e¡½(T (m)¡T)I ¡YT (m)¢
375 ; (A.11)
Evaluating the …rst conditional expectation in line three gives
µ
YT (l)
YT
¶¡¯ ÃYT (l) ¡R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
¡ C
¡
q ¡ q¢
½
+ E
!
¡
µ
YT (k)
YT
¶¡¯ÃYT (k) ¡R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
¡ C
¡
q ¡ q¢
½
+ E
!
:
After rearrangement one obtains
R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢
±
£
£
"µ
YT (l)
YT
¶¡¯ µ
YT (l) ¡ 1¡ ¯¡¯ YS¤
¶
¡
µ
YT (k)
YT
¶¡¯ µ
YT (k) ¡ 1¡ ¯¡¯ YS¤
¶#
:
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This expression would be zero if YT (l) was equal to YT (k). However, YT (l) < YT (k) · YF <
YS¤ and
@
³
YT (l)
YT
´¡¯ ³
YT (l) ¡ 1¡¯¡¯ YS¤
´
@YT (l)
= (1¡ ¯)
µ
YT (l)
YT
¶¡¯ µ
1¡ YS¤
YT (l)
¶
< 0:
Thus, the expectation in line three of equation (A.11) is greater than zero. The same
outcome results if we replace YT (l) by YT (m) with m 2 f1; :::; l ¡ 1g. Hence, not only the
conditional expectation in line three, but also the one in line …ve of equation (A.11) turns
out to be strictly positive. We conclude that equation (A.10) cannot be satis…ed for any
YT (k); YT (l) 2 fYT (0); :::; YT (K)g ½ supp(G2 ¡G¡2 ); YT (l) < YT (k) · YF < YT (k¡1) unless the
equilibrium strategies become degenerate. This completes the proof of subpart (b).
Proof of subpart (c): We have shown so far that there does not exist any symmet-
ric mixed strategy pro…le that has support on some YT 2 (0; YF ) [ (YM ;1) and that
constitutes an equilibrium: The non-existence of any symmetric equilibrium mixed strat-
egy pro…le that has exclusive support on an arbitrary subset of the interval [YF ; YM ] is
proved di¤erently. We start o¤ by assuming that there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium
(G1; G2) with support on YT (0); :::; YT (K), YM ¸ YT (0) > ::: > YT (K) ¸ YF .
First, we prove that YT (K) = YF must be satis…ed in any mixed strategy equilibrium.
Suppose the contrary, i.e. suppose that there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium with
YT (K) > YF . Then the inequality
V1
¡
YT; YT (K); G2
¢ ¸ V1 (YT; YF ; G2)
should be satis…ed. Let us investigate the di¤erence of payo¤s,
V1
¡
YT; YT (K); G2
¢¡ V1 (YT; YF ; G2)
ET[
T (K)Z
T
¦(t) (1¡G2 (t)) dt+
T (K)Z
T
e¡½(t¡T)F (Y (t)) dG2 (t)
+e¡½(T (K)¡T)
¡
1¡G¡2 (T (K))
¢
I
¡
YT (K)
¢
]
¡ ET[
T (K)Z
T
¦ (t) (1¡G2 (t)) dt+
T (K)Z
T
e¡½(t¡T)F (Y (t)) dG2 (t)
+e¡½(T (K)¡T)
¡
1¡G¡2 (T (K))
¢
F
¡
YT (K)
¢
]
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= ET
£
e¡½(T (K)¡T)
¡
1¡G¡2 (T (K))
¢ ©
I
¡
YT (K)
¢¡ F ¡YT (K)¢ª¤ :
Since I(YT ) < F (YT ) 8YT > YF , the above inequality is not satis…ed unless YT (K) = YF .
Second, in any mixed strategy equilibrium, where strategies are discrete lotteries over
some support YT (0); :::; YT (K), it should be satis…ed that
V1
¡
YT; YT (K¡1); G2
¢
= V1
¡
YT; YT (K) = YF ; G2
¢ ¸ V1 (YT; YT ; G2)
with YT 2 (YT (K); YT (K¡1)). Again, let us consider the di¤erence of payo¤s,
V1
¡
YT; YT (K); G2
¢¡ V1 (YT; YT ; G2)
= ET[
T (K)Z
T
¦(t) (1¡G2 (t)) dt+
T (K)Z
T
e¡½(t¡T)F (Y (t)) dG2 (t)
+e¡½(T (K)¡T)
©¡
1¡G¡2 (T (K))
¢
I
¡
YT (K)
¢ª
]
¡ET[
TZ
T
¦ (t) (1¡G2 (t)) dt+
TZ
T
e¡½(t¡T)F (Y (t)) dG2 (t)
+e¡½(T ¡T)
©¡
G2 (T )¡G¡2 (T )
¢
I (YT ) + (1¡G2 (T ))L (YT )
ª
]:
After rearrangement one obtains
V1
¡
YT; YT (K); G2
¢¡ V1 (YT; YT ; G2)
= ET[
T (K)Z
T
¦(t) (1¡G2 (t)) dt+
T (K)Z
T
e¡½(t¡T)F (Y (t)) dG2 (t)
+e¡½(T (K)¡T)
©¡
1¡G¡2 (T (K))
¢
I
¡
YT (K)
¢ª
¡e¡½(T ¡T) ©¡G2 (T )¡G¡2 (T )¢ I (YT ) + (1¡G2 (T ))L (YT )ª]:
Since the equilibrium strategies are discrete lotteries with positive mass on YT (0); :::; YT (K);
we have dG2 (t) = 0; G2(T )¡G¡2 (T ) = 0, and
° (T (K)) := 1¡G2(t) = 1¡G¡2 (T (K)) = 1¡G2 (T ) > 0
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for t 2 [T ; T (K)). Thus, the di¤erence of payo¤s simpli…es to
V1
¡
YT; YT (K); G2
¢¡ V1 (YT; YT ; G2) = ° (T (K))£
£ET
248<:
T (K)Z
T
¦ (t) dt+ e¡½(T (K)¡T)I
¡
YT (K)
¢¡ e¡½(T ¡T)L (YT )
9=;
35
= ° (T (K)) ¢ ET
£
e¡½(T ¡T)
©
S
¡
YT ; YT (K) = YF
¢¡ L (YT )ª¤ :
By plugging in the formula for S and L one obtains for the conditional expectation
µ
YT
YT
¶¡¯ ÃYT ¡R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
¡ C
¡
q ¡ q¢
½
+ E
!
¡
µ
YF
YT
¶¡¯ÃYF ¡R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
¡ C
¡
q ¡ q¢
½
+ E
!
:
After rearrangement we get
R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢
±
£
£
"µ
YT
YT
¶¡¯ µ
YT ¡ 1¡ ¯¡¯ YM
¶
¡
µ
YF
YT
¶¡¯ µ
YF ¡ 1¡ ¯¡¯ YM
¶#
:
This expression would be zero if YT was equal to YF . However, YT (K) = YF < YT < YM
and
@
³
YT
YT
´¡¯ ³
YT ¡ 1¡¯¡¯ YM
´
@YT
= (1¡ ¯)
µ
YT
YT
¶¡¯ µ
1¡ YM
YT
¶
< 0:
Consequently, YT is a pro…table deviation strategy for player 1 revealing that our initial
assertion was wrong. Moreover, this proves that there does not exist any symmetric
mixed strategy equilibrium with supp(G2¡G¡2 ) ½ [YF ; YM ] and supp(G2¡G¡2 ) discrete.
This completes the proof of part (i).
Proof of part (ii): The proof works as follows. In subpart (a) we show that there does
not exist any non-degenerate mixed strategy pro…le that has at least partial support on
[T; TF ) or (YF ; YT]; respectively, and constitutes an equilibrium. Then, in subpart (b), it
is proved that there does not exist any non-degenerate mixed strategy pro…le that has at
least partial support on the complementary interval (TF ;1) or (0; YF ), respectively, and
that is an equilibrium.
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Proof of subpart (a): Immediately follows from the proof of subpart (a) in part (i)
after replacing YM by YF .
Proof of subpart (b): We have shown that any symmetric non-degenerate mixed
strategy equilibrium cannot have support on YT > YF . So in the following part of the
proof we can concentrate on mixed strategies that are lotteries over the interval (0; YF ].
Again, we start o¤ by assuming that there exists a symmetric mixed strategy pro…le G
with supp(G1 ¡G¡1 ) ½ (0; YF ]. In equilibrium
V1
¡
YT; YT (0); G2
¢
= V1
¡
YT; YT (k); G2
¢
(A.12)
should be satis…ed 8YT (k) 2 fYT (1); :::; YT (K)g ½ supp(G2¡G¡2 ), T (0) ¸ TF :We can write
V1
¡
YT; YT (0); G2
¢¡ V1 ¡YT; YT (k); G2¢
= ET[
T (0)Z
T
¦ (t) (1¡G2 (t)) dt
+e¡½(T (0)¡T)
©
G2 (T (0))F
¡
YT (0)
¢
+ (1¡G2 (T (0)))L
¡
YT (0)
¢ª
]
¡ET[
T (k)Z
T
¦ (t) (1¡G2 (t)) dt+
T (k)Z
T
e¡½(t¡T)F (Y (t)) dG2 (t) + e¡½(T (k)¡T) £
£©¡G2 (T (k))¡G¡2 (T (k))¢ I ¡YT (k)¢+ (1¡G2 (T (k)))L ¡YT (k)¢ª]:
It is important to note that F (YT ) = L(YT ) = I(YT ) 8YT · YF . Thus, one obtains
V1
¡
YT; YT (0); G2
¢¡ V1 ¡YT; YT (k); G2¢
= ET[¡
T (k)Z
T (0)
¦ (t) (1¡G2 (t)) dt¡
T (k)Z
T (0)
e¡½(t¡T)I (Y (t)) dG2 (t)
+e¡½(T (0)¡T)I
¡
YT (0)
¢¡ e¡½(T (k)¡T) ¡1¡G¡2 (T (k))¢ I ¡YT (k)¢]
after rearrangement. By using the limit representation of the cumulative distribution
function G2, the di¤erence of payo¤s can be rewritten as
V1
¡
YT; YT (0); G2
¢¡ V1 ¡YT; YT (k); G2¢
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= ET[¡
T (k)Z
T (0)
¦(t) dt+ lim
K!1
k¡1X
m=0
¡2 (T (m))
T (k)Z
T (m)
¦ (t) dt
¡ lim
K!1
k¡1X
m=0
¡2 (T (m)) e
¡½(T (m)¡T)I
¡
YT (m)
¢
+e¡½(T (0)¡T)I
¡
YT (0)
¢¡ e¡½(T (k)¡T) ³1¡ lim
K!1
G2 (T (k ¡ 1))
´
I
¡
YT (k)
¢
];
since G2(T (¡1)) ´ 0. This identity also implies that
1 =
KX
m=0
¡2 (T (m)) =
KX
m=k
¡2 (T (m)) +
k¡1X
m=0
¡2 (T (m))
and
G2 (T (k ¡ 1)) =
k¡1X
m=0
¡2 (T (m)) :
If one applies the former probability-weight transformation to¡ R T (k)
T (0)
¦(t) and exp(¡½(T (0)¡
T))I(YT (0)), and both transformations to (1¡ limK!1 G2(T (k¡1))) ¢ exp(¡½(T (k)¡T))
I(YT (k)), it results that
V1
¡
YT; YT (0); G2
¢¡ V1 ¡YT; YT (k); G2¢
= lim
K!1
KX
m=k
¡2 (T (m))£
£ET
264¡ T (k)Z
T (0)
¦ (t) dt+ e¡½(T (0)¡T)I
¡
YT (0)
¢¡ e¡½(T (k)¡T)I ¡YT (k)¢
375
+ lim
K!1
k¡1X
m=0
¡2 (T (m))£
£ET
264¡ T (m)Z
T (0)
¦ (t) dt+ e¡½(T (0)¡T)I
¡
YT (0)
¢¡ e¡½(T (m)¡T)I ¡YT (m)¢
375 :
Evaluating the …rst conditional expectation in line three gives
µ
YT (k)
YT
¶¡¯ ÃYT (k) ¡R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
¡ C
¡
q ¡ q¢
½
+ E
!
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¡
µ
YT (0)
YT
¶¡¯ÃYT (0) ¡R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
¡ C
¡
q ¡ q¢
½
+ E
!
:
After rearrangement one obtains
R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢
±
£
£
"µ
YT (k)
YT
¶¡¯ µ
YT (k) ¡ 1¡ ¯¡¯ YS¤
¶
¡
µ
YT (0)
YT
¶¡¯ µ
YT (0) ¡ 1¡ ¯¡¯ YS¤
¶#
:
This expression would be zero if YT (k) was equal to YT (0). However, YT (k) < YT (0) · YF
and
@
³
YT (k)
YT
´¡¯ ³
YT (k) ¡ 1¡¯¡¯ YS¤
´
@YT (k)
= (1¡ ¯)
µ
YT (k)
YT
¶¡¯ µ
1¡ YS¤
YT (k)
¶
< 0:
Thus, the expectation in line three is greater than zero. The same outcome results if we
replace YT (k) by YT (m) withm 2 f1; :::; k¡1g. Hence, not only the conditional expectation
in line three, but also the one in line …ve turns out to be strictly positive. Thus, equation
(A.12) cannot be satis…ed for any 8YT (k) 2 fYT (1); :::; YT (K)g ½ supp(G2¡G¡2 ), T (0) ¸ TF .
This completes the proof of subpart (b) and of Proposition 5.
A.9 Proof of Proposition 6
From the proof of Proposition 3 in Appendix A.6 the equilibrium payo¤ V ¤(YT) =
V ¤i (YT) = V
¤
j (YT), i 6= j; i; j 2 f1; 2g is already known. Then L(YT) = V ¤(YT) =
S(YT; YS¤) for YT · YF is an obvious implication of equations (2.18), (2.28), and Ap-
pendix A.6. Next, let us compare L and V ¤ for YT > YF . We have
L (YT) < V
¤ (YT)
, YTR
¡
q; q
¢
±
¡ Cq
½
¡ E +
µ
YF
YT
¶¡¯ YF ¡R ¡q; q¢¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
<
YTR (q; q)
±
¡ Cq
½
¡
µ
YF
YT
¶¡¯
£
£
Ã
YF
¡
R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
¡ C
¡
q ¡ q¢
½
+ E
!
:
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After some rearrangement one gets
(YT)
¡¯
Ã
YT
¡
R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
¡ C
¡
q ¡ q¢
½
+ E
!
> (YF )
¡¯
Ã
YF
¡
R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
¡ C
¡
q ¡ q¢
½
+ E
!
or
(YT)
¡¯
µ
YT ¡ 1¡ ¯¡¯ YM
¶
> (YF )
¡¯
µ
YF ¡ 1¡ ¯¡¯ YM
¶
:
If YT = YF ; the left-hand side would equal the right-hand side. However, YT > YF and
@
h
(YT)
¡¯
³
YT ¡ 1¡¯¡¯ YM
´i
@YT
= (1¡ ¯) (YT)¡¯
µ
1¡ YM
YT
¶
> 0;
since YF > YM due to the assumption of second-mover advantages. Thus, the inequality
holds. Finally, we compare V ¤ and S for YT > YF . Consider the subcase YF < YT · YS¤.
Then
V ¤ (YT) < S (YT; YS¤)
, YTR (q; q)
±
¡ Cq
½
¡
µ
YF
YT
¶¡¯
£
£
Ã
YF
¡
R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
¡ C
¡
q ¡ q¢
½
+ E
!
<
YTR
¡
q; q
¢
±
¡ Cq
½
¡E:
Rearranging gives
V ¤ (YT) < S (YT; YS¤)
, (YT)¡¯
Ã
YT
¡
R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
¡ C
¡
q ¡ q¢
½
+ E
!
< (YF )
¡¯
Ã
YF
¡
R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
¡ C
¡
q ¡ q¢
½
+ E
!
or
(YT)
¡¯
µ
YT ¡ 1¡ ¯¡¯ YS¤
¶
< (YF )
¡¯
µ
YF ¡ 1¡ ¯¡¯ YS¤
¶
:
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Again, both sides would be equal if YT = YF . However, YT > YF : It follows that
@
h
(YT)
¡¯
³
YT ¡ 1¡¯¡¯ YS¤
´i
@YT
= (1¡ ¯) (YT)¡¯
µ
1¡ YS¤
YT
¶
· 0;
since YT · YS¤ by assumption. Moreover, the inequality is strictly satis…ed for YT = YF .
Thus, V ¤ (YT) < S (YT; YS¤). In the remaining subcase, YT > YS¤, the comparison of V ¤
and S yields
V ¤ (YT) < S (YT; YS¤)
, YTR (q; q)
±
¡ Cq
½
¡
µ
YF
YT
¶¡¯
£
£
Ã
YF
¡
R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
¡ C
¡
q ¡ q¢
½
+ E
!
<
YTR (q; q)
±
¡ Cq
½
¡
µ
YS¤
YT
¶¡¯
£
£
Ã
YS¤
¡
R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
¡ C
¡
q ¡ q¢
½
+ E
!
:
Summarizing terms gives
(YS¤)
¡¯
µ
YS¤ ¡ 1¡ ¯¡¯ YS¤
¶
< (YF )
¡¯
µ
YF ¡ 1¡ ¯¡¯ YS¤
¶
:
Suppose that YF = YS¤ . Then both sides would be equal. However, we have
@
h
(YF )
¡¯
³
YF ¡ 1¡¯¡¯ YS¤
´i
@YF
= (1¡ ¯) (YF )¡¯
µ
1¡ YS¤
YF
¶
< 0;
since YF < YS¤ by assumption (2.3). Hence the inequality is generally true. This com-
pletes the proof of Proposition 6.
A.10 Proof of Lemma 5
Proof of part (i): First, Li(YT) = Ii(YT) = Si(YT; YSi) = Fi(YT) for YT · Y minF is
an obvious implication of equations (2.12), (2.18), (2.26), and (2.28). Second, due to
the fact that Ii(YT), Si(YT; YSi), and Fi(YT) are not in‡uenced by the rival’s behavior
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and, especially, do not depend on Cj, i 6= j, the results obtained in the symmetric case
immediately translates to the general case, i.e.
Ii (YT) < Si (YT; YSi) < Fi (YT) for YT > YSi ;
Ii (YT) = Si (YT; YSi) < Fi (YT) for YFi < YT · YSi:
It remains to be shown that
Li (YT) · Ii (YT) for YT > YF;i , Ci < Cj ;
Li (YT) < Ii (YT) for YT > YFi , Ci > Cj :
As we extensively discussed above, the follower’s behavior has an impact on the leader’s
value Li via YFj . And YFj itself is determined by Cj. Thus the results from the symmetric
case do not apply here. In order to compare Li to Ii we have to analyze some subcases:
(a) YT > Y maxF , (b) YFj < YT · YFi , YFi < YFj ; (c) YFi < YT · YFj , YFi < YFj ; and (d)
YT · Y minF . In case (a)
Li (YT) < Ii (YT)
, YTR
¡
q; q
¢
±
¡ Ciq
½
¡ E +
µ
YFj
YT
¶¡¯ YFj ¡R ¡q; q¢¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
<
YTR
¡
q; q
¢
±
¡ Ciq
½
¡E
,
µ
YFj
YT
¶1¡¯ R ¡q; q¢¡R ¡q; q¢
±
<
R
¡
q; q
¢¡R ¡q; q¢
±
generally holds as YT > Y maxF ¸ YFj . Case (b) gives the same result as case (a), since
the follower still refrains from exercising the option. In case (c) it is assumed that the
follower has already exercised his option. Thus, Li(YT) = Ii(YT). The same argument
applies in case (d) such that Li(YT) = Ii(YT) also holds if YT · Y minF .
Proof of part (ii): The strict convexity of Li, Fi, and Si; immediately follows from the
strict convexity of their ”homogeneous counterparts”. See Appendix A.5. This completes
the proof of Lemma 5.
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A.11 Proof of Proposition 7
W.l.o.g. let us assume that C1 < C2 holds henceforth. Before proving the various parts
of Proposition 7, we show the existence and uniqueness of the thresholds bY1 2 (YF1 ; YL1);
YL1 = minfYS1 ; YF2g, and bY2 2 (YF1 ; YL2); YL2 = YM2 . First, in Proposition 7, bY1 is
implicitly de…ned by equation (2.34) for YT ¸ YL1 . The condition can be rewritten as
µ
YL1
YT
¶¡¯ ÃYL1 ¡R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
¡ C1
¡
q ¡ q¢
½
+ E
!
+
Ã bY1
YT
!¡¯ bY1 ¡R ¡q; q¢¡R (q; q)¢
±
¡
µ
YF1
YT
¶¡¯ ÃYF1 ¡R ¡q; q¢¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
¡ C1
¡
q ¡ q¢
½
+ E
!
= 0 :
At the least upper bound of bY1, bY1 = YL1 , the left-hand side of the above equation
becomes
R
¡
q; q
¢¡R ¡q; q¢
±
£
£
"µ
YL1
YT
¶¡¯ µ
YL1 ¡
1¡ ¯
¡¯ YF1
¶
¡
µ
YF1
YT
¶¡¯ µ
YF1 ¡
1¡ ¯
¡¯ YF1
¶#
;
which can be shown to be strictly positive due to YL1 > YF1 . At the greatest lower bound
of bY1, bY1 = YF1 , one obtains
R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢
±
£
£
"µ
YL1
YT
¶¡¯ µ
YL1 ¡
1¡ ¯
¡¯ YS1
¶
¡
µ
YF1
YT
¶¡¯ µ
YF1 ¡
1¡ ¯
¡¯ YS1
¶#
for the left-hand side. However, due to YL1 · YS1 this expression can be shown to be
strictly negative. Since the partial derivative of the condition’s left-hand side terms with
respect to bY1 equals
(1¡ ¯) R
¡
q; q
¢¡R (q; q)
±
Ã bY1
YT
!¡¯
> 0
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for all bY1 > 0; we have established the existence and uniqueness of bY1. Second, suppose
that YL2 = YM2 . Then bY2 is implicitly de…ned by equation (2.35) for YT ¸ YL2 . We
rewrite the condition as
µ
YL2
YT
¶¡¯ ÃYL2 ¡R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
¡ C2
¡
q ¡ q¢
½
+ E
!
¡
Ã bY2
YT
!¡¯ Ã bY2 ¡R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
¡ C2
¡
q ¡ q¢
½
+ E
!
¡
µ
YF1
YT
¶¡¯ YF1 ¡R ¡q; q¢¡R ¡q; q¢¢
±
= 0 :
At the least upper bound of bY2, bY2 = YL2 , the left-hand side of the above equation
becomes
R
¡
q; q
¢¡R ¡q; q¢
±
¢
"µ
YL2
YT
¶¡¯
¡
µ
YF1
YT
¶¡¯#
;
which is obviously greater than zero. At the greatest lower bound of bY2, bY2 = YF1 , one
yields
R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢
±
£
£
"µ
YL2
YT
¶¡¯ µ
YL2 ¡
1¡ ¯
¡¯ YL2
¶
¡
µ
YF1
YT
¶¡¯ µ
YF1 ¡
1¡ ¯
¡¯ YL2
¶#
for the left-hand side. However, due to YF1 < YL2 = YM2 this expression can be shown
to be strictly smaller than zero. Again, since the partial derivative of the condition’s
left-hand side with respect to bY2;
¡ (1¡ ¯) R (q; q)¡R
¡
q; q
¢
±
Ã bY2
YT
!¡¯ µ
1¡ YS2bY2
¶
;
turns out to be strictly positive due to bY2 < YL2 < YS2 ; we have established the existence
and uniqueness of bY2 conditionally on YL2 = YM2.
Proof of part (i): As in the identical …rm case the equilibrium strategies satisfy the
intertemporal consistency condition in De…nition 3. We have YL1 ¸ bY2 _ YL2 = YF1 by
assumption. Though the high-cost …rm (…rm 2), is known to follow immediately, it is the
low-cost …rm (…rm 1) that adopts the leader’s role at YL1 in the equilibrium proposed
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in part (i) and, thereby, yields S1(YT; YL1). Proposition 1 implies that, if the low-cost
…rm gets assigned to the leader’s role, then its payo¤ attains a unique global maximum
at minfYF2 ; YS1g = YL1 (note that R1 · CjCL=C1 , YF2 · YS1). Thus, …rm 1 does not
have any incentive to deviate to YT > YL1 or YT 2 (YF1 ; YL1). Moreover, by deviating
to some YT · YF1 ; …rm 1 yields S1(YT;maxfYT ; Y 02g) with Y 02 denoting the equilibrium
adoption threshold of …rm 2, Y 02 · YF1 . In section 2.2 it was shown that S1(YT; YS) is
strictly increasing in YS for all YS < YS1 . Therefore, maxfYT ; Y 02g · YF1 < YL1 implies
that S1(YT;maxfYT ; Y 02g) < S1(YT; YL1). We conclude that reducing capacity later than
YF1 cannot be a pro…table deviation strategy for …rm 1.
Now suppose that the high-cost …rm (…rm 2) deviates to some threshold YT 2
(YF1 ; YL1 ]. Since …rm 2 immediately follows …rm 1 at YL1 anyway, …rm 2’s payo¤ is
not a¤ected by this modi…ed choice of the adoption date of the leader’s role. If …rm 2
deviates to even earlier exercise thresholds YT > YL1 , then it becomes the leader at YT .
Conditionally on the high-cost …rm getting assigned to the leader’s role, from Proposi-
tion 1 its payo¤ is known to be strictly decreasing in the adoption threshold YT for all
YT > maxfYM2; YF1g = YL2 (note that CjCL=C2 · R2 , YM2 · YF1). Now suppose
that YL2 = YF1 ) YL1 > YL2 implying that …rm 2’s payo¤ from getting assigned to the
leader’s role at YL2 ;
ET
264 TL2Z
T
e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)R (q; q)¡ C2q] dt+ e¡½(TL2¡T)L2 (YL2)
375 = S2 (YT; YL2 = YF1) ;
is strictly greater than the payo¤ from deviating to YT > YL1 . However, in equilibrium
…rm 2 gets S2(YT; YL1). From the derivations in section 2.2, we known that S2(YT; YS)
is strictly increasing in YS for all YS < YS2. Therefore, YL2 = YF1 < YL1 < YS2 implies
that S2(YT; YL2) < S2(YT; YL1) in this case. Thus, early reduction at YT > YL1 is not a
pro…table deviation strategy for …rm 2 if YL2 = YF1. Next suppose that YL1 ¸ bY2 and
note that the existence of bY2 requires YL2 = YM2 . Further, note that equation (2.35) that
implicitly de…nes bY2 can be rewritten as
ET
264 TL2Z
T
e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)R (q; q)¡ C2q] dt+ e¡½(TL2¡T)L2 (YL2)
375 = S2 ³YT; bY2´ :
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The left-hand side denotes …rm 2’s maximum payo¤ from getting assigned to the leader’s
role. Again, since S2(YT; YS) is strictly increasing in YS for all YS < YS2 ; the orderingbY2 < YL1 < YS2 implies that S2(YT; bY2) < S2(YT; YL1): We conclude that adopting the
leader’s role at YT > YL1 is not pro…table for …rm 2. Subgame perfection is not shown
explicitly but can easily be proved by following a similar line of arguments as in the
identical-…rm case. This completes the proof of part (i).
Proof of part (ii): Again, note that the intertemporal consistency condition in De…-
nition 3 holds with respect to the equilibrium strategies. We have YL2 = YM2 ¸ bY1: Firm
2 adopts the leader’s role at YL2 = YM2 in the equilibrium proposed in part (ii) and,
thereby, yields S2(YT; bY2) according to the derivations in the proof of part (i). Propo-
sition 1 implies that, if the high-cost …rm gets assigned to the leader’s role and if the
di¤erence in variable cost is su¢ciently large (i.e. CjCL=C2 > R2 , YL2 = YM2 > YF1),
then its payo¤ attains a unique global maximum at YL2 = YM2 . Thus, …rm 2 does not
have any incentive to deviate to YT > YL2 or YT 2 (YF1 ; YL2). Moreover, by deviating
to some YT · YF1 ; …rm 2 yields S2(YT;maxfYT ; Y 01g) with Y 01 denoting the equilibrium
adoption threshold of …rm 1, Y 01 · YF1 . Since S2(YT; YS) is strictly increasing in YS for
all YS < YS2; the ordering maxfYT ; Y 01g · YF1 < bY2 < YL2 = YM2 < YS2 implies that
S2(YT;maxfYT ; Y 01g) < S2(YT; bY2). We conclude that reducing capacity later than YF1
cannot be a pro…table deviation strategy for …rm 2.
Now suppose that …rm 1 deviates to some threshold YT 2 (YF1 ; YL2). Since …rm 1
conditionally on being assigned to the follower’s role does not reduce capacity before YF1
anyway, …rm 1’s payo¤ is not a¤ected by this modi…ed choice of the adoption date of
the leader’s role. If …rm 1 deviates to even earlier exercise thresholds YT ¸ YL2 , then
it either becomes the leader at YT > YL2 or …rms move simultaneously at YT = YL2 .
Conditionally on getting assigned to the leader’s role or moving jointly at YT , from the
above derivations, …rm 1’s payo¤ is known not to be greater than S1(YT; L1). Further,
note that equation (2.34) that implicitly de…nes bY1 can be rewritten as
S1(YT; L1) = ET
264 bT1Z
T
e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)R (q; q)¡ C1q] dt+ e¡½( bT1¡T)F1 ³bY1´
375 :
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In equilibrium …rm 1 gets
ET
264 TL2Z
T
e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)R (q; q)¡ C1q] dt+ e¡½(TL2¡T)F1 (YL2)
375 :
By substracting the former expression from the equilibrium payo¤, we obtain
ET[e¡½(TL2¡T)F1 (YL2)¡ e¡½(bT1¡T)F1
³bY1´
¡
bT1Z
TL2
e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)R (q; q)¡ C1q] dt]
=
R
¡
q; q
¢¡R (q; q)
±
24µYL2
YT
¶¡¯
YL2 ¡
Ã bY1
YT
!¡¯ bY1
35 ¸ 0
due to YL2 ¸ bY1. Thus, …rm 1’s payo¤ from deviating to an earlier exercise thresholds
YT > YL2 is strictly smaller than its equilibrium payo¤. Again, we refrain from show-
ing subgame perfection explicitly but refer the reader to the identical-…rm case. This
completes the proof of part (ii).
Proof of part (iii): To prove that the strategy pro…les suggested in part (i) of the
proposition are the only subgame perfect equilibria of the general timing game if YL2 < bY1,
we can resort to the above …ndings. In the proof of part (i) it was shown that any
deviation from the equilibrium exercise threshold YL1 leaves …rm 1 with a strictly smaller
payo¤ than playing its equilibrium strategy. This implies that …rm 1 always has an
incentive to deviate to YL1 from any equilibrium candidate where …rm 1 adopts the
leader’s role at YT 6= YL1 ; while …rm 2 sticks to the equilibrium strategy proposed in part
(i). So none of these candidates is a Nash equilibrium.
Now suppose that …rm 2 does not stick to its equilibrium exercise rule but starts
adopting the leader’s role with probability one when Y (t) …rst hits YT 2 (YF1 ; bY1]. Note
that …rm 1 is indi¤erent between adopting the leader’s role at YL1 or getting assigned
to the follower’s role at bY1. Hence, …rm 1 cannot do better than moving …rst at YL1 in
all subgames that start at YT ¸ YL1 . However, in any (o¤-equilibrium-path) subgame
that starts at YT < YT ; conditionally on no player having moved before YT, …rm 1 has an
incentive to refrain from adopting the leader’s role and to become the follower at YT, since
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F1(YT) > L1(YT) for YT > YF1 according to Lemma 5. So all strategy pro…les such that
…rm 1 reduces capacity at YL1 and …rm 2 plays YT 2 (YF1 ; bY1] are Nash equilibria of the
supergame that starts at YT ¸ YL1 , but they do not satisfy subgame perfection. Finally,
suppose that there exists an equilibrium such that …rm 2 plays YT > bY1. Following our
derivations in the proof of part (ii), it can be shown that …rm 1 prefers to become the
follower at YT ¸ bY1 rather than trying to exercise …rst at YL1 : Since roles are assumed
to behave optimally, …rm 1 reduces capacity at YF1 in this case. However, the proposed
strategy pro…le cannot be a Nash equilibrium: Firm 2 conditionally on getting assigned
to the leader’s role strictly maximizes its payo¤ by exercising its option at YL2 . Since
YL2 < bY1 by assumption, …rm 2 has an incentive to deviate from any equilibrium candidate
involving YT > bY1.
Next we prove that the strategy pro…les suggested in part (ii) of the proposition are
the only subgame perfect equilibria of the general timing game if YL1 = YS1 < bY2 (recall
that the existence of bY2 requires YL2 = YM2). In the proof of part (ii) it was shown
that any deviation from the equilibrium exercise threshold YL2 = YM2 leaves …rm 2 with
a strictly smaller payo¤ than playing its equilibrium strategy. This implies that …rm
2 always has an incentive to deviate to YL2 from any equilibrium candidate where …rm
2 adopts the leader’s role at YT 6= YL2 ; while …rm 1 sticks to the equilibrium strategy
proposed in part (ii). Hence, none of these candidates is a Nash equilibrium.
Now suppose that …rm 1 does not stick to its equilibrium exercise rule but starts
adopting the leader’s role with probability one at YT 2 (YF1 ; bY2]. Note that …rm 2 is
indi¤erent between adopting the leader’s role at YL2 or getting assigned to the follower’s
role at bY2. Hence, …rm 2 cannot do better than moving …rst at YL2 in all subgames that
start at YT ¸ YL2 . However, in any (o¤-equilibrium-path) subgame that starts at YT <
YT ; conditionally on no player having moved before YT, …rm 2 has an incentive to refrain
from adopting the leader’s role and to become the follower at YT, since F2(YT) > L2(YT)
for YT > YF1 according to Lemma 5. So all strategy pro…les such that …rm 2 reduces
capacity at YL2 and …rm 1 plays YT 2 (YF1; bY2] are Nash equilibria of the supergame
that starts at YT ¸ YL2 , but they do not satisfy subgame perfection. Finally, suppose
that there exists an equilibrium such that …rm 1 plays YT > bY2 (implying that …rm 2
follows at minfYF2 ; YT g. However, our derivations in the proof of part (i) implies that,
conditionally on getting assigned to the leader’s role, …rm 1’s payo¤ attains a unique
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global maximum at YL1 . Since YL1 = YS1 < bY2 by assumption, …rm 1 has an incentive to
deviate from any equilibrium candidate involving YT > bY2.
A.12 Proof of Proposition 8
W.l.o.g. let us assume that C1 < C2 holds henceforth. Before proving Proposition 8, we
show the existence and uniqueness of the threshold eY2. In Proposition 8, eY2 has implicitly
been de…ned by equations (2.36) and (2.37) for YT ¸ YL2 . The …rst condition can be
rewritten as
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At the least upper bound of eY2, eY2 = YL2 , the left-hand side of the above equation
becomes
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where ¡ = (R(q; q) ¡ R(q; q))=(R(q; q) ¡ R(q; q)) > 1. The resulting expression can be
shown to be strictly positive due to YL2 > YF2 > YF1. At the greatest lower bound of eY2,eY2 = YF2, one obtains
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for the left-hand side. Due to YF2 < YL2 = YM2 the former expression in square brackets
turns out to be strictly negative. However, the latter expression in square brackets is
obviously strictly positive. Whether the positive or the negative terms dominate cannot
be determined generally. It depends on the speci…c parameterization of the model. If the
positive terms dominate, then equation (2.36) cannot be satis…ed for any eY2 2 (YF2 ; YL2),
since the partial derivative of the condition’s left-hand side terms with respect to eY2 is
strictly greater than zero for all eY2 > 0: However, in this case the complementary equation
(2.37) must hold for some eY2 2 (YF1 ; YF2 ] as we will show immediately. Equation (2.37)
can be written as
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At the greatest lower bound of eY2, eY2 = YF1 , one yields
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for the left-hand side. However, due to YF1 < YL2 = YM2 this expression can be shown
to be strictly smaller than zero. At the least upper bound of eY2, eY2 = YF2 , the left-hand
side of the above equation is identical to equation (2.36) evaluated at its greatest lower
bound, eY2 = YF2. Since the partial derivative of the left-hand side of equation (2.37) with
respect to eY2;
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¢
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;
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turns out to be strictly positive due to eY2 < YL2 < YS2 ; there must exist a unique eY2 that
satis…es either equation (2.36) or equation (2.37).
Proof of part (i): Note that all equilibrium strategies satisfy the intertemporal con-
sistency condition in De…nition 3. We have YL1 ¸ eY2 by assumption. Let us begin
to analyze the equilibrium strategy pro…le where the low-cost-…rm (…rm 1) adopts the
leader’s role at YL1 and …rm 2’s probability of adopting the leader’s role jumps to one at
or after YF1.
First, suppose that CjCL=C1 · R2 < 1 , maxfYM1; YF2g = YF2 and, therefore,
YL1 = minfYF2 ; YS1g. Due to YL1 · YF2 …rm 2 is known to exercise its closure option
immediately after …rm 1 has done so. Thus, …rm 1 yields S1(YT; YL1). Proposition 1
implies that, if the low-cost …rm gets assigned to the leader’s role, then its payo¤ attains a
unique global maximum at minfYF2 ; YS1g = YL1 (note that R1 · CjCL=C1 , YF2 · YS1).
Thus, …rm 1 does not have any incentive to deviate to YT > YL1 or YT 2 (YF1 ; YL1).
Moreover, by deviating to some YT · YF1 ; …rm 1 yields S1(YT;maxfYT ; Y 02g), Y 02 · YF1 .
As S1(YT; YS) is strictly increasing in YS for all YS < YS1 , the ordering maxfYT ; Y 02g ·
YF1 < YL1 · YS1 implies that S1(YT;maxfYT ; Y 02g) < S1(YT; YL1). We conclude that
reducing capacity later than YF1 cannot be a pro…table deviation strategy for …rm 1.
Now suppose that …rm 2 deviates to some threshold YT 2 (YF1 ; YL1 ]. Since …rm 2
immediately follows …rm 1 at YL1 anyway, …rm 2’s payo¤ is not a¤ected by this modi…ed
choice of the adoption date of the leader’s role. If …rm 2 deviates to even earlier exercise
thresholds YT > YL1 , then it becomes the leader at YT . Conditionally on the high-
cost …rm getting assigned to the leader’s role, we known from Proposition 1 that …rm
2 maximizes its deviation payo¤ by adopting the leader’s role at YL2 = YM2 (note that
CjCL=C2 > 1 > R2 , YM2 > YF1). From the assumption YL1 = minfYF2 ; YS1g ¸ eY2 it
follows that eY2 2 (YF1 ; YF2 ]. Then equation (2.37) says that …rm 2 is indi¤erent between
deviating to YL2 = YM2 and moving simultaneously at eY2: Both alternatives generate a
payo¤ that equals S2(YT; eY2): Since S2(YT; YS) is strictly increasing in YS for all YS < YS2 ,eY2 · YL1 = minfYF2 ; YS1g < YS2 implies that the payo¤ from deviation is not greater than
…rm 2’s equilibrium payo¤ S2(YT; YL1). Thus, neither …rm 1 nor …rm 2 has an incentive
to deviate from the proposed equilibrium. The reader should notice that YL1 ¸ eY2 is a
critical assumption. As we stressed above, one may …nd a parameterization of the model
such that eY2 2 (YF2 ; YL2) for all CjCL=C1 , R1 and R2 with CjCL=C1 · R2. In this case
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YL1 = minfYF2 ; YS1g ¸ eY2 can never occur and …rm 2 has always an incentive to deviate
from the suggested joint-reduction strategy pro…le.
Second, suppose that R2 < CjCL=C1 < 1 , maxfYM1 ; YF2g = YM1 and, therefore,
YL1 = YM1 . Following an analogous line of arguments as in the previous case reveals that
…rm 1 neither prefers to deviate to earlier nor to later exercise thresholds. Similar, …rm 2
is indi¤erent between trying to adopt the leader’s role at some YT · (YF1 ; YL1) or sticking
to one of the equilibrium strategies, since its payo¤ does not change. Playing YT = YL1
as a deviation strategy leaves …rm 2 with a payo¤ of S2(YT; YL1), while its equilibrium
payo¤ amounts to
ET
264 TL1Z
T
e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)R (q; q)¡ C2q] dt+ e¡½(TL1¡T)F2 (YL1)
375 :
Since I2(YT ) < F2(YT ) for all YT ¸ YF2 according to Lemma 5, YL1 > YF2 implies that
…rm 2’s equilibrium payo¤ exceeds S2(YT; YL1). Finally, if …rm 2 deviates to YT > YL1 , it
becomes the leader. As we pointed out above, …rm 2 maximizes its payo¤ from deviation
by adopting the leader’s at YL2 = YM2 . According to equations (2.36) and (2.37), this
deviation payo¤ either equals S2(YT; eY2) for eY2 2 (YF1 ; YF2 ] or
ET
264 eT2Z
T
e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)R (q; q)¡ C2q] dt+ e¡½(eT2¡T)F2 ³eY2´
375
for eY2 2 (YF2 ; YL2). Because I2(YT ) < F2(YT ) for all YT ¸ YF2; S2(YT; YS) increases for all
YS < YS2 and YL2 < YS2, the latter payo¤ exceeds the former payo¤, S2(YT; eY2). Let us
compare this maximum payo¤ from deviation with the equilibrium payo¤. If the strategy
pro…le proposed above is indeed an equilibrium, we should have
ET
264¡ eT2Z
TL1
e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)R (q; q)¡ C2q] dt
+e¡½(TL1¡T)F2 (YL1)¡ e¡½( eT2¡T)F2
³eY2´i ¸ 0 :
In the proof of part (ii) of Proposition 7 an almost identical expression was already shown
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to be strictly positive. We conclude that the proposed strategy pro…le that involves
sequential disinvestment with …rm 1 being the leader is indeed an equilibrium if YL1 =
YM1 ¸ eY2. Again, we stress that YL1 ¸ eY2 might be a critical assumption.
Let us investigate the equilibrium strategy pro…le where …rm 2 adopts the leader’s role
at YL2 = YM2 and …rm 1 follows and reduces capacity at YF1 . A similar line of arguments
as we applied above suggests that …rm 2 cannot do better than reducing capacity at
YL2 conditionally on being assigned to the leader’s role. Thus, …rm 2 does not have any
incentive to deviate to some YT 2 (YF1; YL2) or YT > YL2. If …rm 2 deviates to even later
thresholds, YT · YF1 ; it yields S2(YT;maxfYT ; Y 01g), Y 01 · YF1 . As S2(YT; YS) is strictly
increasing in YS for all YS < YS2, the ordering maxfYT ; Y 01g · YF1 < eY2 < YL2 < YS2
implies that the deviation payo¤, S2(YT;maxfYT ; Y 01g), is strictly smaller than the lower
bound to …rm 2’s equilibrium payo¤, S2(YT; eY2). Firm 1’s payo¤ does not vary if it
deviates to an earlier threshold YT 2 (YF1; YL2). By playing YT = YL2 ; …rm 1 obtains
S1(YT; YL2) which is known to be strictly smaller than its equilibrium payo¤
ET
264 TL2Z
T
e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)R (q; q)¡ C2q] dt+ e¡½(TL2¡T)F1 (YL2)
375
(see previous derivations of almost identical expressions). If …rm 1 brings forward its
adoption date to some YT > YL2 , then it becomes the leader at YT . From Proposition 1
we know that the payo¤ of the leader who exhibits variable cost of C1 is decreasing in
YT > YL1 = minfmaxfYM1; YF2g; YS1g. Since YL2 > YL1 ,
ET
264 TL2Z
T
e¡½(t¡T) [Y (t)R (q; q)¡ C2q] dt+ e¡½(TL2¡T)L1 (YL2)
375
represents an upper bound to the payo¤ from deviating to YT > YL2. Because L1(YT ) <
F1(YT ) for all YT > YF1 according to Lemma 5, we can conclude that the maximum pay-
o¤ from deviation is strictly smaller than the equilibrium payo¤. Thus, the equilibrium
strategy pro…le generating a sequential disinvestment pattern with the high-cost …rm as
the leader is always an equilibrium irrespective of the concrete parameter constellation.
We refrain from proving subgame perfection explicitly. However, this can easily be ac-
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complished by following a similar line of arguments as in the identical-…rm case. This
completes the proof of part (i).
Proof of part (ii): Our considerations in part (i) immediately imply that …rm 2 always
has an incentive to take over the leader’s role if YL1 < eY2. Thus, the joint-reduction
equilibrium outcome and the sequential disinvestment scenario with …rm 1 becoming the
leader vanishes in this case. It remains to be shown that there does not exist any other
subgame perfect equilibrium of the general closure timing game. Again, we can resort
to earlier …ndings. First, consider those equilibria where …rm 1 adopts the leader’s role
at YL1 and …rm 2’s probability of adoption does not raise before YF1. It was shown that
any deviation from the equilibrium exercise threshold YL1 leaves …rm 1 with a strictly
smaller payo¤ than playing its equilibrium strategy. This implies that …rm 1 always has
an incentive to deviate to YL1 from any equilibrium candidate where …rm 1 adopts the
leader’s role at YT 6= YL1 ; while …rm 2 sticks to its equilibrium strategy proposed in part
(i). So none of these candidates is a Nash equilibrium.
Now suppose that …rm 2 does not stick to its equilibrium exercise rule but starts
adopting the leader’s role with probability one at YT 2 (YF1 ; eY1]. Let eY1 be de…ned
such that …rm 1 is indi¤erent between getting assigned to the follower’s role at eY1 and
adopting the leader’s role at YL1. Existence and uniqueness can be shown equivalently
to the considerations on bY1 in the proof of Proposition 7. Hence, …rm 1 cannot do better
than moving …rst at YL1 in all subgames that start at YT ¸ YL1 . However, in any (o¤-
equilibrium-path) subgame that starts at YT < YT ; conditionally on no player having
moved before YT, …rm 1 has an incentive to refrain from adopting the leader’s role and
to become the follower at YT, since F1(YT) > L1(YT) for YT > YF1 according to Lemma
5. So all strategy pro…les such that …rm 1 reduces capacity at YL1 and …rm 2 plays
YT 2 (YF1 ; eY1] are Nash equilibria of the supergame that starts at YT ¸ YL1, but they do
not satisfy subgame perfection. Finally, suppose that there exists an equilibrium such
that …rm 2 plays YT > eY1. Following our derivations in the proof of part (i), it can be
shown that …rm 1 prefers to become the follower at YT > eY1 rather than trying to exercise
…rst at YL1 : Since roles are assumed to behave optimally, …rm 1 reduces capacity at YF1
in this case. However, the proposed strategy pro…le cannot be a Nash equilibrium: Firm
2 conditionally on getting assigned to the leader’s role strictly maximizes its payo¤ by
exercising its option at YL2 . Thus, …rm 2 has an incentive to deviate from any equilibrium
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candidate that involves YT 6= YL2.
Next we analyze the equilibrium strategy pro…les where …rm 2 adopts the leader’s
role at YL2 and …rm 1 does not raise its adoption probability before YF1 . It was shown
that any deviation from the equilibrium exercise threshold YL2 = YM2 leaves …rm 2 with
a strictly smaller payo¤ than playing its equilibrium strategy. This implies that …rm 2
always has an incentive to deviate to YL2 from any equilibrium candidate where it adopts
the leader’s role at YT 6= YL2 ; while …rm 1 sticks to the equilibrium strategy proposed in
part (i). Hence, none of these candidates is a Nash equilibrium.
Now suppose that …rm 1 does not stick to its equilibrium exercise rule but starts
adopting the leader’s role with probability one at YT 2 (YF1 ; eY2]. Recall that …rm 2 is
indi¤erent between adopting the leader’s role at YL2 or getting assigned to the follower’s
role at eY2. Hence, …rm 2 cannot do better than moving …rst at YL2 in all subgames that
start at YT ¸ YL2 . However, in any (o¤-equilibrium-path) subgame that starts at YT <
YT ; conditionally on no player having moved before YT, …rm 2 has an incentive to refrain
from adopting the leader’s role and to become the follower at YT, since F2(YT) > L2(YT)
for YT > YF1 . So all strategy pro…les such that …rm 2 reduces capacity at YL2 and …rm
1 plays YT 2 (YF1 ; eY2] are Nash equilibria of the supergame that starts at YT ¸ YL2 , but
they do not satisfy subgame perfection. Finally, suppose that there exists an equilibrium
such that …rm 1 plays YT > eY2 (implying that …rm 2 reduces capacity at minfYF2 ; YT g).
Our derivations in the proof of part (i) implies that, conditionally on getting assigned
to the leader’s role, …rm 1’s payo¤ attains a unique global maximum at YL1. Thus, …rm
1 has an incentive to deviate from any equilibrium candidate involving YT 6= YL1. This
completes the proof of Proposition 7.
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Appendix B
Proofs of Chapter 3
B.1 Proof of Proposition 9
Proof of part (i): Imagine a price-taking …rm that is equipped with the option to extend
capacity from q to q. If YT is smaller than its optimal closure threshold YP ; the price
taker has the following value,
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where TP = inf(t > T jY (t) · YP ). The partial derivative of ¨(YT) with respect to YP ;
@¨
@YP
= (¯ ¡ 1)
µ
YT
YP
¶¯ D ¡2q¢ ¡q ¡ q¢
±
Ã
¯
¯ ¡ 1
±E
YPD
¡
2q
¢ ¡
q ¡ q¢ ¡ 1
!
;
has its unique root at
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¢ ¡
q ¡ q¢ :
>From the second-order condition, YP > 0 is known to be the unique global maximizer.
Proof of part (ii): Principally, the monopolist may decide to invest in additional
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capacity sequentially or to extend capacity in a single step from 2q to 2q. That is, either
he chooses two distinct investment thresholds Y 0O and Y
00
O , Y
0
O < Y
00
O , or he exercises
both options simultaneously at YO. Suppose that a sequential disinvestment pattern is
optimal. Then Y 0O and Y
00
O ; Y
0
O < Y
00
O , are the solutions to the maximization problem
maxY 0O ;Y 00O O
seq(YT) with
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E];
T 0O = inf(t ¸ T jY (t) · Y 0O ) and T 00O = inf(t ¸ T jY (t) · Y 00O ). The monopolist’s value
function can be expressed in terms of the closure thresholds,
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The …rst-order condition with respect to Y 0O,
1¡ ¯
±
µ
YT
Y 0O
¶¯ µ
R
¡
q; q
¢
+R
¡
q; q
¢¡ 2R ¡q; q¢¡ ¯
¯ ¡ 1
±E
Y 0O
¶
= 0;
is satis…ed for
Y 0O =
¯
¯ ¡ 1
±E
R
¡
q; q
¢
+R
¡
q; q
¢¡ 2R ¡q; q¢ :
The second-order condition reveals that Y 0O is a global maximizer of O
seq. With respect
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to Y 00O a similar result is obtained. The maximizing argument turns out to be
Y 00O =
¯
¯ ¡ 1
±E
2R (q; q)¡R ¡q; q¢¡R ¡q; q¢ :
Substracting the denominator in the expression for Y 00O from the denominator of Y
0
O yields
2
£
R
¡
q; q
¢¡R ¡q; q¢¡R (q; q) +R ¡q; q¢¤
which is greater than zero due to the assumption of …rst-mover advantages. Thus, we
have Y 0O < Y
00
O verifying our initial assertion.
Proof of part (iii): Recall condition (2.3) in section 2.1. Then YM > YP immediately
follows from D(2q)(q ¡ q) > R(q; q) ¡ R(q; q) , D(2q) > D(q + q). YM < Y 0O is an
implication of the fact that R(q; q) +R(q; q)¡ 2R(q; q) < R(q; q)¡R(q; q) , R(q; q) <
R(q; q). Finally, Y 0O < YS¤ and YS¤ < Y
00
O is satis…ed due to R(q; q)¡R(q; q) < R(q; q) +
R(q; q)¡ 2R(q; q) , R(q; q)¡R(q; q) < R(q; q)¡R(q; q) and 2R(q; q)¡R(q; q)¡R(q; q)
< R(q; q)¡R(q; q) , R(q; q)¡R(q; q) < R(q; q)¡R(q; q), respectively. This completes
the proof of Proposition 10.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 10
The ordering YRE < YP immediately follows from the de…nition of YRE and from L(YP ) >
F (YP ). The validity of the latter inequality can be veri…ed by calculating the di¤erence
L(YP )¡ F (YP ). According to equations (3.1) and (3.4) one obtains
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According to equation (3.9) E can be replaced by
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:
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Due to R(q; q)¡R(q; q) = D(q + q)(q ¡ q) we can write
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If YF = YP ; then L (YP )¡ F (YP ) would equal zero. However, YF > YP and
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by using the de…nitions of YF annd YP in equations (3.2) and (3.9), respectively. Since
D
¡
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q ¡ q¢
D (2q) q ¡D ¡q + q¢ q > D
¡
2q
¢
D
¡
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¢ , D ¡q + q¢ > D (2q) ;
one yields @ [L (YP )¡ F (YP )] =@YF > 0 and, therefore, L (YP ) > F (YP ). This completes
the proof of Proposition 11.
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